yazmasamolmazmıydı

One potential flashpoint with the upcoming Turkish maritime law will be the islet of Zürafa/Ladoxera. If the law, for example, explicitly mentions the island as annexed territory, or leads to direct or symbolic efforts to assert Turkish sovereignty, that’ll be quite provocative

Ο λύκος πεινάει. Θέλει γη

My friend, This trio of treaties looks impressive in citation, but it does not survive a reading of the actual texts. Taken in order: 1) Article 12 of Lausanne does not say what you claim it says. Article 12 assigns specific islands to Greece and specific islands to Turkey. Among the features assigned to Turkey are “all islands situated at less than three miles from the Asiatic coast.” Article 12 contains no clause stating that “everything beyond three miles belongs to Greece.” The reading you have cited is not in the text — it is an assumption inserted into it. There is a fundamental difference between “X belongs to Turkey” and “everything that is not X belongs to Greece.” The treaty makes the first statement. It does not make the second. 2) The 1932 Italo-Turkish Agreements covered only specifically enumerated groups of islets (particularly around Kastellorizo). They do not cover the approximately 152 small features — rocks, islets, formations — scattered across the Aegean. More importantly: Greece was not a party to those agreements. Pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt — a treaty cannot create rights for third parties. To invoke 1932 instruments as a basis for Greek sovereignty is to repudiate one of the most elementary rules of international law. 3) Article 14 of the 1947 Paris Treaty effected a transfer from Italy to Greece. Nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse habet — no one can transfer rights they do not themselves possess. Italy held sovereignty over only the features defined in the 1932 agreements; for features outside that scope, Italy possessed no sovereignty to transfer. Furthermore, Paris Article 14(2) bound the transfer with an explicit demilitarization condition: “These islands shall be and shall remain demilitarised.” That condition has been in continuous breach for sixty years. Where do the 152 Islands, Islets and Rocks of Unsettled Treaty Status in the Aegean features fit? Precisely here: in the grey zone that none of the three treaties expressly covers, and whose status therefore remains legally unsettled. The Turkish Foreign Ministry’s concept of EGAYDAAK (Islands, Islets and Rocks the Sovereignty Over Which Has Not Been Transferred to Greece by Treaty) names this grey zone explicitly. This is not theoretical speculation. The 1996 Kardak/Imia crisis arose directly from this legal lacuna. If sovereignty had been “resolved 100 years ago,” two NATO allies would not have been brought to the brink of war over a pair of rocks. The crisis itself is the proof that the question is not resolved. There is a more telling question still: if Greek sovereignty over these features is genuinely indisputable, why did Greece not refer Kardak to the International Court of Justice? The answer lies in the jurisprudence itself. Eritrea v. Yemen (1998), Indonesia v. Malaysia (Sipadan and Ligitan) (2002), Singapore v. Malaysia (Pedra Branca) (2008) — these cases resolve disputed island sovereignty through the doctrine of effectivités, meaning effective administration. For the Aegean grey-zone features, the record of effective administration is mixed and the outcome is genuinely uncertain. Greece understands this. That is why Greece does not bring the question to the bench. Summary: — Lausanne Article 12 does not assign “everything beyond three miles” to Greece; it assigns the features within three miles of the Anatolian coast to Turkey. — The 1932 Italo-Turkish instruments do not bind Greece (pacta tertiis) and cover only a limited set of features. — Paris 1947 can transfer no more than Italy itself held (nemo plus iuris) and is bound by the demilitarization condition. — The 152 EGAYDAAK features are not fully covered by any of the three treaties — and that fact is the legal foundation of the Turkish positioThe 1996 Kardak crisis is the concrete proof of the lacuna. — Greek refusal to litigate sovereignty is the admission of awareness of that lacuna. Citing three treaties is not sufficient; one must read them.

My friend, This trio of treaties looks impressive in citation, but it does not survive a reading of the actual texts. Taken in order: 1) Article 12 of Lausanne does not say what you claim it says. Article 12 assigns specific islands to Greece and specific islands to Turkey. Among the features assigned to Turkey are “all islands situated at less than three miles from the Asiatic coast.” Article 12 contains no clause stating that “everything beyond three miles belongs to Greece.” The reading you have cited is not in the text — it is an assumption inserted into it. There is a fundamental difference between “X belongs to Turkey” and “everything that is not X belongs to Greece.” The treaty makes the first statement. It does not make the second. 2) The 1932 Italo-Turkish Agreements covered only specifically enumerated groups of islets (particularly around Kastellorizo). They do not cover the approximately 152 small features — rocks, islets, formations — scattered across the Aegean. More importantly: Greece was not a party to those agreements. Pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt — a treaty cannot create rights for third parties. To invoke 1932 instruments as a basis for Greek sovereignty is to repudiate one of the most elementary rules of international law. 3) Article 14 of the 1947 Paris Treaty effected a transfer from Italy to Greece. Nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse habet — no one can transfer rights they do not themselves possess. Italy held sovereignty over only the features defined in the 1932 agreements; for features outside that scope, Italy possessed no sovereignty to transfer. Furthermore, Paris Article 14(2) bound the transfer with an explicit demilitarization condition: “These islands shall be and shall remain demilitarised.” That condition has been in continuous breach for sixty years. Where do the 152 Islands, Islets and Rocks of Unsettled Treaty Status in the Aegean features fit? Precisely here: in the grey zone that none of the three treaties expressly covers, and whose status therefore remains legally unsettled. The Turkish Foreign Ministry’s concept of EGAYDAAK (Islands, Islets and Rocks the Sovereignty Over Which Has Not Been Transferred to Greece by Treaty) names this grey zone explicitly. This is not theoretical speculation. The 1996 Kardak/Imia crisis arose directly from this legal lacuna. If sovereignty had been “resolved 100 years ago,” two NATO allies would not have been brought to the brink of war over a pair of rocks. The crisis itself is the proof that the question is not resolved. There is a more telling question still: if Greek sovereignty over these features is genuinely indisputable, why did Greece not refer Kardak to the International Court of Justice? The answer lies in the jurisprudence itself. Eritrea v. Yemen (1998), Indonesia v. Malaysia (Sipadan and Ligitan) (2002), Singapore v. Malaysia (Pedra Branca) (2008) — these cases resolve disputed island sovereignty through the doctrine of effectivités, meaning effective administration. For the Aegean grey-zone features, the record of effective administration is mixed and the outcome is genuinely uncertain. Greece understands this. That is why Greece does not bring the question to the bench. Summary: — Lausanne Article 12 does not assign “everything beyond three miles” to Greece; it assigns the features within three miles of the Anatolian coast to Turkey. — The 1932 Italo-Turkish instruments do not bind Greece (pacta tertiis) and cover only a limited set of features. — Paris 1947 can transfer no more than Italy itself held (nemo plus iuris) and is bound by the demilitarization condition. — The 152 EGAYDAAK features are not fully covered by any of the three treaties — and that fact is the legal foundation of the Turkish positioThe 1996 Kardak crisis is the concrete proof of the lacuna. — Greek refusal to litigate sovereignty is the admission of awareness of that lacuna. Citing three treaties is not sufficient; one must read them.

My friend, This trio of treaties looks impressive in citation, but it does not survive a reading of the actual texts. Taken in order: 1) Article 12 of Lausanne does not say what you claim it says. Article 12 assigns specific islands to Greece and specific islands to Turkey. Among the features assigned to Turkey are “all islands situated at less than three miles from the Asiatic coast.” Article 12 contains no clause stating that “everything beyond three miles belongs to Greece.” The reading you have cited is not in the text — it is an assumption inserted into it. There is a fundamental difference between “X belongs to Turkey” and “everything that is not X belongs to Greece.” The treaty makes the first statement. It does not make the second. 2) The 1932 Italo-Turkish Agreements covered only specifically enumerated groups of islets (particularly around Kastellorizo). They do not cover the approximately 152 small features — rocks, islets, formations — scattered across the Aegean. More importantly: Greece was not a party to those agreements. Pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt — a treaty cannot create rights for third parties. To invoke 1932 instruments as a basis for Greek sovereignty is to repudiate one of the most elementary rules of international law. 3) Article 14 of the 1947 Paris Treaty effected a transfer from Italy to Greece. Nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse habet — no one can transfer rights they do not themselves possess. Italy held sovereignty over only the features defined in the 1932 agreements; for features outside that scope, Italy possessed no sovereignty to transfer. Furthermore, Paris Article 14(2) bound the transfer with an explicit demilitarization condition: “These islands shall be and shall remain demilitarised.” That condition has been in continuous breach for sixty years. Where do the 152 Islands, Islets and Rocks of Unsettled Treaty Status in the Aegean features fit? Precisely here: in the grey zone that none of the three treaties expressly covers, and whose status therefore remains legally unsettled. The Turkish Foreign Ministry’s concept of EGAYDAAK (Islands, Islets and Rocks the Sovereignty Over Which Has Not Been Transferred to Greece by Treaty) names this grey zone explicitly. This is not theoretical speculation. The 1996 Kardak/Imia crisis arose directly from this legal lacuna. If sovereignty had been “resolved 100 years ago,” two NATO allies would not have been brought to the brink of war over a pair of rocks. The crisis itself is the proof that the question is not resolved. There is a more telling question still: if Greek sovereignty over these features is genuinely indisputable, why did Greece not refer Kardak to the International Court of Justice? The answer lies in the jurisprudence itself. Eritrea v. Yemen (1998), Indonesia v. Malaysia (Sipadan and Ligitan) (2002), Singapore v. Malaysia (Pedra Branca) (2008) — these cases resolve disputed island sovereignty through the doctrine of effectivités, meaning effective administration. For the Aegean grey-zone features, the record of effective administration is mixed and the outcome is genuinely uncertain. Greece understands this. That is why Greece does not bring the question to the bench. Summary: — Lausanne Article 12 does not assign “everything beyond three miles” to Greece; it assigns the features within three miles of the Anatolian coast to Turkey. — The 1932 Italo-Turkish instruments do not bind Greece (pacta tertiis) and cover only a limited set of features. — Paris 1947 can transfer no more than Italy itself held (nemo plus iuris) and is bound by the demilitarization condition. — The 152 EGAYDAAK features are not fully covered by any of the three treaties — and that fact is the legal foundation of the Turkish positioThe 1996 Kardak crisis is the concrete proof of the lacuna. — Greek refusal to litigate sovereignty is the admission of awareness of that lacuna. Citing three treaties is not sufficient; one must read them.

My friend, This trio of treaties looks impressive in citation, but it does not survive a reading of the actual texts. Taken in order: 1) Article 12 of Lausanne does not say what you claim it says. Article 12 assigns specific islands to Greece and specific islands to Turkey. Among the features assigned to Turkey are “all islands situated at less than three miles from the Asiatic coast.” Article 12 contains no clause stating that “everything beyond three miles belongs to Greece.” The reading you have cited is not in the text — it is an assumption inserted into it. There is a fundamental difference between “X belongs to Turkey” and “everything that is not X belongs to Greece.” The treaty makes the first statement. It does not make the second. 2) The 1932 Italo-Turkish Agreements covered only specifically enumerated groups of islets (particularly around Kastellorizo). They do not cover the approximately 152 small features — rocks, islets, formations — scattered across the Aegean. More importantly: Greece was not a party to those agreements. Pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt — a treaty cannot create rights for third parties. To invoke 1932 instruments as a basis for Greek sovereignty is to repudiate one of the most elementary rules of international law. 3) Article 14 of the 1947 Paris Treaty effected a transfer from Italy to Greece. Nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse habet — no one can transfer rights they do not themselves possess. Italy held sovereignty over only the features defined in the 1932 agreements; for features outside that scope, Italy possessed no sovereignty to transfer. Furthermore, Paris Article 14(2) bound the transfer with an explicit demilitarization condition: “These islands shall be and shall remain demilitarised.” That condition has been in continuous breach for sixty years. Where do the 152 Islands, Islets and Rocks of Unsettled Treaty Status in the Aegean features fit? Precisely here: in the grey zone that none of the three treaties expressly covers, and whose status therefore remains legally unsettled. The Turkish Foreign Ministry’s concept of EGAYDAAK (Islands, Islets and Rocks the Sovereignty Over Which Has Not Been Transferred to Greece by Treaty) names this grey zone explicitly. This is not theoretical speculation. The 1996 Kardak/Imia crisis arose directly from this legal lacuna. If sovereignty had been “resolved 100 years ago,” two NATO allies would not have been brought to the brink of war over a pair of rocks. The crisis itself is the proof that the question is not resolved. There is a more telling question still: if Greek sovereignty over these features is genuinely indisputable, why did Greece not refer Kardak to the International Court of Justice? The answer lies in the jurisprudence itself. Eritrea v. Yemen (1998), Indonesia v. Malaysia (Sipadan and Ligitan) (2002), Singapore v. Malaysia (Pedra Branca) (2008) — these cases resolve disputed island sovereignty through the doctrine of effectivités, meaning effective administration. For the Aegean grey-zone features, the record of effective administration is mixed and the outcome is genuinely uncertain. Greece understands this. That is why Greece does not bring the question to the bench. Summary: — Lausanne Article 12 does not assign “everything beyond three miles” to Greece; it assigns the features within three miles of the Anatolian coast to Turkey. — The 1932 Italo-Turkish instruments do not bind Greece (pacta tertiis) and cover only a limited set of features. — Paris 1947 can transfer no more than Italy itself held (nemo plus iuris) and is bound by the demilitarization condition. — The 152 EGAYDAAK features are not fully covered by any of the three treaties — and that fact is the legal foundation of the Turkish positioThe 1996 Kardak crisis is the concrete proof of the lacuna. — Greek refusal to litigate sovereignty is the admission of awareness of that lacuna. Citing three treaties is not sufficient; one must read them.