uLand

@ensvision QATAROIL.ETH

Your first .eth name. What was it? Not your best one. Not your most valuable. The FIRST one — the name that got you into ENS. Do you still own it? Did it become your main? Or is it retired in a wallet somewhere, still renewed every year for sentimental reasons? Drop it below. First-name stories are the best stories in this space. 👇 🧡 ensvision.com #ENS #ETH #Web3Identity

@ofc_the_club England 3 France 3 Penalty 4:5

One last battle before World Cup Final. Who's taking home the bronze? 🥉 👀 ▫️Follow @ofc_the_club ▫️Drop your exact score prediction in the comments One lucky winner might receive a small gift 🤝

@MrBeast @LudwigAhgren @qtcinderella SheSaidYes.ETH VS MrsBeast.ETH 🤔

@LudwigAhgren @qtcinderella :D

she said #yes !

@Walodja1987 @CryptoIgzeee That's exactly what I meant. In my opinion, this is an overly complicated way to promote it and the wrong audience. It sounds more like a cry from the heart or a call to join some kind of cult, no offense.😉 After all, we're all "Ethereum witnesses" here.🤗

@ULandPro @CryptoIgzeee I offer it opportunistically. It’s not an official namespace-drop campaign. These are take-it-or-leave-it-offers. A free option. It may help with adoption but it’s not the main utility of XNS. I don’t mind owning the namespaces myself.

🚨 trusthub.eth is for sale — 10 ETH A strong ENS name for anyone building in digital identity, trust infrastructure, AI agents, credentials, security, reputation, or Web3 verification. Clean. Brandable. Memorable. DM if interested. Serious offers only.

@Walodja1987 @CryptoIgzeee I think you still need to refine the concept and come with a clear commercial proposal for brokers. Right now it’s not very obvious what the actual financial benefit and long-term prospects of collaboration would be.

@ULandPro @CryptoIgzeee It’s a bonus. People should push it because of its utility and not because of the fees they earn. You can also create namespaces that have higher prices, eg 1 ETH or even more.

@Walodja1987 @CryptoIgzeee With names at 0.001 ETH (~$1.78), your 10% cut is only ~$0.18 per registration. Offering the same to namespace owners doesn’t look like a strong incentive. Hard to see why anyone would push XNS for that kind of revenue.💸

You can’t win by being nice. It’s David vs Goliath with a $350m warchess. They can own a namespace and earn 10% of registration fees. I’m offering it to anyone who wants to integrate or promote XNS. It’s sort of an airdrop. My profit is 10% of all name registrations. I’m transparent about that. But I won’t get rich as most names cost 0.001 ETH and 80% is burned.

@Walodja1987 @CryptoIgzeee I understand it was your personal experience. Still, I’ll stick to my opinion. The idea itself isn’t bad, but the way it’s being executed feels off to me. Also, it’s strange to say you’re not doing this for profit while offering the model to brokers whose goal is making money.🤔

Someone’s bad experience? It was me who sent the payment to a wrong address. I was directly involved. Even if I was not involved, people should learn from mistakes and improve, especially when it comes to handling money flows. It’s not like visiting a website that will display different content. I will keep informing people. You may not like my style, and it’s fine for me. I’m not here to make money. I am here to make transacting with on Ethereum simple and safe. I spare you the posts from ENS domainers about competing name services.

@Walodja1987 @CryptoIgzeee I’m not sure it’s a good idea to build your project on someone else’s bad experience and loss. It would probably be better if you focused on XNS’s own advantages instead of using that kind of vibe.

My aggressive anti-ENS stance comes from an incident where one of my friends lost money, because he didn‘t realize that his ENS name expired and someone else registered it. He kept sharing his ENS name with me for payments and one payment ($3k) went to the new subscriber (see screenshot). ENS guys were laughing at him, saying it’s a skill issue. That event was my main motivation to build a better naming system where this cannot happen. While on it, I fixed many other issues that ENS has (read here: x.com/xnsname/status…) Some people only learn when they experience a loss themselves. The XNS contract is emotionless. You can integrate it without liking my attitude towards ENS. You do it for your users. Not for me. 🤝

Launching an ENS brokerage service and I want to showcase some of the most epic names on our website please comment your names below 👇

@CryptoIgzeee @Walodja1987 This guy is building XNS, a permanent non-transferable naming system on Ethereum. It’s a solid idea, but his aggressive anti-ENS stance makes collaborations difficult. Most importantly, with no secondary market, he should focus his limited time on end users instead of brokers.

@Walodja1987 can i be on your DAO?

SOLDEX.ETH serves as the perfect digital identity for serious DeFi builders, elite traders & visionaries. Solid solutions. Real dexterity. uland.pro/soldex-eth/ #DeFi #Web3 #DEX #IDENTITY

@ofc_the_club 2:2 (Penalty 4:3)

MATCHDAY CHALLENGE 🚨 France vs Morocco today 🇫🇷🇲🇦 Comment the exact score below before kickoff! One lucky winner might receive a small gift 🤝

@MrBeast x.com/i/status/20665…

Our gaming channel might one day pass the main channel in views 🤣 Glad everyone is enjoying the vids 🙏🏻

@BrantlyMillegan Whatever you choose next, you'll crush it — you've already proven that. Just go after what genuinely excites you, the thing that makes you want to wake up before the alarm. That's the one worth pouring yourself into.

now that I'm done with ENS, what should I work on next?

@swiss_agency This is a profoundly correct and insightful framing. It offers genuine hope that Ethereum can mature from a collection of isolated applications into the reliable foundation of a decentralized digital economy.

ENS is critical Ethereum infrastructure. This statement conveys far more than simply saying that ENS is important. It moves ENS from the category of applications into the category of foundational infrastructure. The distinction is profound. A decentralised exchange is an application. An NFT marketplace is an application. A blockchain game is an application. Infrastructure, however, is what makes all applications possible. It is the difference between: • a car and a motorway; • a website and the Domain Name System (DNS); • a house and the electricity grid. You rarely notice infrastructure when it works. You only notice it when it fails—or when it is absent. That is the deeper meaning of this statement. If Ethereum is to serve as the infrastructure of a digital economy, it requires: • security; • consensus; • execution; • settlement; • and identity. This is where ENS fits. ENS is not trying to become just another application. It addresses one of the fundamental challenges of the decentralised internet: How do you identify people, organisations, wallets, applications and AI agents in a universal, neutral and permissionless way? That is an infrastructure problem. Not a marketing problem. Not a pricing problem. Not a speculative problem. Ultimately, the value of infrastructure is not measured by how much attention it receives, but by how indispensable it becomes. ENS is not merely building a naming service; it is building the identity layer that users, applications and autonomous agents can share across Ethereum.

@broker_ens A very well-thought-out approach and good set of proposals. Unfortunately, I doubt this will garner support from @nicksdjohnson and $ENS.

My thoughts: DAOs require skin in the game, and ENS is no exception. TL;DR: I agree that governance participation needs better incentives, but I don't think moving voting power away from the token is the right solution. The core issue isn't that $ENS holders control governance—it's that holding $ENS has weak economic incentives. Governance should remain token-based, but token holders should have real skin in the game through mechanisms like revenue sharing and buybacks. That aligns voters with the protocol's long-term success while keeping governance permissionless and market-driven, rather than relying on subjective decisions about who deserves voting power. By skin in the game, I mean an unavoidable alignment with the DAO's success: if the DAO doesn't do well, your own interests are directly affected. Setting aside the aspirational goal of "building a protocol for the Internet," and assuming that the strongest incentive is ultimately economic, I'd like to focus on that aspect. ----- Mismatch between skin in the game and voting power Today, there is a mismatch between the people who have skin in the game and those who actually hold voting power. This reduces incentives to participate in governance. As we've already seen, economic incentives tend to dominate: most people who received the airdrop saw greater value in selling immediately than in holding for future upside. 1. Domain holders have significant skin in the game. They are investors and users. They spend money on ENS and actively use the product. Yet they have no voting power. 2. Protocols and related projects invest their time, resources, and businesses into creating value around ENS. They are developers and companies building on top of the protocol. They also have no voting power. 3. Token holders, on the other hand, effectively own governance. However, holding the token alone does not necessarily create skin in the game. Their only asset is governance over a protocol whose success may never directly translate into economic returns for them. If economic incentives matter most, why would anyone buy $ENS today? The protocol generates revenue. $ENS holders decide where that revenue is allocated. But the only way for them to personally capture value is by influencing governance so that funds flow toward themselves or their interests. That doesn't seem like a particularly healthy or sustainable incentive structure. So the question becomes: 1. Should domain holders receive voting power? Perhaps. But should someone who has held a domain for five years receive more voting power? Should voting power be based on renewal fees paid? Should a member of the 999 Club receive more voting power than someone in the 10k Club simply because they own a more valuable asset? The mechanism is far from obvious. 2. Should protocols receive voting power? Again, perhaps. But how do we determine which protocol deserves more voting power than another? Which KPIs should we use to measure contributions to ENS? This also seems difficult to define objectively. 3. Should the ENS token remain the governance mechanism? I believe yes—but with much stronger direct incentives for token holders. Using a token as the governance mechanism is what markets naturally understand: put your own capital at risk and receive greater voting power. Over time, tokens can also be distributed to participants in categories (1) and (2), but the governance primitive should remain the token itself. Today, voting power ultimately belongs to whoever has invested the most capital into the token market (for example, nick.eth, who holds enough voting power to meaningfully influence governance on his own). But that raises an important question: why hasn't anyone else chosen to accumulate a similar position? Because of points (2) and (3), I believe governance power should continue to reside in the token. That's why @avsa proposal doesn't fully convince me. ----- Skin in the game for token holders 1. Revenue participation Token holders should directly benefit from the protocol's economic success. A portion of protocol fees could be distributed to token holders, while another portion could be used for buybacks and token burns. Naturally, this would require carefully designed tokenomics, including eligibility criteria such as minimum holding periods or other anti-short-term mechanisms. This would create a much stronger incentive to hold the token, while aligning holders with the protocol's long-term success. The incentive becomes straightforward: "If ENS as a whole generates more revenue, I benefit. Therefore, I am incentivized to vote for whatever maximizes the protocol's long-term growth." This shifts the incentive from: "The only way I can make money from ENS is by working on the protocol and requesting budget allocations." to: "The more others build on ENS and help the protocol grow, the better it is for me." 2. Distribution Distribution can continue to be handled by the market, just as it is today. The key is creating the right incentive mechanism, and the first proposal addresses exactly that. ----- Conclusion This is an early draft that would certainly benefit from input by tokenomics experts. However, I believe it could be a meaningful direction to increase the governance value of the token by creating the right economic incentives, while naturally improving token distribution over time. From there, we can also discuss complementary mechanisms such as quadratic voting and other governance improvements. But even on its own, I think this is a proposal worth exploring.

@swiss_agency Vitalik proposes radically simplifying Ethereum’s architecture. He just published a technical outline for a new, extremely lean consensus layer as part of the Lean ETH roadmap — aiming for significantly lower complexity, stronger validator privacy, and better long-term efficiency

Ethereum needs more than scalability. It needs identity. An internet without a neutral identity layer remains incomplete. That’s why ENS is infrastructure, not merely an application.

@aiapi_ch @WhaleHunterReal 😂

@ULandPro @WhaleHunterReal 😘

$3,000 to 30 people who predicts correct score. ends in 12 hours.

@aiapi_ch @WhaleHunterReal 2:2 (5:4)😉

@WhaleHunterReal 1:3

@MrBeast Personal Royal Wallet for Queen uland.pro/mrsbeast-eth/

Happy Birthday America! If I was born in any other country I wouldn’t be where I am today. I wasn’t born into wealth. I shouldn’t be MrBeast. This country gave me the freedom to chase my dreams and mindset that I can achieve anything. America isn’t perfect but dam I love her 🇺🇸