So the Iraqi Foreign Ministry condemns the militia drone attack on the UAE. I'm not holding my breath waiting for tangible action.
وزارة الخارجية العراقية@Iraqimofa
بيان صحفي – وزارة الخارجية العراقية mofa.gov.iq/2026/62409/
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Kirk H. Sowell
52.2K posts
Kirk H. Sowell
@UticaRisk
Utica Risk Services: Arabic-language services firm, MENA political economy, risk analysis | Publisher of #InsideIraqiPolitics newsletter |
Katılım Eylül 2011
661 Takip Edilen13.2K Takipçiler
Kirk H. Sowell retweetledi
Our @nytimes report finds there was a second Israeli base in Iraq's desert. At least one dated back to the June '25 war. Israel chose Iraq for these covert ops due to US role in Iraq's security affairs. The shepherd who exposed the first base was killed.
nytimes.com/2026/05/17/wor…
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This has got to be really embarrassing for certain Iraqi officials.
nytimes.com/2026/05/17/wor…
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@IraqShamel How much of it is the ability to speak Arabic grammatically versus having a distinct local accent that makes his voice stand out?
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Zaidi getting widely slammed for weak oratory skills by Arabic speakers. This handicap may be with him for a while. Let's see if he can get over it with some governance solutions or some amazing management skills.
Government of Iraq - الحكومة العراقية@IraqiGovt
رئيس مجلس الوزراء السيد علي فالح الزيدي خلال كلمته الى الشعب العراقي: حكومتكم ستكون حكومة دولة مؤسسات ومنفتحة على الجميع وتستمع لصوت المواطن. #الحكومة_العراقية
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Kirk H. Sowell retweetledi
دعوة لإلغاء الألقاب الطبقية
عندما تسنّمتُ منصب الوزارة عام ٢٠١٨، كان أول توجيه أصدرته هو إلغاء المخاطبات الصادرة من مكتب الوزير بعناوين مثل: “فخامة الرئيس”، و”دولة الرئيس”، و”معالي الوزير”، و”سعادة السفير”…، التزاماً مني بثقافة الدول الديمقراطية التي تعتمد توصيف صاحب المنصب بعنوان ثابت وموحّد: “السيد” أو “السيدة”.
ومن هذا المنطلق، أدعو الحكومة العراقية إلى ترسيخ معالم الديمقراطية من خلال إلغاء هذه التوصيفات الطبقية، التي تُعد من موروثات الأنظمة الملكية، والتي ترسّخت بصورة أكبر خلال فترات الحكم العثماني، ثم ورثتها الدول العربية لاحقاً في أساليب المخاطبة الرسمية، في حين تخلّت عنها الدول التي تبنّت الأنظمة الديمقراطية الحديثة.
في النهاية، وخصوصاً في النظم الديمقراطية، فإن الرئيس والوزير والسفير ما هم إلا موظفو دولة عموميون، مهما علت مناصبهم وتعاظمت مسؤولياتهم؛ فالمناصب تكليف لا تشريف.
لؤي الخطيب
العربية
Kirk H. Sowell retweetledi
أصدر منتدى الاستراتيجيات الأردني ورقة سياسات بعنوان "رأس المال البشري: هدف وأداة النمو الشامل والتنمية المستدامة"، بين فيها أن رأس المال البشري يمثل أحد المحركات الرئيسية للنمو الاقتصادي، والحد من مستويات الفقر، وتعزيز الإنتاجية، مشيرًا إلى أن الاستثمار في التعليم، والصحة، والمهارات، والتوظيف لا ينعكس فقط على رفاه الأفراد، بل يشكل أيضًا ركيزة أساسية لرفع تنافسية الاقتصاد الوطني ودعم مسار نموه الشامل والمستدام.
للاطلاع: bit.ly/42EyAFK
العربية
Note on Muhammad al-Sudani's coalition falling apart the day after he leaves the PM's office. Call it adding injury to insult politically.
substack.com/profile/284201…
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على الجانب الاخر, الاردن بلد رائع لالدراسة اللغة العربية عند الاجانب.
JordanStrategyForum@JSFJordan
الأردن جاء في المرتبة 105 عالمياً من أصل 123 دولة على مؤشر إتقان اللغة الإنجليزية 2025، أي ضمن أدنى 15% من الدول المشاركة، وبدرجة 425 نقطة من أصل 800.
العربية
@NatlContext I would say that Fadhila had de facto split w/ Maliki even before yesterday.
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Yesterday’s Iraqi parliament vote on Ali al-Zaidi’s new cabinet further confirmed what The National Context reported a month ago: the emergence of a new informal axis that mainly consists of the five figures below.
In yesterday’s session, all ministerial nominees aligned with this bloc won parliamentary confidence and were sworn in. By contrast, none of the two nominees backed by Maliki’s State of Law for the interior and higher education ministries secured enough votes; the Sunni Azm Alliance’s nominees for planning and culture also failed; and one of the KDP’s two nominees, for the construction ministry, was rejected.
The three groups are now said to be furious, viewing the outcome as a pre-planned ambush by the five-person power bloc, especially as the remaining cabinet posts are unlikely to be voted on before the summer because of parliament’s Eid and recess breaks.
In response, the coalition led by former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani fractured today, in a move al-Maliki is believed to be behind. Militia-linked factions led by Ahmed al-Asadi, Haider al-Gharawi, and Falih al-Fayyadh defected from Sudani’s alliance. Together, they control around 19 seats. Since al-Asadi won two seats outside Sudani’s alliance, the split could push Sudani’s bloc below 30 seats.
However, this may also be partly a response to al-Fadhila, which is formally part of State of Law and holds 12 of its 30 seats, but appears to have effectively broken away. It nominated and secured the Health Ministry as its own faction, rather than as part of State of Law, and won enough votes. This may signal that al-Fadhila is now moving closer to the new five-person axis.
Maliki, Barzani, and the Azm Alliance appear to believe there was a coordinated game inside parliament, especially as the speakership is largely controlled by this same bloc. Some unconfirmed reports also claim that the quiet architect behind this next-generation axis is Judicial Council chief Faiq Zaidan, with the new prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi, seen as particularly close to him.
The National Context@NatlContext
The contours of an emerging axis in Iraq, centred on Sudani, Khazali, Talabani, Halbousi and Hakim, have been taking shape quietly for months as it captures one institutional pillar after another in a cascading sequence. That axis is now on course to deliver Mohammed Shia al-Sudani a second term as prime minister. Numbers alone do not explain the bloc’s strength. Its components now sit at many of the key points through which power moves inside the Iraqi state. The speakership of parliament is held by Halbousi’s bloc. The first deputy speakership is held by Khazali’s faction. Both posts were won despite opposition from Masoud Barzani and Nouri al-Maliki, the two most established power centres in Iraqi politics. In other words, the bloc had already begun imposing outcomes over the objections of the old centres long before the presidency. The 11 April 2026 session that elected the president was the clearest demonstration of that capacity, but it was not the first. The pattern had surfaced often enough in earlier institutional contests to read as something more than coincidence. Nor was it confined to Baghdad. The same axis has also translated that cooperation into local power-sharing arrangements, most notably in Kirkuk and Salahuddin. That institutional positioning also became the mechanism through which the more recent breakthrough was achieved. The presidential session could not have been pushed onto the agenda against the Barzani-Maliki boycott without a speaker willing to schedule it and a first deputy willing to back the move. The presidency requires a two-thirds quorum in parliament, meaning at least 220 MPs must be present before a vote can take place at all. The premiership, by contrast, requires only a simple majority. Because it is the president who tasks a candidate with forming the government, the presidential vote is normally choreographed in advance, with broad consensus, precisely because it sets the terms for everything that follows. Pushing the session through despite the Barzani-Maliki boycott therefore did more than seat Amedi. It showed that the anti-Sudani camp could not block even the higher bar. If they failed to stop the harder vote, their chances of stopping the easier one are plainly worse. That asymmetry is why Sudani’s second term is now highly likely. Maliki, however, remains vehemently opposed to a second Sudani term, and some smaller factions within the Coordination Framework are still with him. Yet the more likely outcome is that, just as with the presidency, the matter will ultimately be settled in parliament. If that happens, the consequence would be the end of the Coordination Framework as it has functioned until now. In other words, one of the central pillars of the post-2003 Shia-led order, and with it a core part of Iraq’s traditional sectarian arrangement, would be breaking down in real time. This longer read explains the origins of this new axis, its numbers, how it captured key institutions, how it contributed to the collapse of Maliki’s bid to return, and how its members are beginning to shape one another as a new political map emerges: thenationalcontext.com/cross-sectaria…
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I don't know which bothers me more: that most of our ambassadorial posts are empty, or that hardly anyone seems to care. Maybe Netflix should screen a free viewing of "The Diplomat" at the White House to raise awareness on the issue.
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Worth noting that in addition to doing double-duty on Syria, Trump special envoy to Turkey Tom Barrack is also handling American ambassadorless Iraq. Though the charge d'affairs gets a lot of references in the Iraqi media as well.
@RobbieGramer
wsj.com/politics/polic…
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Kirk H. Sowell retweetledi
@FIstrabadi @VictoriaT_ Sudani's allies are portraying Zaidi as being a continuation of Sudani, as if Sudani had been a success instead of leading Iraq to the edge of an economic abyss.
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@VictoriaT_ Entirely predictable for a political neophyte with no political base of his own, who did not run for any office, and who is dependent entirely on the existing political class—especially the Shia religious parties, including the militias—for his position. Same old same old.
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This is a very positive statement for Iraq’s PM Ali al-Zaidi, and I take from this, that the USG is willing to give him some time to take action — at least in public.
I’d note, however, that the new cabinet members signal more continuity rather than a bold new direction. This is no surprise. This cabinet is still a product of elite negotiation and power sharing by the same political actors who have produced previous government.
Ambassador Tom Barrack@USAMBTurkiye
Congratulations to Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi on securing parliamentary confidence and the approval of his government by the Council of Representatives. We are encouraged by your fresh leadership and look forward to collaborating on a bold new agenda aligned with our shared interests: building a sovereign, prosperous, stable Iraq, at peace with its neighbors, that delivers opportunity and growth for all its citizens in mutually beneficial partnership with the United States. President Trump, Secretary Rubio, and the United States stand ready to work closely with you and your government to advance our shared goals of prosperity for the Iraqi people and the elimination of terrorism, which is always an impediment to the people’s progress.
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Kirk H. Sowell retweetledi
Ali al-Zaidi confirmed as Iraq’s new prime minister along with 14 cabinet members. Several more minister positions outstanding, will be filled in coming weeks. Disputes over Interior Minister among them, arguments could be seen during the vote
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@dr_jasemj67 I'll note that this letter suspending a popular but critical talk show is signed by the commission's executive, director, Baligh Abu Kalal, who tied to Hakim's party. The host is critical of the Shia parties mostly.
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@dr_jasemj67 Iraq's media regulator suspends Adnan al-Tai's program on UTV. I've lost track of how many times this is.
youtube.com/watch?v=9FnO3i…
YouTube
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هيئة الاعلام والاتصالات: ايقاف برنامج #الحق_يقال لمدة 45 يوم.
#عدنان_الطائي
العربية
Kirk H. Sowell retweetledi
Parliament session to vote on Zaidi’s cabinet is about to get started soon.
Here’s a full list of the 18 names and their political affiliations that he’s expected to submit.
iraqhorizons.com/p/full-list-of…
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This is the paradox: however you explain it - fraud, poor organization, apathy - the secular opposition in Iraq totally bombed in November. The Islamists dominated the election. So the democratic process is facilitating militia rule.
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This is a good article but in addition to militia ties to the state it also needs to be understood that the political wings of the Islamist groups dominate this parliament more than any other as a result of the Nov election.
wsj.com/world/middle-e…
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