Mary Wells

Here you go, Nick. A list of 100 currently living Marxist professors: David Abraham — University of Miami (Law, retired) Ervand Abrahamian — CUNY Baruch College (History, emeritus) Jaafar Aksikas — Columbia College Chicago (Cultural Studies) Jack Amariglio — Merrimack College (Economics, emeritus) Bill Ayers — University of Illinois Chicago (Education, emeritus) Asatar Bair — Riverside City College (Economics) Rick Baldoz — Oberlin College (Sociology) Gopal Balakrishnan — UC Santa Cruz (History) Tithi Bhattacharya — Purdue University (History) Bruno Bosteels — Columbia University (Latin American Studies) Samuel Bowles — Santa Fe Institute (Economics) Neil Brenner — Harvard University (Urban Theory) Robert Brenner — UCLA (History) Wendy Brown — Columbia University (Political Science) Ben Burgis — Morehouse College (Philosophy/Logic) Michael Burawoy — UC Berkeley (Sociology, emeritus) Paul Burkett — Indiana State University (Economics) Charisse Burden-Stelly — University of Wisconsin Madison (African American Studies) Hazel Carby — Yale University (African American Studies, emeritus) Vivek Chibber — NYU (Sociology) Ronald H. Chilcote — UC Riverside (Political Science, emeritus) Harry Cleaver — UT Austin (Economics, emeritus) George Ciccariello-Maher — formerly Drexel University (Politics) Joshua Clover — UC Davis (English) Angela Davis — UC Santa Cruz (History of Consciousness, emerita) Greg Dawes — NC State University (Latin American Studies) Jodi Dean — Hobart and William Smith Colleges (Political Science) Cedric de Leon — UMass Amherst (Sociology) Lisa Duggan — NYU (American Studies) Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz — CSU East Bay (History, emerita) Silvia Federici — Hofstra University (Political Philosophy, emerita) Samuel Farber — CUNY Brooklyn College (Political Science, emeritus) Johanna Fernández — CUNY Baruch College (History) Duncan K. Foley — New School for Social Research (Economics, emeritus) Barbara Foley — Rutgers University (English, emerita) John Bellamy Foster — University of Oregon (Sociology) Harriet Fraad — New School (Psychology) H. Bruce Franklin — Rutgers University (English, emeritus) Nancy Fraser — New School for Social Research (Philosophy) Grover Furr — Montclair State University (English) Michael Goldfield — Wayne State University (Political Science) Alyosha Goldstein — University of New Mexico (American Studies) Michael Hardt — Duke University (Literature) David Harvey — CUNY Graduate Center (Anthropology, emeritus) Gerald Horne — University of Houston (History) Michael Hudson — University of Missouri Kansas City (Economics, emeritus) Aaron Jaffe — SUNY Old Westbury (Philosophy) Adrian Johnston — University of New Mexico (Philosophy) Sharryn Kasmir — Hofstra University (Anthropology) Robin D.G. Kelley — UCLA (History) Andrew Kliman — Pace University (Economics) Karl Klare — Northeastern University School of Law (Labor & Employment Law) David Laibman — CUNY Brooklyn College (Economics, emeritus) Paul Le Blanc — La Roche University (History) Li Minqi — University of Utah (Economics) Peter Linebaugh — University of Toledo (History, emeritus) George Lipsitz — UC Santa Barbara (Black Studies) Stephanie Luce — CUNY School of Labor and Urban Studies (Labor Studies) Biju Mathew — Rider University (Business) Paul Mattick Jr. — Adelphi University (Philosophy) Robert McChesney — University of Illinois (Communications, emeritus) Randall H. McGuire — SUNY Binghamton (Anthropology) Peter McLaren — Chapman University (Education, emeritus) David McNally — University of Houston (Political Science) Jodi Melamed — Marquette University (English) Salar Mohandesi — University of Pennsylvania (History) Jason W. Moore — Binghamton University (Sociology) Fred Moseley — Mount Holyoke College (Economics) Kirstin Munro — New School for Social Research (Economics) Immanuel Ness — CUNY Brooklyn College (Political Science) Bertell Ollman — NYU (Politics) Christian Parenti — CUNY (Journalism/Economics) Michael Perelman — California State University Chico (Economics, emeritus) Michael J. Piore — MIT (Economics, emeritus) Minnie Bruce Pratt — Syracuse University (Writing, emerita) Barbara Ransby — University of Illinois Chicago (History) Adolph L. Reed Jr. — University of Pennsylvania (Political Science, emeritus) Touré Reed — Illinois State University (History) Gabriel Rockhill — Villanova University (Philosophy) David Roediger — University of Kansas (American Studies) John Roemer — Yale University (Economics) William I. Robinson — UC Santa Barbara (Sociology) Mike Rotkin — UC Santa Cruz (Lecturer) E. San Juan Jr. — University of Connecticut (English, emeritus) Anwar Shaikh — New School for Social Research (Economics) Tommie Shelby — Harvard University (Philosophy/African American Studies) Nikhil Pal Singh — NYU (Social and Cultural Analysis) Robyn Spencer — Lehman College CUNY (History) Neferti Tadiar — Barnard College (Women's Studies) Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor — Princeton University (African American Studies) Alberto Toscano — UC San Diego (Sociology) Mark Tushnet — Harvard Law School (Constitutional Law, emeritus) Alan M. Wald — University of Michigan (English, emeritus) Thomas E. Weisskopf — University of Michigan (Economics, emeritus) Richard Wolff — New School for Social Research (Economics, emeritus) John Womack — Harvard University (History, emeritus) Robert Wrenn — University of Maine (Economics, emeritus) Michael D. Yates — formerly University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown (Economics) Gale A. Yee — Episcopal Divinity School (Biblical Studies) Michael Zweig — SUNY Stony Brook (Economics, emeritus)

Happy Tree Kangaroo Day from Tristan, Pearl and Nane! 🤎🧡 We’re thrilled to share the name of our nine-month-old Huon tree kangaroo joey: Nane (pronounced Nah-Nae). Nane was named by his Animal Care team in honor of Danny Nane’s father, who recently passed away. Danny, a resident of Papua New Guinea, has been an important part of the Tree Kangaroo Conservation Program (TKCP) for many years, helping protect Critically Endangered tree kangaroos and their forest habitat. At nine months old, Nane is now considered “at foot,” an important developmental milestone for tree kangaroo joeys. This means he has permanently emerged from mom’s pouch but still stays close by her side as he learns the skills he’ll need to become more independent. He seems to get cuter by the day, is eating solid foods and has even explored his outdoor habitat with mom, Pearl. Join us in celebrating Nane and the incredible conservation partnerships helping protect these amazing animals in the wild!

Smartphones are not the explanation for the recent decline in fertility. Instead, they are an accelerator of deeper forces already at work. Let’s start with the facts. Fertility is falling almost everywhere: in rich, middle-income, and poor countries; in secular and religious countries; and in countries with high and low levels of gender equality. The decline accelerated around 2014. So, no country-specific explanation will work unless you are willing to believe that 200 distinct country-specific explanations arrived at roughly the same time. Smartphones look like the obvious candidate: the first iPhone was released in 2007, and global adoption has been astonishingly fast. Economists understand the first major decline in fertility in advanced economies, from 6 or 7 children per woman throughout most of human history to about 1.8, that occurred between the early 1800s and roughly 1970, well before smartphones. The main drivers were a sharp fall in child mortality (effective fertility was rarely above 3 and often close to 2) and the shift from a low-skill, rural agrarian economy to a high-skill, urban industrial one. We have quantitative models that fit these facts well. Country-specific factors mattered too, of course. Proximity to low-fertility neighbors accelerated Hungary’s decline, while fragmented landowning structures accelerated France’s. But these were second-order mechanisms. This is also why most economists long considered Paul Ehrlich’s doom scenarios implausible. We forecast that fertility in middle- and low-income economies would follow the same path as in the rich, probably faster, because reductions in child mortality reached India or Africa at lower income levels (medical technology is nearly universal, and most gains come from handwashing and cheap antibiotics, not Mayo Clinic-level care). Much of what we see in Africa or parts of Latin America today is still that old story. But in the 1980s, a new pattern appeared. Japan and Italy fell below 1.8, the level we had thought was the new floor. By 1990, Japan was at 1.54 and Italy at 1.36. This second fertility decline began in Japan and Italy earlier than elsewhere, driven by country-specific factors, but the underlying dynamics were widespread: secularization, an education arms race, expensive housing, the dissolution of old social networks, and the shift to a service economy in which women’s bargaining power within the household is higher. The U.S. lagged because secularization came later, suburban housing remained relatively cheap, and African American fertility was still high. U.S. demographic patterns are exceptional and skew how academics (most of whom are in the U.S.) and the New York Times see the world. My best guess is that, without smartphones, Italy’s 2025 fertility rate would be about 1.24 rather than 1.14. I doubt anyone will document an effect larger than 0.1-0.2. Italy was at 1.19 in 1995, not far from today’s 1.14. The TFR is cyclical due to tempo effects, so I do not read too much into the rise between 1995 and 2007 or the decline from 1.27 in 2019 to 1.14 today. The direct effect of smartphones is not zero, but it is not, by itself, that large. Where social media, in general, and smartphones, in particular, matter is in the diffusion of social norms. What would have taken 25 years now happens in 10. Social media are not the cause of fertility decline; modernity is. But they are a very fast accelerator. That is why social media are a major part of the story behind Guatemala (yes, Guatemala) going from 3.8 children per woman in 2005 to 1.9 in 2025. Without them, Guatemala would also have reached 1.9, just 20 years later. Modernity, in its current form, is incompatible with replacement-level fertility. By modernity, I do not mean capitalism: fertility fell earlier and faster in socialist economies than in market economies. Socialist Hungary fell below replacement in 1960, and socialist Czechoslovakia in 1966 (both experienced small, short-lived baby booms in the mid-1970s). By modernity, I mean a society organized around rational, large-scale systems and formalized knowledge. Countries will not converge to the same fertility rate. East Asia is likely stuck near 1, possibly below, given its unbalanced gender norms and toxic education systems. Latin America faces the same gender problem plus weak growth prospects, so I expect something around 1.2. Northern Europe has more egalitarian family structures and might hold near 1.5. The very religious societies are probably the only ones that will sustain 1.8. All of this could change with AI or changes in population composition. We will see. But on the current evidence, deep sub-replacement fertility is the “new new normal.” Unless we reorganize our societies, better learn to handle it as best we can.

The vibes in SF feel pretty frenetic right now. The divide in outcomes is the worst I've ever seen. Over the last 5yrs, a group of ~10k people - employees at Anthropic, OpenAI, xAI, Nvidia, Meta TBD, founders - have hit retirement wealth of well above $20M (back of the envelope AI estimation). Everyone outside that group feels like they can work their well-paying (but <$500k) job for their whole life and never get there. Worse yet, layoffs are in full swing. Many software engineers feel like their life's skill is no longer useful. The day to day role of most jobs has changed overnight with AI. As a result, 1. The corporate ladder looks like the wrong building to climb. Everyone's trying to align with a new set of career "paths": should I be a founder? Is it too late to join Anthropic / OpenAI? should I get into AI? what company stock will 10x next? People are demanding higher salaries and switching jobs more and more. 2. There’s a deep malaise about work (and its future). Why even work at all for “peanuts”? Will my job even exist in a few years? Many feel helpless. You hear the “permanent underclass” conversation a lot, esp from young people. It's hard to focus on doing good work when you think "man, if I joined Anthropic 2yrs ago, I could retire" 3. The mid to late middle managers feel paralyzed. Many have families and don't feel like they have the energy or network to just "start a company". They don't particularly have any AI skills. They see the writing on the wall: middle management is being hollowed out in many companies. 4. The rich aren’t particularly happy either. No one is shedding tears for them (and rightfully so). But those who have "made it" experience a profound lack of purpose too. Some have gone from <$150k to >$50M in a few years with no ramp. It flips your life plans upside down. For some, comparison is the thief of joy. For some, they escape to NYC to "live life". For others still, they start companies "just cuz", often to win status points. They never imagined that by age 30, they'd be set. I once asked a post-economic founder friend why they didn't just sell the co and they said "and do what? right now, everyone wants to talk to me. if i sell, I will only have money." I understand that many reading this scoff at the champagne problems of the valley. Society is warped in this tech bubble. What is often well-off anywhere else in the world is bang average here. Unlike many other places, tenure, intelligence and hard work can be loosely correlated with outcomes in the Bay. Living through a societally transformative gold rush in that environment can be paralyzing. "Am I in the right place? Should I move? Is there time still left? Am I gonna make it?" It psychologically torments many who have moved here in search of "success". Ironically, a frequent side effect of this torment is to spin up the very products making everyone rich in hopes that you too can vibecode your path to economic enlightenment.