Bagudu

It's going to be slow but there's nothing stopping $LIT from hitting $8 ✌️

@vigho4u That was a ridiculous statement from the guy. I couldn't hold my laughter when he said it. NGL, I was really disappointed with the way they coordinated the space.

Person say if e need $100k in 10 mins e no where to get am 😂 Why e no go get am make e take am pump the token back to $700k Mcap to keep the integrity 😂

@vigho4u That space was a cult meeting.

They should not have held that space 🥲 the community are not kids 🔴

@LordCrypto_ why should he refund? Is there a binding contract to this effect?

I just Heard on Space now that Sanusi said He doesn’t have Money to Refund??? 🤔 Is this not same person they said is “Mr Integrity” because he refunds money??🤔🤔

@ox_vanguard @FirstBankngr As it should be 💯

@Yab_jnr @FirstBankngr winning IRL and onchain

Bought this about a week ago. Keep building @FirstBankngr 😎

@TheChainWriter1 @Szymansk_ii @sleektru They are both fools who can tweet anything to farm X impressions.

What did they even know? @Szymansk_ii that started crypto with Notcoin? @sleektru that started crypto with SoSoValue? They don’t know anything about CEFI. They don’t know anything about DEFI. They don’t know anything about INFOFI. They don’t know anything about on-chain analytics. They don’t know anything about smart contracts. They don’t know anything about liquidity pools. They don’t know anything about cyber forensics. They don’t want to admit that they know nothing. 🤷‍♂️ The only reasonable person among them is @Vindicatedchidi and a few others because I’ve known them for a very long time. But these newcomers like Szymanski and his group know nothing except hatred for Northerners and Northern projects. Unfortunately for them, they’re too late. They scammed us out of more than ₦500 million through Vibe Coin. By the will of Allah, we will go after all of your accounts, you worthless hypocrites. Here is Szymanski’s X account—please report it: x.com/sleektru Here is Sleektru’s account: x.com/sleektru Report this one as well, and after you do, send me a screenshot. We will keep coming after every one of you. You’re nothing but scammers.

What the Blockchain Shows About the $SUNUSI Drain Why we carried out this investigation On 13 July 2026 the developer of the $SUNUSI token, a Solana memecoin, said publicly that his wallet had been drained while he was trying to burn part of his own supply using a website called solanaburner.com. Public discussion quickly split into two camps. One held that the developer had staged a rug pull and blamed a tool to cover it. The other held that he was a genuine victim. Several early write ups also described the mechanism incorrectly, for example claiming a permanent delegate had been granted. We set out to establish, from the public blockchain alone, what actually happened: how the assets left the wallet, how the tool worked, when its pieces were put in place, whether the same tool was used on anyone else, and whether the on chain record links the developer to the operation. Throughout, the links to the exact wallets and transactions are placed with the claims, so every statement can be opened and checked. What we can establish from the chain: the token's own settings, the exact contents of the transactions that moved the assets, the amounts, where the assets went and what they sold for, when the tool's contracts were deployed, and whether specific wallets are connected to each other. What we cannot establish from the chain: who recommended the tool to the developer, who operates the tool, what the developer knew or intended, and the private logic on the website that decides which users get a clean burn and which get drained. These live off chain, and we say so plainly where they arise. 1. The website and the contracts were both recent The website, solanaburner.com, was registered on 22 May 2026, roughly seven weeks before the drain, through the registrar NameCheap, and it was hosted on Vercel (name servers ns1.vercel-dns.com and ns2.vercel-dns.com). A burn service that a person should trust with a large holding did not exist two months earlier. The on chain tool behind it is just as recent. The drainer program used on the developer was deployed on 9 July 2026, four days before the drain, by a throwaway wallet solscan.io/account/svHjvE… whose funding came through the Privacy Cash mixer (funding transaction solscan.io/tx/U8yNQpccVmr…). An earlier copy of the same code solscan.io/account/67risJ… had already been deployed around 1 July 2026. The code was rebuilt again and again by a series of throwaway wallets over about two weeks, all funded the same anonymous way. So the tool was a fresh, disposable, and deliberately hidden piece of infrastructure, not an established product. 2. The token itself was clean The $SUNUSI token solscan.io/token/2vvw3cSw… has no hidden trap. It has no permanent delegate, no freeze authority, and no mint authority. The token could not, on its own, move anyone's holdings. Whatever happened did not come from the token, which rules out the "the contract was malicious" and "a permanent delegate was granted" explanations at the source. 3. What made the developer trust the tool Two things. First, by his own account he was advised to burn part of his supply to reduce it and to build confidence, and he chose this tool for the job. That part is his statement and is not something the chain can confirm. Second, and this the chain does confirm, he tested the tool the day before, on 12 July 2026, and the test worked. The test wallet solscan.io/account/59qjPD… burned about 9,511 tokens cleanly and lost nothing else (test transaction solscan.io/tx/5zyYkPp2hEd…). That test wallet is his own, traced through his own funding chain: his main wallet solscan.io/account/FH5HjZ… funded an intermediary wallet solscan.io/account/fFbt14… which funded the test wallet. So the successful test he relied on was real. This is exactly how the trap works. The tool performs a genuine, honest burn on a small amount so that a test succeeds and earns trust, and it collects a small fee for that service, which is what keeps hundreds of ordinary users burning through it without complaint. 4. The first drain, and the anomaly he noticed On 13 July 2026 the developer connected his main wallet and approved what the site presented as a burn of a large part of his holdings. The transaction he signed solscan.io/tx/nnEgahKvjdp… did not do that. It burned only about 242,258 tokens, roughly one tenth of one percent of the amount involved, and in the same transaction it transferred about 242 million tokens to a wallet controlled by the operator solscan.io/account/Ah4mTq…. He noticed the anomaly, that the burn had not reduced the supply as expected and that most of the tokens had moved to an unknown wallet, which then began selling. 5. Why he used the tool again, and the second drain This is the part that looks strange at first, so it is worth setting out. By his account, in the confusion after the first transaction some people suggested burning more of the remaining supply to steady the market, and before doing another large burn he decided to test again with a small amount, the same way his test the day before had worked safely. The blockchain records what that second attempt did. He signed a small 10,000 token burn solscan.io/tx/5ksnbtjfxyS… and the same transaction ran a hidden program that swept everything that was left, the rest of the $SUNUSI, all of his ANSEM tokens, and his SOL, to the same operator wallet. So the reason he went back is consistent with the way the tool is built to be trusted. His first, genuine test had been clean, and he tried to repeat that safe pattern with another small test after the anomaly. The tool used that second approval to finish the job. The motive here is his account and cannot be read from the chain. What the chain shows is that the second transaction burned only 10,000 tokens and moved the rest to the operator. 6. Where the assets went and what they were worth Across the two transactions, about 484 million $SUNUSI, roughly 48 percent of the supply, plus 205 ANSEM tokens solscan.io/token/9cRCn9rG… and 2.44 SOL left his wallet and arrived at the operator wallet solscan.io/account/Ah4mTq…. That wallet then sold the $SUNUSI in 37 rapid trades over about 80 minutes, which crashed the price by roughly 95 percent. At the moment of the drain the project was worth somewhere between about $400,000 and $725,000. On paper the stolen tokens were worth a few hundred thousand dollars, but selling that much collapses the price as you go, so the amount actually realized was about $94,000. The 37 sell trades are visible under that wallet's Defi activity. 7. The developer's own test wallet was not drained, and we cannot fully explain why The test wallet in section 3 is worth returning to, because it raises a fair question. It held thousands of dollars at the time, yet the tool left it alone and gave it a clean burn, while the same operation fully drained other wallets, in one case a wallet worth only a few dollars. So the tool did not simply take from the richest wallets. Why the developer's own high value wallet received a clean burn while much smaller wallets were emptied is not something the blockchain can explain, because the logic that decides who is robbed sits in the website's private backend. The most likely reading is that a tool that robbed everyone would be flagged within hours, so it robs only a portion and lets the rest, including small tests, burn cleanly. That is a reasonable inference, not a proven fact, and it is listed among the open questions. 8. The same code on other wallets, and one "victim" that was a self-test The program that drained the developer is one of many copies. To see whether other people were also robbed, we traced two wallets the same code had drained, and they turned out to be two very different things. One is a genuine independent victim solscan.io/account/81Cwtx…. That wallet was funded by Coinbase about eight months ago and has a long, active trading history of its own, with no link to the operator or to the developer. It was drained the same way, a tiny burn and a sweep of the rest, in its own transaction solscan.io/tx/4fkMmpgETQS…. This is a real, unrelated person who lost their tokens. The other is not a victim at all, it is the operator testing its own contract solscan.io/account/A9iBMJ…. That wallet was funded by the operator's own collection wallet solscan.io/account/Gs5oEs… which first sent it the tokens, and then those exact tokens were drained straight back to that same collection wallet (transaction solscan.io/tx/5FX6fnxRhg4…). Tokens out from the operator, tokens back to the operator, is a round trip test, not a robbery. So this operation does two separate things at once. It robs genuine independent people, the developer and at least one confirmed other victim, and separately it runs its own test drains with worthless tokens. The practical lesson for anyone reviewing these events is that a small "victim" is only a victim if the tokens did not come from, and return to, the same operator wallet. That single check is what separated the real victim from the self-test above. 9. What links to the developer, and what does not On the money trail, the developer's main wallet was funded from one exchange, MEXC solscan.io/account/FH5HjZ…. The wallets that built and funded the drainer trace back through the Privacy Cash mixer to another exchange, Binance (through solscan.io/account/9KXXW6…). We found no direct on chain link between the developer's wallets and the operator's wallets. Two limits matter. First, the developer operates through intermediary wallets, at least one of which we found and used above, and we did not trace every hop of every related wallet, so a full money flow audit was not done. "No direct link found" is accurate, but it is not the same as "proven unrelated." Second, the blockchain cannot show intent. It records which wallet signed which transaction, not what the signer knew or meant. 10. Questions we cannot answer from the chain Why was the developer's own test wallet, holding thousands of dollars, not drained, while a much smaller wallet was? The selection logic is on the website's private backend and is off chain. How many genuine victims are there in total? We confirmed two independent victims, the developer and one Coinbase funded trader, and one operator self test that first looked like a victim. The other deployed copies of the drainer were not all checked, so the full number is unknown. Are the operator's receiving wallets truly independent of the developer's wallet cluster? No direct link was found, but a complete money flow audit was not performed. Who recommended the tool to the developer? That is a private conversation, not a transaction, and it is not on chain. Who operates the tool? The funding runs through a mixer built to hide exactly that. Only the mixer operator, the exchanges, or law enforcement could reach it. Did the developer know or intend anything about how the transactions would behave? The chain records signatures, not intent, so this cannot be settled here. 11. Lessons for everyone Never use a burn tool or any dApp you have not independently verified, especially for large amounts, and be wary of any site or contract that is only weeks old. Type the address of a well known tool yourself instead of following a link someone sends you. A successful small test proves nothing. These tools let a test succeed on purpose to earn your trust, then behave differently on the real amount. Read every transaction before signing. If it shows transfers to unknown wallets when you expected a burn, reject it. If something looks wrong after one approval, stop. Do not try again on the same tool. The second attempt is often what finishes the job. For large holdings, assume every unfamiliar site is hostile. One approval can drain everything. cc: @SunusiMinjibir @B_Versee @connectwithtola @richie_bitcoin @Szymansk_ii @Vindicatedchidi

@EngineerAdam123 You guys are stupid

🚨 Sell your $SUNUSI now. The Dev's wallet has reportedly been hacked. Sell before the hackers dump the tokens. More details coming soon. Stay tuned.

@0xmelissa19 Snake!

gm 💙 may this week bring unexpected opportunities and unexpected alerts too 😂

@SamuelXeus But you already 35 na 😁

i really don't want to wake up one day and i am 30 years old with just a million dollars in my account. I don’t want to be a failure.💔

@viktorbensonyt Do you like yourself when you are broke?

@Table_Shaker1 @LABtrade_ You are on your own. A lot of people lost more than that

Hello, @LABtrade_ I saw your project dipping, so I decided to support it by buying. I'm just a small trader. I even sold my mother's wrapper to raise $500 and bought 89 LAB at $5.70. Now LAB is around $1. Yesterday it was even lower. I invested because I thought it would pump to $15 or $20 like the good old days. Instead of leaving the trenches, I've been promoted from the trenches to the gutter. At this point, please kindly refund my $500. I don't want to support innovation anymore.

Now that the market is calm, let me congratulate @SunusiMinjibir for launching a memecoin that resonates with African cultural values. As a man proven of integrity, it’s crystal clear that he didn’t launch the memecoin for personal interest, rather, to elevate the community and demonstrate our collective strength - The African Bull 🐂 I spent the last three days studying the on-chain activities and only now I made a decision to join the bandwagon. Market: dexscreener.com/solana/5smcocy… 𝕏: @theafricanbulll Remember, memecoins are for the culture, and you should get in at your own understanding.

$VOOI is the next $Lab. Expect a massive pump!

@Jameelweb3 @Gayu_BTC Well said. But I think every body is trying to move with the trend.

To be honest, I think you launched this project @Gayu_BTC, too early. Our community don't have the energy to push two tokens at the same time. Why not wait until we've taken $SUNUSI to where it needs to be, then we can shift our focus to your project ?

@_yeminiz I'm expecting a crime pump that'll take EVAA to $20 above. The pattern is very similar

i eventually made over $900 on EVAA today went up to $3.8 two mutuals recommended me for gigs W or L?

Come on, we all know this was coming. It was just a matter of time. You guys should do better!

Every day, life teaches us different lessons—but are we paying attention? One family is asking people to report and remove their late daughter's social media account so her posts stop appearing after her passing. Another family is urging people to keep watching, saving, and sharing the beneficial knowledge their late son left behind, so others can continue to benefit from it. Both passed away before the age of 30. Yet each left behind a different digital legacy. The question is: What will your legacy be? May Allah forgive them both, have mercy on them, and grant them Jannatul Firdaus. Ameen.

@FirdaousIsiaq @ay0dele_ It's what feminists want though 😆

@ay0dele_ It’s a brutal game to play in a relationship

Splitting everything strictly 50/50 when one partner makes 200k and the other makes 100k isn't equality, it’s financial oppression wrapped in fairness.