
Mithril | IceBreaker | Astarter ✳️
8.7K posts

Mithril | IceBreaker | Astarter ✳️
@YoadaStakepool
Consider staking your $ADA with our 0% fee #Cardano pool YoAda https://t.co/NjH5goIFp5 drep1y26sfka2km0p4xw073ujdq406wxxczhdyfh9vw7yxpfselchzkdjn


strkBTC's bridge is designed to evolve across 3 phases, each one removing a layer of trust. The destination: a bridge where fraudulent transactions become mathematically impossible. Here's a breakdown of each phase 👇



一部の日本のdRepが私たちの研究提案に反対票を投じたことに、深い悲しみを覚えています。 もしこの提案が可決されなければ、カルダノ(Cardano)はその科学者たちを失い、私たちのラボは閉鎖に追い込まれるということを、日本のコミュニティ全体に再認識していただきたいと考えています。私たちは10年以上の歳月をかけて努力と成長を積み重ね、暗号資産分野において世界最強の研究グループを築き上げてきました。 一部の断片的な資金援助だけで、この成果をバラバラに崩壊させるわけにはいきません。私たちの科学者たちは、より確実性と敬意のある場所へと去ってしまうでしょう。 どうか、カルダノの研究アジェンダを支持するdRepへの委任をお願いいたします。

On Science x.com/i/broadcasts/1…





At this point I think it's over 30 people involved in this, I am one of them. I understand @dapp_central is in a very bad position, but the lack of communication and the fact that people need to post to get his attention is very sad. I hope Farid will do the right thing for himself and the people involved, I still prefer to believe this was a very big mistake not an evil plan. Or maybe @ESCOweb3 was right and it's just a big scam.😅

I have removed all my delegation from the DAPP stake pool.


It's crazy that a guy that scammed half of the Cardano community has so much stake while a guy that shows up every day for the past 5 years is still sitting around 2 mil🫣


This morning, THORChain was drained of roughly $10.8m Node operators have freezed the network for nearly 13 hours. The full analysis isn't out yet, but according to @jpthor, this could be a MPC exploit. ECDSA and TSS is hard. THORChain's vaults rely on TSS, a flavor of MPC where a quorum of nodes jointly produces a signature without ever reconstructing the private key. Clean for Schnorr or EdDSA; painful for ECDSA, which Bitcoin and Ethereum require. That's why we saw plenty of protocol attempts (Lindell17, GG18, GG20, CMP, CGGMP21, DKLS, KU23...), each patching flaws in the previous one. GG20 has a track record. THORChain's TSS uses GG20, on a fork of Binance's tss-lib. GG20 has shipped two well-publicized critical bugs: CVE-2023-33241 and TSSHOCK. CGGMP21, now cggmp24, are the latest protocols, but GG20 is still widely deployed. I often hear a misconception when I hear about MPC setup: "The key is split across many nodes, so any single co-signer doesn't really matter". In every published GG18/GG20 attack, one malicious or compromised co-signer is enough to extract everyone else's shard and reconstruct the full key. AI changes the threat model. Compromising a full software node, complex Go stack, exposed P2P, custom signing daemons, a churn protocol that admits new participants on a schedule, has always been difficult and acted as a barrier. With LLM-driven vulnerability discovery and exploit synthesis, the bar to compromise one of N validators is dropping fast. Here, it's a plausible TSSHOCK-style playbook: - compromise one operator - wait for it to churn into an active Asgard vault - send malformed proofs during keygen or signing - reconstruct the key offline - sweep in a single transaction It's unclear yet if the attacker used a known-unpatched GG20 weakness, or a fresh cryptographic flaw. But, in all cases, MPC and TSS are not a substitute for hardening every co-signer. They sit on top of co-signers that must each be treated as critical infrastructure, hardware-isolated enclaves, minimally exposed, continuously audited, and running protocol with security proofs. While the investigation progresses, be careful in your interactions onchain. These TSS setup are used in various protocols.







