80HD

BBBY Hearing 06/17/25 Hearing for Bed, Bath's specific case lasted half an hour, shorter than the Judge said he expected, because additionally prepared arguments weren't needed past a certain juncture. Kurzon had traveled from New Hampshire to be in person at this hearing at the New Jersey courtroom. I'm just gonna include below the parts of the hearing that I believe were significant, this is in NO way a complete listing of all statements. "..." means a gap in time/statements, or some filler words in the middle of a quote, and it's only an exact quote if I use "quotation marks," everything else is a paraphrase/summary. Bolded words indicate just what IMO were the most interesting/crucial things said: Kurzon formally stated his appearance, saying "Pro Se, on behalf of Class 9..." Papalia contested Kurzon's wording, mentioning that he is an attorney and words are important. "You can't speak on behalf of others, it sounds like you're saying this is a class action, but you're here on behalf of only yourself, this is not a class action." ... Kurzon wanted to explain his prior appearance in a hearing 9 months ago, and that he was "totally unprepared," and he was speaking maybe too off-the-cuff. Kurzon specifically mentioned speaking to "MJL, ML1" around that last hearing. Kurzon brought up the fact that in the last hearing he said his family had 4 horses, but he wants to now correct that they actually only had 3. Papalia: "But what does that have to do with this?" Kurzon said he mentions this because he feels he has a duty to be honest before the court. Papalia: I don't need to deal with that. ... Kurzon clarified at length that he had 58,000 shares as shown in his filed papers, Judge Papalia eventually cut him off to just state for the record that the Court does recognize him as a prior shareholder. Kurzon said that the opposition (Goldberg, for the Estate) says he was only a "purported" shareholder. Lawyer for the Estate then chimed in that they are willing to formally recognize that Kurzon WAS a shareholder at the effective date of the Plan. Kurzon explained that he wants "ALL creditors to be repaid in full, plus interest... "I want creditors to say that Jeff Kurzon is the best shareholder ever." Kurzon questioned about the definition of "allowed interests," saying it's not defined clearly. Papalia: "Interest" IS defined. Kurzon: I asked if any equity interest is distributed or set to be distributed to old shareholders. Therefore I'm asking about the number of shares, whether 782 million shares or... Papalia: "Very clear to me, whether there's 180 million shares, 701 million shares, or 50 million shares, they're all canceled and treated the same. All extinguished. Whether they were canceled by Cede & Co., some official notice from them, is not relevant to me. Because the Plan was confirmed... determines that interests allowed, unallowed, any interest, is canceled and extinguished... no paradox, no question, if Cede & Co missed some shares, they missed some shares, they're still canceled." Kurzon: If ALL shares were canceled, then why did Kirkland say "Each allowed interest" but not "ALL interests?" Pap: those shares are ALL deemed to be canceled... I'll clarify for the record, ALL interests are canceled... You don't need to reconcile, you don't need lists... you're moving to compel something but there's nothing i have before me like a subpoena to produce, nothing for me to enforce... I thought your issue was [something else] (because you said "paradox")... if you took a loss on your taxes because your interests were canceled, you're right. Kurzon: so for clarification, ALL interests are canceled, not just allowed interests? Pap: ALL shares, preferred, common, and warrants were canceled. I'm just saying what's already in the Plan, I'm not issuing a new ruling. Kurzon: Isn't it important how many shares there were? Pap: "You tell me why." Kurzon: there's no equity at this time, but there could be, if Bed Bath emerges from bankruptcy. Pap: I can't submit to Cede and Co. questioning, it would require notices, subpoenas... there's no question, that your shares are canceled... ALL shares are canceled. [Kurzon seems to understand, not argue the point] Pap: so then what're you saying, you withdraw your objection, your motion? [Kurzon reiterates about wanting to question Cede & Co.'s shares] Pap: I can't compel something... I was trying to remove your doubt on rights. Kurzon: "i'm not sure if you're aware but there's a whole cottage industry online discussing this... about the hopefulness of Class 9 to get some recovery." Pap: "What am I, what is a bankruptcy judge in New Jersey gonna do about a cottage industry, if there is one, that trades in canceled shares?" Kurzon: 'It's not about trading, it's about hopefulness by Class 9 to get some recovery. There is suspicion of naked shorting in the shares. If price of shares was manipulated, that's an issue for Mr. Goldberg. I don't see how Goldberg can pursue securities fraud against them unless he looks at the ledger.' Pap [to the Estate's lawyers]: "Don't you have actions pending?" To pursue recovery against parties? Estate: "Yes, many many, HUNDREDS of actions pending." ... Pap: I can't control naked shorting in markets. ... Kurzon: if enough recovery comes to the estate, that would benefit class 9. Pap: Yes, if that ever happens... we'll cross that bridge when we come to it... I cannot speculate sir, I can't speculate. ... Kurzon: I'll send a draft to the estate, so if there is an amendment to the Plan, then my papers will be relevant. Pap: are you withdrawing your motion, because i can rule, i basically have ruled. Kurzon: Because the plan says "each allowed interest," not "ALL," i can't withdraw my motion. Pap: 'It could not be clearer from the plan, and it's not a paradox, that "ALL equity interests are canceled." There's no need, no basis to distribute according to the share ledger, because shares are canceled. To submit for reconciliation about discrepancy for Cede and Co. shares... you're an attorney, so maybe you know this, you don't get to force somebody to reconcile discrepancies. I would deny that even if there WERE a proper discovery request.' Kurzon: It's confusing to navigate the interplay between transfer agent, plan administrator, about this discrepancy of shares... the ledger doesn't lie. If you're telling me i have no right to see the ledger... Pap: 'I'm telling you there's no right to compel a party, like reconciling shares... [cites specific court cases and their rulings, specific clauses of laws] There's no duty to compel documents nor reports... and then to pursue rights of equity holders, and you OPTED OUT, whatever rights you have or lost are there in the Plan. i can't issue an opinion because there's no controversy before me.' [Kurzon brings up that shareholders like him were not given proper notice of Plan's stipulations around shares] Pap: You GOT notice. There was a Plan. Kurzon: Shareholders didn't get notice the way Cede got notice. Pap: The actual notice you got for proceedings was the submission of the form that opts out relief. ... Estate: "should we settle an order?" Pap: That's right, I don't have an order. Keep it simple. Motion is denied for reasons on the record... the rules are, if comments, there's a 7-day rule, 7 days to object... you don't need to speak because I ruled. [I'll stay for a bit now to check any possible questions but maybe less than other times, have other things to get to.]

The Hollow Men American capitalism is rotting from the head down. We have replaced the "Owner-Operator"—the risk-taker-with a new, parasitic class of corporate bureaucrat: The Risk-Free Insider. By "Insider," I am not referring to a specific title. I am referring to the entire administrative state that has captured the modern corporation. This includes the Directors who exist solely to collect fees, the Executives who exist solely to collect bonuses, and the Managers who exist solely to hire consultants. These are the hollow men of the boardroom. They are masters of PowerPoint. They wear the right suits. They say the right buzzwords about "governance" and "ESG." But they are mercenaries fighting a war with someone else’s ammunition. In a functioning economy, authority is tied to liability. If you make a bad decision, you lose your own money. That fear of loss is the only thing that keeps a business honest. It forces you to cut waste, obsess over the customer, and stay late to fix what is broken. Today, we have severed that link. We have rigged the game so that heads, the Insider wins; tails, the shareholder loses. If the stock goes up, the Insider collects a massive performance bonus. If the stock crashes due to their own incompetence, they are fired with a "Golden Parachute" worth tens of millions. They are gambling with the house’s money, and they never leave the table poorer than they arrived. This looting starts in the boardroom. We have normalized a "Country Club" culture where directors are selected based on social profiling rather than their ability to build a business. The modern board member is often a professional tourist—paid an average of $350,000 a year. Let’s be brutally honest about what that number represents. The average director is paid nearly five times the GDP per capita of the United States. They earn more for attending four quarterly lunches than the vast majority of Americans earn in five years of hard labor. And for what? Most of these directors are "over-boarded," sitting on three or four boards simultaneously. They treat directorships as a gig economy for the elite. They fly in, rubber-stamp a compensation package they didn't read, and fly out. They collect checks from companies they do not understand, do not use, and certainly do not love. They are not there to ask hard questions. They are there to be collegial. They are there to protect the other Insiders. And what happens when these boards hire executives who also have no personal capital at risk? We get the Delegation Economy. When a Risk-Free Insider faces a crisis—bloated expenses, a broken supply chain, or a stale product—they do not roll up their sleeves. They hire a consultant. They pay a strategy firm millions of shareholder dollars to produce a 100-page deck telling them what they already know. This is not management. It is intellectual money laundering. They use shareholder capital to buy an insurance policy for their own careers. If the plan fails, they can blame the consultants. They delegate the work because they are terrified of the responsibility. They would rather preside over a slow, comfortable decline than risk a bold mistake. While American Insiders are busy optimizing their severance packages, our global competitors are optimizing their products. They are not slowed down by bureaucracy. They are not waiting for a slide deck. They are outworking us. If we continue to fill our C-suites with administrators instead of operators, we will lose our edge. We will see iconic American franchises hollowed out by fees, managed for the benefit of the Insiders, while the true owners—the shareholders—are left holding the bag. The time for polite governance is over. If we want to save the American economy from mediocrity, we must demand a return to the "Owner’s Mentality." We need leaders who treat shareholder capital with the same reverence they treat their own savings. The era of the Risk-Free Insider must end.

The Hollow Men American capitalism is rotting from the head down. We have replaced the "Owner-Operator"—the risk-taker-with a new, parasitic class of corporate bureaucrat: The Risk-Free Insider. By "Insider," I am not referring to a specific title. I am referring to the entire administrative state that has captured the modern corporation. This includes the Directors who exist solely to collect fees, the Executives who exist solely to collect bonuses, and the Managers who exist solely to hire consultants. These are the hollow men of the boardroom. They are masters of PowerPoint. They wear the right suits. They say the right buzzwords about "governance" and "ESG." But they are mercenaries fighting a war with someone else’s ammunition. In a functioning economy, authority is tied to liability. If you make a bad decision, you lose your own money. That fear of loss is the only thing that keeps a business honest. It forces you to cut waste, obsess over the customer, and stay late to fix what is broken. Today, we have severed that link. We have rigged the game so that heads, the Insider wins; tails, the shareholder loses. If the stock goes up, the Insider collects a massive performance bonus. If the stock crashes due to their own incompetence, they are fired with a "Golden Parachute" worth tens of millions. They are gambling with the house’s money, and they never leave the table poorer than they arrived. This looting starts in the boardroom. We have normalized a "Country Club" culture where directors are selected based on social profiling rather than their ability to build a business. The modern board member is often a professional tourist—paid an average of $350,000 a year. Let’s be brutally honest about what that number represents. The average director is paid nearly five times the GDP per capita of the United States. They earn more for attending four quarterly lunches than the vast majority of Americans earn in five years of hard labor. And for what? Most of these directors are "over-boarded," sitting on three or four boards simultaneously. They treat directorships as a gig economy for the elite. They fly in, rubber-stamp a compensation package they didn't read, and fly out. They collect checks from companies they do not understand, do not use, and certainly do not love. They are not there to ask hard questions. They are there to be collegial. They are there to protect the other Insiders. And what happens when these boards hire executives who also have no personal capital at risk? We get the Delegation Economy. When a Risk-Free Insider faces a crisis—bloated expenses, a broken supply chain, or a stale product—they do not roll up their sleeves. They hire a consultant. They pay a strategy firm millions of shareholder dollars to produce a 100-page deck telling them what they already know. This is not management. It is intellectual money laundering. They use shareholder capital to buy an insurance policy for their own careers. If the plan fails, they can blame the consultants. They delegate the work because they are terrified of the responsibility. They would rather preside over a slow, comfortable decline than risk a bold mistake. While American Insiders are busy optimizing their severance packages, our global competitors are optimizing their products. They are not slowed down by bureaucracy. They are not waiting for a slide deck. They are outworking us. If we continue to fill our C-suites with administrators instead of operators, we will lose our edge. We will see iconic American franchises hollowed out by fees, managed for the benefit of the Insiders, while the true owners—the shareholders—are left holding the bag. The time for polite governance is over. If we want to save the American economy from mediocrity, we must demand a return to the "Owner’s Mentality." We need leaders who treat shareholder capital with the same reverence they treat their own savings. The era of the Risk-Free Insider must end.

The Hollow Men American capitalism is rotting from the head down. We have replaced the "Owner-Operator"—the risk-taker-with a new, parasitic class of corporate bureaucrat: The Risk-Free Insider. By "Insider," I am not referring to a specific title. I am referring to the entire administrative state that has captured the modern corporation. This includes the Directors who exist solely to collect fees, the Executives who exist solely to collect bonuses, and the Managers who exist solely to hire consultants. These are the hollow men of the boardroom. They are masters of PowerPoint. They wear the right suits. They say the right buzzwords about "governance" and "ESG." But they are mercenaries fighting a war with someone else’s ammunition. In a functioning economy, authority is tied to liability. If you make a bad decision, you lose your own money. That fear of loss is the only thing that keeps a business honest. It forces you to cut waste, obsess over the customer, and stay late to fix what is broken. Today, we have severed that link. We have rigged the game so that heads, the Insider wins; tails, the shareholder loses. If the stock goes up, the Insider collects a massive performance bonus. If the stock crashes due to their own incompetence, they are fired with a "Golden Parachute" worth tens of millions. They are gambling with the house’s money, and they never leave the table poorer than they arrived. This looting starts in the boardroom. We have normalized a "Country Club" culture where directors are selected based on social profiling rather than their ability to build a business. The modern board member is often a professional tourist—paid an average of $350,000 a year. Let’s be brutally honest about what that number represents. The average director is paid nearly five times the GDP per capita of the United States. They earn more for attending four quarterly lunches than the vast majority of Americans earn in five years of hard labor. And for what? Most of these directors are "over-boarded," sitting on three or four boards simultaneously. They treat directorships as a gig economy for the elite. They fly in, rubber-stamp a compensation package they didn't read, and fly out. They collect checks from companies they do not understand, do not use, and certainly do not love. They are not there to ask hard questions. They are there to be collegial. They are there to protect the other Insiders. And what happens when these boards hire executives who also have no personal capital at risk? We get the Delegation Economy. When a Risk-Free Insider faces a crisis—bloated expenses, a broken supply chain, or a stale product—they do not roll up their sleeves. They hire a consultant. They pay a strategy firm millions of shareholder dollars to produce a 100-page deck telling them what they already know. This is not management. It is intellectual money laundering. They use shareholder capital to buy an insurance policy for their own careers. If the plan fails, they can blame the consultants. They delegate the work because they are terrified of the responsibility. They would rather preside over a slow, comfortable decline than risk a bold mistake. While American Insiders are busy optimizing their severance packages, our global competitors are optimizing their products. They are not slowed down by bureaucracy. They are not waiting for a slide deck. They are outworking us. If we continue to fill our C-suites with administrators instead of operators, we will lose our edge. We will see iconic American franchises hollowed out by fees, managed for the benefit of the Insiders, while the true owners—the shareholders—are left holding the bag. The time for polite governance is over. If we want to save the American economy from mediocrity, we must demand a return to the "Owner’s Mentality." We need leaders who treat shareholder capital with the same reverence they treat their own savings. The era of the Risk-Free Insider must end.

The GME logo at Chase literally since today