Rogier De Langhe

Just as it was with the end of the gold standard, so it is with the end of the dollar standard. It’s the inner war period all over again. It was 20yrs bw the end of the gold std and Bretton Woods. We’re in the 1st inning. The breakdown in global coordination and increase in trade tensions will grow exponentially (from everyone) from here.

A lot of green in global rates...

Is Treasury Quietly Executing Miran’s Gold-to-FX Playbook? We have compelling evidence of stealthy US FX reserve accumulation – using gold. Stephen Miran’s 2023 “User’s Guide” detailed how Treasury could convert gold into foreign reserves without congressional approval. Current market fingerprints suggest Miran’s playbook may already be active. How Miran’s Strategy Works: 1. Buy unlimited gold: Treasury, under 31 U.S.C. § 5116, can acquire bullion freely without new appropriations, typically financing via short-term T-bills. Gold is the only asset Treasury can later “monetize” into foreign cash without new appropriations. 2. Monetize gold later: The Gold Reserve Act requires proceeds from gold sales to retire Treasury debt. 3. Create a debt liability first: ESF sells dollars forward (ex. agreeing to deliver USD in six months for euros). 4. Settle using gold: Just before settlement, Treasury sells gold, immediately using dollars raised to retire the forward liability, satisfying statutory debt reduction. Result: Treasury swapped idle bullion for interest-bearing FX reserves, all within existing law…no congressional vote, no hit to headline debt, no directional bet on gold. That’s the whole playbook: buy gold freely and use it as collateral to flip into euros or yen via a forward sale of dollars. Evidence Its Live: 1. 2000+ tonnes of gold shipped to New York since December, the largest inflow ever. 2. EUR fwd rate - essentially the 1yr fwd discount vs. spot EUR/USD - normally tracks spot closely but recently has diverged sharply (see chart). This indicates someone, who is rate-insensitive, is supplying dollars (or demanding euros) in the forward market strongly enough to flatten the curve even as the cash market pushes spot higher. That is precisely the footprint you would expect if a large player were selling USD fwd in size while simultaneously accumulating euros: the forward supply leans on basis/forward points, but the spot legs of those trades, whether outright EUR buys or the mirror leg of a gold swap, push spot up. In other words, the correlation break is further circumstantial evidence that the fwd leg is being used to fund something structural, not a speculative punt. 3. Last week, Treasury abruptly raised its Q2 borrowing estimate by $390 billion, primarily in short-dated bills, precisely how you'd prefund a substantial fwd settlement requiring cash delivery. Alternative Explanations (partial): Admittedly, this theory could partially be explained by other factors: 1. European institutional investors have sold large unhedged USD asset holdings, pressuring spot EUR/USD upward. 2. The massive bullion inflows to COMEX were partly driven by tariff fears, creating a profitable arb and prompting dealers to deliver gold against COMEX futures. 3. The extra bills issuance could merely be “catch-up” financing to get the TGA back to $850 bn once the debt ceiling is lifted. But if Treasury were also buying bullion for a forthcoming FX swap, the mechanics would look identical on headline borrowing data: issue bills now (shows up as higher net borrowing), pay bullion suppliers (cash outflow eats into the TGA), sell the gold for dollars at forward settlement. It also doesn’t fully explain why the EUR/USD fwd curve has flattened steadily across longer maturities, nor why the forward vs spot correlation would break so decisively, nor the curious alignment with Treasury’s sudden borrowing spike, and why COMEX stocks would remain persistently high after the tariff exemption - only bled ~1.5 mn oz...small vs the inflow. Why isn’t the metal racing back to London now that the arb is gone? Also, important to note that public ledgers still show flat official FX assets. That means either: dealer banks are warehousing the euro and yen leg until forward settlement - perfectly consistent with Miran’s structure; or we’re still “testing the plumbing” with modest ticket sizes. We should know for certain in short order, as Treasury must publish Sovereign Wealth Fund details by Sunday, May 4 and Thursday’s H.4.1 release and upcoming TIC banking data will confirm whether we're witnessing the first genuine US fx reserve build in decades, or if it’s simply an improbable set of coincidences that just happen to perfectly align with the mechanics of Miran’s gold-reserve accumulation strategy.

Here's a 👀 datapoint. In January a whopping 67% of ALL UK exports to America were gold bars. Ponder that for a moment. 67% of EVERY PHYSICAL THING the UK exported to the US (by value) Totally unprecedented. Further evidence of the scale of gold outflows from Britain to America

Is Treasury Quietly Executing Miran’s Gold-to-FX Playbook? We have compelling evidence of stealthy US FX reserve accumulation – using gold. Stephen Miran’s 2023 “User’s Guide” detailed how Treasury could convert gold into foreign reserves without congressional approval. Current market fingerprints suggest Miran’s playbook may already be active. How Miran’s Strategy Works: 1. Buy unlimited gold: Treasury, under 31 U.S.C. § 5116, can acquire bullion freely without new appropriations, typically financing via short-term T-bills. Gold is the only asset Treasury can later “monetize” into foreign cash without new appropriations. 2. Monetize gold later: The Gold Reserve Act requires proceeds from gold sales to retire Treasury debt. 3. Create a debt liability first: ESF sells dollars forward (ex. agreeing to deliver USD in six months for euros). 4. Settle using gold: Just before settlement, Treasury sells gold, immediately using dollars raised to retire the forward liability, satisfying statutory debt reduction. Result: Treasury swapped idle bullion for interest-bearing FX reserves, all within existing law…no congressional vote, no hit to headline debt, no directional bet on gold. That’s the whole playbook: buy gold freely and use it as collateral to flip into euros or yen via a forward sale of dollars. Evidence Its Live: 1. 2000+ tonnes of gold shipped to New York since December, the largest inflow ever. 2. EUR fwd rate - essentially the 1yr fwd discount vs. spot EUR/USD - normally tracks spot closely but recently has diverged sharply (see chart). This indicates someone, who is rate-insensitive, is supplying dollars (or demanding euros) in the forward market strongly enough to flatten the curve even as the cash market pushes spot higher. That is precisely the footprint you would expect if a large player were selling USD fwd in size while simultaneously accumulating euros: the forward supply leans on basis/forward points, but the spot legs of those trades, whether outright EUR buys or the mirror leg of a gold swap, push spot up. In other words, the correlation break is further circumstantial evidence that the fwd leg is being used to fund something structural, not a speculative punt. 3. Last week, Treasury abruptly raised its Q2 borrowing estimate by $390 billion, primarily in short-dated bills, precisely how you'd prefund a substantial fwd settlement requiring cash delivery. Alternative Explanations (partial): Admittedly, this theory could partially be explained by other factors: 1. European institutional investors have sold large unhedged USD asset holdings, pressuring spot EUR/USD upward. 2. The massive bullion inflows to COMEX were partly driven by tariff fears, creating a profitable arb and prompting dealers to deliver gold against COMEX futures. 3. The extra bills issuance could merely be “catch-up” financing to get the TGA back to $850 bn once the debt ceiling is lifted. But if Treasury were also buying bullion for a forthcoming FX swap, the mechanics would look identical on headline borrowing data: issue bills now (shows up as higher net borrowing), pay bullion suppliers (cash outflow eats into the TGA), sell the gold for dollars at forward settlement. It also doesn’t fully explain why the EUR/USD fwd curve has flattened steadily across longer maturities, nor why the forward vs spot correlation would break so decisively, nor the curious alignment with Treasury’s sudden borrowing spike, and why COMEX stocks would remain persistently high after the tariff exemption - only bled ~1.5 mn oz...small vs the inflow. Why isn’t the metal racing back to London now that the arb is gone? Also, important to note that public ledgers still show flat official FX assets. That means either: dealer banks are warehousing the euro and yen leg until forward settlement - perfectly consistent with Miran’s structure; or we’re still “testing the plumbing” with modest ticket sizes. We should know for certain in short order, as Treasury must publish Sovereign Wealth Fund details by Sunday, May 4 and Thursday’s H.4.1 release and upcoming TIC banking data will confirm whether we're witnessing the first genuine US fx reserve build in decades, or if it’s simply an improbable set of coincidences that just happen to perfectly align with the mechanics of Miran’s gold-reserve accumulation strategy.

For the first time ever, the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee discusses stablecoins as a "new payment mechanism" and a potentially huge source of demand for US T-Bills. Key observations: 1. Stablecoin issuers currently hold >$120bn in T-bills 2. Rapid growth in stablecoins could lead to incremental demand of ~$900BN for T-Bills (size of Bill market today is $6.4TN). 3. If stablecoins experience exponential growth, demand for USTs should be correlated, likely at the expense of bank deposits 4. Stablecoins could grow to $2 trillion by 2030 in response to "continued market and regulatory breakthroughs." 5. Stablecoins could disrupt traditional banks by drawing away deposits.