3abidal
2.4K posts

3abidal
@abidalista
ex @alibabagroup 🤖https://t.co/myQBq7NY9U ⚡️https://t.co/hNlrFc4V9O 🧱https://t.co/MNvuUwtNyw











AI software development, simplified and accelerated for everyone. HUMAIN and @Replit have partnered to bring generative coding to Saudi Arabia at scale, empowering governments, enterprises, and individuals alike. Hosted on HUMAIN Cloud and powered by Replit’s AI coding tools, this partnership removes technical barriers to allow anyone to build, solve, and create. #HUMAINAI #TheEndOfLimits




بدأنا أنا و @malobeiwi رحلة بناء "آتام Atam"؛ وهي مبادرة خاصة وستارت أب مستقل تماماً، نهدف من خلاله لتطوير تقنيات دفاعية تدمج قوة الذكاء الاصطناعي بالأنظمة المستقلة وهندسة الهاردوير. 🇸🇦 نحتاج عقولاً استثنائية تشاركنا التأسيس في: • Autonomy & Computer Vision (AI) • Embedded Systems & Robotics (Drones) • Big Data Infrastructure إذا كنت ترى في نفسك القدرة على الابتكار في مشروع تقني عميق، مكانك معنا. قدم هنا: atam.careers






Software horror: litellm PyPI supply chain attack. Simple `pip install litellm` was enough to exfiltrate SSH keys, AWS/GCP/Azure creds, Kubernetes configs, git credentials, env vars (all your API keys), shell history, crypto wallets, SSL private keys, CI/CD secrets, database passwords. LiteLLM itself has 97 million downloads per month which is already terrible, but much worse, the contagion spreads to any project that depends on litellm. For example, if you did `pip install dspy` (which depended on litellm>=1.64.0), you'd also be pwnd. Same for any other large project that depended on litellm. Afaict the poisoned version was up for only less than ~1 hour. The attack had a bug which led to its discovery - Callum McMahon was using an MCP plugin inside Cursor that pulled in litellm as a transitive dependency. When litellm 1.82.8 installed, their machine ran out of RAM and crashed. So if the attacker didn't vibe code this attack it could have been undetected for many days or weeks. Supply chain attacks like this are basically the scariest thing imaginable in modern software. Every time you install any depedency you could be pulling in a poisoned package anywhere deep inside its entire depedency tree. This is especially risky with large projects that might have lots and lots of dependencies. The credentials that do get stolen in each attack can then be used to take over more accounts and compromise more packages. Classical software engineering would have you believe that dependencies are good (we're building pyramids from bricks), but imo this has to be re-evaluated, and it's why I've been so growingly averse to them, preferring to use LLMs to "yoink" functionality when it's simple enough and possible.

LiteLLM HAS BEEN COMPROMISED, DO NOT UPDATE. We just discovered that LiteLLM pypi release 1.82.8. It has been compromised, it contains litellm_init.pth with base64 encoded instructions to send all the credentials it can find to remote server + self-replicate. link below














