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Spotify launches new fitness feature today with guided workouts for strength, cardio, yoga & meditation. Free + Premium users get access to dozens of curated workout playlists, while Premium users unlock 1,400+ on-demand Peloton classes.

Lebanese villages erased from apple and Google maps.

Time for a big systems advice thread! In distributed systems there's no magic "push everything to prod at once" button. Every service gets pushed independently and nodes within a service get updated incrementally. If you mess up forwards/backwards compatibility you can fail irrecoverably. So how to avoid this? 1/5: Decouple data and code changes. Never push out a release that changes how data is stored at the same time as the code that uses this new data. If there's a bug and you need to roll back to the old version of your code it won't be able to handle the new data in the new format. Instead push out a release that first changes the data in a way that’s compatible with both the old and new code (e.g., optional fields etc), when that’s stable push out the new code that uses it, then when that’s stable you can change the data to remove backwards compatibility. This is known as a “migration” in the database world and yes it’s annoying, but yes you need to do it.

Software horror: litellm PyPI supply chain attack. Simple `pip install litellm` was enough to exfiltrate SSH keys, AWS/GCP/Azure creds, Kubernetes configs, git credentials, env vars (all your API keys), shell history, crypto wallets, SSL private keys, CI/CD secrets, database passwords. LiteLLM itself has 97 million downloads per month which is already terrible, but much worse, the contagion spreads to any project that depends on litellm. For example, if you did `pip install dspy` (which depended on litellm>=1.64.0), you'd also be pwnd. Same for any other large project that depended on litellm. Afaict the poisoned version was up for only less than ~1 hour. The attack had a bug which led to its discovery - Callum McMahon was using an MCP plugin inside Cursor that pulled in litellm as a transitive dependency. When litellm 1.82.8 installed, their machine ran out of RAM and crashed. So if the attacker didn't vibe code this attack it could have been undetected for many days or weeks. Supply chain attacks like this are basically the scariest thing imaginable in modern software. Every time you install any depedency you could be pulling in a poisoned package anywhere deep inside its entire depedency tree. This is especially risky with large projects that might have lots and lots of dependencies. The credentials that do get stolen in each attack can then be used to take over more accounts and compromise more packages. Classical software engineering would have you believe that dependencies are good (we're building pyramids from bricks), but imo this has to be re-evaluated, and it's why I've been so growingly averse to them, preferring to use LLMs to "yoink" functionality when it's simple enough and possible.