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$KAS vs. MEV resistance (and a little bonus at the end) How Kaspa wants to tackle one of the most significant "bugs" of Decentralized finance? Majority of people does not even know what the term MEV means and how it affects the users of it. MEV = maximum extractable value or in other words it is the maximum value that a miner/validator can extract from a single transaction. It does not sound it could be any harmful to regular users, however, due to design of traditional blockchains (such as Ethereum, Solana, BTC, etc.) sophisticated players can attach your transaction to gain an extra profit at your expense (front-running, back-running, sandwich attacks, etc.). So how $Kaspa wants to solve this problem? With a credit to @MichaelSuttonIL I will use his picture of @hashdag recent presentation showing how parallelism can introduce an effective competing market amongst miners -> since blockDAG allows for a parallel confirmation of blocks you can see that at each point in time there are several blocks (see the parts in blue) -> and the more the blocks per second (currently mainnet 1bps, testnet 10bps and goal is 100bps) the more parallelism takes place and the better the competition is (Please note that all famous blockchains dont have parallelism and there is a monopoly for a successful miner/validator to decide if he/she behaves honestly or not) So having a high bps will not only increase the throughput (increase in speed will be unnoticeable for users) but most importantly it would drastically increase the level of competition between miners and thus it would significantlty increase the level of safety for a regular user. We should also touch the mechanics of this competition -> miners will set a percentage of mined transaction fee that they are willing to add back to the originator of a transaction -> and since the one who adds back the most wins there will be incentive to eliminate the MEV attacks because such miner would be unlikely to win the transaction auction. And now the little bonus :) ORACLE problem: The Oracle Problem in cryptocurrency and blockchain refers to the inherent challenge of reliably connecting blockchain systems, which are deterministic and trustless, with external data sources (referred to as "oracles") that are often centralized, mutable, and require trust. This problem arises because blockchains, by design, cannot directly access off-chain data, yet many decentralized applications (dApps), particularly in DeFi (Decentralized Finance), need real-world information such as price feeds, weather data, or event outcomes. Is there a way how to tackle this issue with a high parallelism Kaspa would once allow? In the recent presentation Yonatan Sompolinsky mentioned that he is working on a solution for the Oracle problem in a similar way as he developed for MEV. He just briefly touched this topic and did not go into any details but my understanding is that various data providers who would be responsible for transfer of outside the blockdag information to kaspa network would be competing in terms of reliability and those with a bad track record would not be used be users (defi applications) so there would be a natural incentive to bring correct oracle data to blockdag. This is very interesting thought and YS again proved all of us that he is always 2 steps ahead of the herd...what a legend :) youtube.com/live/VquMb8TUp…

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