bucca

🚨 BREAKING: Opus 4.6 ROASTS the claude code codebase and gives it the same score as GPT 5.4 ... 6.5 💀 > That's not a file, that's a startup > That's not state management, that's hoarding > Some of these TODOs have been there long enough to vote

🚨 INACREDITÁVEL 🚨 A F1 postou o onboard da pole de Antonelli, mas a partir do minuto 1:02 simplesmente mudam para uma câmera externa. É nesse ponto da pista (antes da 130R) que ocorre o super clipping, com os pilotos perdendo 50 km/h mesmo acelerando.

NBA estava tão doida ontem que tivemos a versão “RESERVA DE MAGRÃO” após Timberwolves x Rockets. Torcedor esculachou KD e todo mundo. Kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk

Davi Brito nasceu para o entretenimento de baixa qualidade é uma entrega de corpo e alma ao showbuziness

Software horror: litellm PyPI supply chain attack. Simple `pip install litellm` was enough to exfiltrate SSH keys, AWS/GCP/Azure creds, Kubernetes configs, git credentials, env vars (all your API keys), shell history, crypto wallets, SSL private keys, CI/CD secrets, database passwords. LiteLLM itself has 97 million downloads per month which is already terrible, but much worse, the contagion spreads to any project that depends on litellm. For example, if you did `pip install dspy` (which depended on litellm>=1.64.0), you'd also be pwnd. Same for any other large project that depended on litellm. Afaict the poisoned version was up for only less than ~1 hour. The attack had a bug which led to its discovery - Callum McMahon was using an MCP plugin inside Cursor that pulled in litellm as a transitive dependency. When litellm 1.82.8 installed, their machine ran out of RAM and crashed. So if the attacker didn't vibe code this attack it could have been undetected for many days or weeks. Supply chain attacks like this are basically the scariest thing imaginable in modern software. Every time you install any depedency you could be pulling in a poisoned package anywhere deep inside its entire depedency tree. This is especially risky with large projects that might have lots and lots of dependencies. The credentials that do get stolen in each attack can then be used to take over more accounts and compromise more packages. Classical software engineering would have you believe that dependencies are good (we're building pyramids from bricks), but imo this has to be re-evaluated, and it's why I've been so growingly averse to them, preferring to use LLMs to "yoink" functionality when it's simple enough and possible.

People who spent $700 on a mac mini to run an openclaw agent watching claude launch all the features natively for $20

Just look at the difference a year makes

reassisti duna 1 e 2 e sinceramente ?