Tinashe Madondo

AI Law won’t work, stop massaging your egos with these AI written arguments. Those who know the law have already said the facts and that is what will carry the day if the amendments were to be made….

Utter nonsense. To quote another eminent lawyer: “This opinion is woefully mistaken and fundamentally wrong. The mistake emanates from at least three oversights from the Constitutional text as a whole: 1. Firstly, section 95(2) does not leave a lacuna in the Constitution that could be filled by a new provision that the President’s term could run for 7, 8 or 10 years. The phrase “except as provided for in this Constitution” must be read with the existing Constitutional text which provides for several scenarios where a President’s term would not be 5 years (I.e. would be less than 5 years). If, for example, the coup had been in 2014 instead of in 2017, the four years of Mugabe’s term that ED served would not have been 5 years in length but would have counted as a term per section 91. That is what the purpose of the phrase is, not so that Parliament could later insert some new clause that extends the President’s term. 2. Secondly, the opinion overlooks several other provisions that restrict the president’s term of office to 5 years. To be fair to Mr Nyambirai he accepts that his argument is based on an assumption that section 95 is the only provision which restricts the President’s term of office to 5 years. It’s not. Section 158(2) as read with section 143(1) also restrict the President’s term of office to 5 years since Parliament has a 5 year term and parliamentary elections have to be held concurrently with presidential elections. These are peremptory provisions. These provisions would need to be amended for ED to stay in office after 2028. 3. Thirdly, the opinion does not take into account the very broad definition of a term limit provision in section 328 and, most crucially, does not consider the words of section 328(7) which say that an amendment to a term limit provision “the effect of which would be to extend the length of term that the a person may hold office”. Therefore, section 328(7) is focused on the effect of the amendment - not technicalities. If its effect is to extend someone’s time in office, the incumbent cannot benefit.

While I appreciate the academic effort to distinguish "term lengths" from "term limits," the argument is dangerous legal sophistry. It uses a strained, technical interpretation to find a semantic loophole in an unambiguous constitutional firewall. The argument is unconstitutional, failing for three primary reasons: 1. It creates a false dichotomy between "term length" and "term limit." 2. It catastrophically misapplies the Mupungu precedent. 3. It willfully ignores the purposive language of Section 328(7). I will break these down below: 1. The False Dichotomy The central thesis that Section 95(2) (a 5-year length) is not a "term-limit provision" and thus evades Section 328(7); is a distinction without a legal difference. A "term limit" of two terms (S. 91) is meaningless without the "term length" of five years (S. 95). They are inextricably linked. Arguing that Parliament can change the "length" to 20 years but not the "limit" of two terms renders the principle of limited government absurd. Furthermore, the claim that S. 95 is "flexible" is a severe misreading: "Except as otherwise provided...": This is a standard harmonization clause referring to existing provisions (like S. 158 wartime extensions), not a loophole for future amendments.  "Coterminous with... Parliament": This reinforces the 5-year term (S. 143), as it provides for shortening a term via early dissolution, not a basis for unilateral extension. 2. The Misapplication of Mupungu The reliance on Mupungu v. Minister of Justice (CCZ 7/21) is a critical legal error. In Mupungu, the Court ruled a judge's retirement age was not a term limit because it was a "non-specific effluxion of time" (contingent on a birthdate). A 5-year presidential term is the exact opposite: it is the very definition of a "fixed, determinable period." Therefore, the Mupungu precedent actually supports the conclusion that S. 95(2) is a term-limit provision, entirely defeating the argument. 3. The Disregard of Section 328(7) This is the argument's fatal flaw. The framers of S. 328(7) anticipated exactly this semantic trickery. The safeguard does not just ban amending "Section 91(2)"; it bans any amendment to a "term-limit provision" "the effect of which is to extend the length of time..." A court will not ask what label is put on the amendment ("length adjustment"). It will ask what its effect is. The only possible effect of amending "five years" to "seven years" is to "extend the length of time" the incumbent holds office. Therefore, S. 328(7) applies directly and prohibits the incumbent from benefiting. 4. A Note on Misreading Section 91(2) The claim that S. 91(2) sets a minimum term ("three or more years") but no upper cap is a stunning misinterpretation. That clause is an anti-circumvention provision to define what counts as a "full term," preventing a president from resigning after 4 years and claiming it "doesn't count." It in no way implies a term can be longer than the 5 years explicitly set in S. 95. This argument by the Professor who is yet to conclude his legal studies is an exercise in constitutional vandalism. The legal position is unambiguous and rests on a "double-lock" mechanism: 1. Any amendment changing "five years" to "seven" has the effect of extending the incumbent's time in office. 2. Section 328(7) explicitly prohibits such an amendment from benefiting the incumbent. 3. To make this amendment apply to the incumbent, Section 328(7) must first be repealed. 4. Repealing S. 328(7) requires a national referendum, as mandated by S. 328(9) and S. 328(6). Any attempt to bypass this referendum via a semantic "term length" trick would be a flagrant violation of the Constitution and should be struck down. I thank you. 🙏

Superb and correct riposte.

While I appreciate the academic effort to distinguish "term lengths" from "term limits," the argument is dangerous legal sophistry. It uses a strained, technical interpretation to find a semantic loophole in an unambiguous constitutional firewall. The argument is unconstitutional, failing for three primary reasons: 1. It creates a false dichotomy between "term length" and "term limit." 2. It catastrophically misapplies the Mupungu precedent. 3. It willfully ignores the purposive language of Section 328(7). I will break these down below: 1. The False Dichotomy The central thesis that Section 95(2) (a 5-year length) is not a "term-limit provision" and thus evades Section 328(7); is a distinction without a legal difference. A "term limit" of two terms (S. 91) is meaningless without the "term length" of five years (S. 95). They are inextricably linked. Arguing that Parliament can change the "length" to 20 years but not the "limit" of two terms renders the principle of limited government absurd. Furthermore, the claim that S. 95 is "flexible" is a severe misreading: "Except as otherwise provided...": This is a standard harmonization clause referring to existing provisions (like S. 158 wartime extensions), not a loophole for future amendments.  "Coterminous with... Parliament": This reinforces the 5-year term (S. 143), as it provides for shortening a term via early dissolution, not a basis for unilateral extension. 2. The Misapplication of Mupungu The reliance on Mupungu v. Minister of Justice (CCZ 7/21) is a critical legal error. In Mupungu, the Court ruled a judge's retirement age was not a term limit because it was a "non-specific effluxion of time" (contingent on a birthdate). A 5-year presidential term is the exact opposite: it is the very definition of a "fixed, determinable period." Therefore, the Mupungu precedent actually supports the conclusion that S. 95(2) is a term-limit provision, entirely defeating the argument. 3. The Disregard of Section 328(7) This is the argument's fatal flaw. The framers of S. 328(7) anticipated exactly this semantic trickery. The safeguard does not just ban amending "Section 91(2)"; it bans any amendment to a "term-limit provision" "the effect of which is to extend the length of time..." A court will not ask what label is put on the amendment ("length adjustment"). It will ask what its effect is. The only possible effect of amending "five years" to "seven years" is to "extend the length of time" the incumbent holds office. Therefore, S. 328(7) applies directly and prohibits the incumbent from benefiting. 4. A Note on Misreading Section 91(2) The claim that S. 91(2) sets a minimum term ("three or more years") but no upper cap is a stunning misinterpretation. That clause is an anti-circumvention provision to define what counts as a "full term," preventing a president from resigning after 4 years and claiming it "doesn't count." It in no way implies a term can be longer than the 5 years explicitly set in S. 95. This argument by the Professor who is yet to conclude his legal studies is an exercise in constitutional vandalism. The legal position is unambiguous and rests on a "double-lock" mechanism: 1. Any amendment changing "five years" to "seven" has the effect of extending the incumbent's time in office. 2. Section 328(7) explicitly prohibits such an amendment from benefiting the incumbent. 3. To make this amendment apply to the incumbent, Section 328(7) must first be repealed. 4. Repealing S. 328(7) requires a national referendum, as mandated by S. 328(9) and S. 328(6). Any attempt to bypass this referendum via a semantic "term length" trick would be a flagrant violation of the Constitution and should be struck down. I thank you. 🙏

While I appreciate the academic effort to distinguish "term lengths" from "term limits," the argument is dangerous legal sophistry. It uses a strained, technical interpretation to find a semantic loophole in an unambiguous constitutional firewall. The argument is unconstitutional, failing for three primary reasons: 1. It creates a false dichotomy between "term length" and "term limit." 2. It catastrophically misapplies the Mupungu precedent. 3. It willfully ignores the purposive language of Section 328(7). I will break these down below: 1. The False Dichotomy The central thesis that Section 95(2) (a 5-year length) is not a "term-limit provision" and thus evades Section 328(7); is a distinction without a legal difference. A "term limit" of two terms (S. 91) is meaningless without the "term length" of five years (S. 95). They are inextricably linked. Arguing that Parliament can change the "length" to 20 years but not the "limit" of two terms renders the principle of limited government absurd. Furthermore, the claim that S. 95 is "flexible" is a severe misreading: "Except as otherwise provided...": This is a standard harmonization clause referring to existing provisions (like S. 158 wartime extensions), not a loophole for future amendments.  "Coterminous with... Parliament": This reinforces the 5-year term (S. 143), as it provides for shortening a term via early dissolution, not a basis for unilateral extension. 2. The Misapplication of Mupungu The reliance on Mupungu v. Minister of Justice (CCZ 7/21) is a critical legal error. In Mupungu, the Court ruled a judge's retirement age was not a term limit because it was a "non-specific effluxion of time" (contingent on a birthdate). A 5-year presidential term is the exact opposite: it is the very definition of a "fixed, determinable period." Therefore, the Mupungu precedent actually supports the conclusion that S. 95(2) is a term-limit provision, entirely defeating the argument. 3. The Disregard of Section 328(7) This is the argument's fatal flaw. The framers of S. 328(7) anticipated exactly this semantic trickery. The safeguard does not just ban amending "Section 91(2)"; it bans any amendment to a "term-limit provision" "the effect of which is to extend the length of time..." A court will not ask what label is put on the amendment ("length adjustment"). It will ask what its effect is. The only possible effect of amending "five years" to "seven years" is to "extend the length of time" the incumbent holds office. Therefore, S. 328(7) applies directly and prohibits the incumbent from benefiting. 4. A Note on Misreading Section 91(2) The claim that S. 91(2) sets a minimum term ("three or more years") but no upper cap is a stunning misinterpretation. That clause is an anti-circumvention provision to define what counts as a "full term," preventing a president from resigning after 4 years and claiming it "doesn't count." It in no way implies a term can be longer than the 5 years explicitly set in S. 95. This argument by the Professor who is yet to conclude his legal studies is an exercise in constitutional vandalism. The legal position is unambiguous and rests on a "double-lock" mechanism: 1. Any amendment changing "five years" to "seven" has the effect of extending the incumbent's time in office. 2. Section 328(7) explicitly prohibits such an amendment from benefiting the incumbent. 3. To make this amendment apply to the incumbent, Section 328(7) must first be repealed. 4. Repealing S. 328(7) requires a national referendum, as mandated by S. 328(9) and S. 328(6). Any attempt to bypass this referendum via a semantic "term length" trick would be a flagrant violation of the Constitution and should be struck down. I thank you. 🙏

Mayor, if the intention was to make section 95(2) a presidential term limiting provision, wouldn’t it have been better to adopt the simplicity of Article 56 of the Indian Constitution? 📜 Article 56: Term of Office of President (1) The President shall hold office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office: Provided that— (a) the President may resign from his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Vice-President; (b) the President may, for violation of the Constitution, be removed from office by impeachment in the manner provided in Article 61; and (c) the President shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term, continue to hold office until his successor enters upon his office.

The opinion that a constitutional loophole exists to extend the presidential term for an incumbent is not the discovery of a clever legal pathway; it is a constitutional fantasy. The proposition dangerously conflates creative wordplay with legal reality and represents a frontal assault on the foundational principles of the Republic of Zimbabwe. The argument's core, distinguishing an "insertion" from an "amendment"; is a semantic game. Any change that alters the Constitution's legal effect is an amendment and is therefore subject to the full, unyielding rigour of Section 328. Likewise, the phrase "...except as otherwise provided..." in Section 95 is not a procedural backdoor; it is a standard drafting tool for internal consistency, not an open invitation to override the definitive five-year term at will.   Crucially, both the duration of a term (Section 95) and the number of terms (Section 91) are indivisible "term-limit provisions". Any attempt to extend the term's length runs directly into the constitutional fortress built by Section 328.   1The Anti-Incumbent Firewall: Section 328(7) is absolute and unambiguous. It explicitly prohibits an amendment extending a term limit from applying to "any person who held or occupied that office... at any time before the amendment". This clause was purpose-built to stop precisely this kind of self-serving maneuver.   

 2The Referendum Double-Lock: To bypass this firewall, one would have to amend Section 328(7) itself. This triggers the double-lock mechanism in Section 328(9), which subjects any such change to the highest possible procedural hurdle: a national referendum, the same required to amend the Declaration of Rights.   

 Finally, beyond these insurmountable procedural barriers, such a scheme would be a profound violation of the Constitution's foundational spirit. The principles of "regular elections" and "the orderly transfer of power" enshrined in Section 3 are not mere suggestions. An amendment that seeks to destroy these core tenets could be challenged as an "unconstitutional constitutional amendment"—an act that mutilates the very identity of our national charter.   The notion of a loophole is, therefore, a legal absurdity. The Constitution is not a flimsy document to be bent by political ambition; it is a fortress, deliberately constructed with layered defences. Any attempt to proceed down this path is an act of constitutional vandalism, destined to fail before any court committed to upholding the supreme law of the land.