Vidhya Ananthakrishnan

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Vidhya Ananthakrishnan

Vidhya Ananthakrishnan

@byvidhya

Curious | Investments at Accel | ex-Apna, BCG

Katılım Kasım 2023
169 Takip Edilen89 Takipçiler
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Vidhya Ananthakrishnan
Vidhya Ananthakrishnan@byvidhya·
Meesho opens for IPO subscription today as India's largest ecommerce player by shipments, beating Amazon and Flipkart to become the first horizontal consumer internet IPO. 210M users. 88% outside top 8 cities. Here's why they solved a problem the incumbents are structurally incapable of solving (Details 🧵below) : Everyone thinks Meesho won by being "the cheap option." Wrong. Meesho won by recognizing that 200M+ Indians were structurally locked out of organized ecommerce. Not because they didn't want it. Because serving them profitably was impossible with existing cost structures. The core insight: You can't serve Rs 200 transactions with infrastructure built for Rs 2000 transactions.
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Vidhya Ananthakrishnan
Vidhya Ananthakrishnan@byvidhya·
An interesting quote I read today : "The market for feeling productive is orders of magnitude larger than the market for being productive. Most people, most of the time, want to click and watch the number go up. They do not want to be told the number is fake. They will pay in time, in attention, in actual money to keep the number going up." Felt like AI is riding this wave, not sure how many of us are using the tools we have to our fullest potential
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Kshitij Khandelwal
Kshitij Khandelwal@kshitijgokul·
Got married to MY WIFE who I love very much so that we can finally HOLD HANDS!! 🥹♥️
Kshitij Khandelwal tweet mediaKshitij Khandelwal tweet mediaKshitij Khandelwal tweet media
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Vidhya Ananthakrishnan
Vidhya Ananthakrishnan@byvidhya·
This single line from @danhockenmaier nails why the “AI agents kill all marketplaces” take, falls apart at the heavily-managed end. “Anthropic/OpenAI aren’t about to start accepting returns, financing buyers, or building their own driver fleets and logistics networks.” That capital-intensive, physical-world grind? Still very much a human (and moated) game. Gives us more hope for the longevity of Indian ops heavy consumer tech plays
Dan Hockenmaier@danhockenmaier

Takeaway from the Citrini backlash should not be that all marketplaces are immune to AI, just that DoorDash was a particularly bad example to choose. Defensibility is largely a product of how far they are to the right on this spectrum. The argument is "agents will just transact on your behalf and look for lowest price" This is massively flawed for two reasons in the case of DD: 1. Price is function of network density. You must be able to optimize routes and batch orders to win 2. Even if someone else could win on price, customers care about many other things (selection, quality, service, all of which DD has invested in heavily) So you can’t build a good agentic food delivery product without DD cooperation. And for obvious reasons, they will not cooperate. But it doesn’t follow that this will play out everywhere. The more heavily managed a marketplace is, the harder it is for someone else to cut in. There are basically 4 levels of marketplace: 1. Lead gen: just a list of suppliers 2. Transactional: also handle payment 3. Managed: also take on risk (returns, net terms) 4. Heavily managed: also manage service delivery Google has been trying to eat the marketplace profit pool for many years, and really only succeeded in taking most of it away from lead gen marketplaces. LLMs are another aggregation layer like Google, but with two big differences: search is much better, and critically, they can transact on your behalf. So LLMs should be able to push up one step farther in the stack, and take on transactional marketplaces directly. But is Anthropic going to try to do the final two jobs of managing risk or managing service delivery itself? Are they going to start accepting returns? Offering financing terms to buyers? Are they going to manage their own drivers or build their own logistics network. That seems very unlikely. As a result, managed marketplaces are largely safe. Marketplaces that do the hardest, most capital intensive, most scale-dependent stuff will get rewarded for it. I wrote an essay on this here: danhock.co/p/llms-vs-mark…

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Vidhya Ananthakrishnan
Vidhya Ananthakrishnan@byvidhya·
Everyone talks about diversifying stocks and asset classes. But nobody talks about diversifying currency. Nifty returned 94% over 5 years. S&P returned 81%. Though the Indian market performed better, rupee fell 21% against the dollar. So S&P in rupee terms? 119%. If we only invested in Indian markets we made 25% less. Your returns aren’t just about asset selection especially if it’s denominated with a depreciating currency. It’s time you hedged the currency risk and invested in multiple markets as well.
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Deepinder Goyal
Deepinder Goyal@deepigoyal·
Last one on this topic, and I have been holding this in myself for a while. For centuries, class divides kept the labor of the poor invisible to the rich. Factory workers toiled behind walls, farmers in distant fields, domestic help in backrooms. The wealthy consumed the fruits of that labor without ever seeing the faces or the fatigue behind it. No direct encounter, no personal guilt. The gig economy shattered that invisibility, at unprecedented scale. Suddenly, the poor aren't hidden away. They're at your doorstep: the delivery partner handing over your ₹1000+ biryani, late-night groceries, or quick-commerce essentials. You see them in the rain, heat, traffic, often on borrowed bikes, working 8–10 hours for earnings that give them sustenance. You see their exhaustion, their polite smile masking frustration with life in general. This is the first time in history at this scale that the working class and consuming class interact face-to-face, transaction after transaction. And that discomfort with our own selves is why we are uncomfortable about the gig economy. We want these people to look our part, so that the guilt we feel while taking orders from them feels less. We aren't just debating economics. We are confronting guilt. That ₹800 order might equal their entire day's earnings after fuel, bike rent, and app cuts. We tip awkwardly, or avoid eye contact, because the inequality is no longer abstract. It's personal. Pre-gig era, the rich could enjoy luxury without moral discomfort. Labor was out of sight. Now, every doorbell ring is a reminder of systemic inequality. That's why debates explode. It's not just policy. It's emotional reckoning. Some defend the system (“they choose it”), others demand change (“this isn't progress, its exploitation”). And here’s the uncomfortable twist: the unsaid ask of clumsy ‘solutions’ isn’t dignity. It is about returning to invisibility. Ban gig work and you don’t solve inequality. You remove livelihoods. These jobs don’t magically reappear as formal, protected employment the next day. They disappear, or they get pushed back into the informal economy where there are even fewer protections and even less accountability. Over-regulate it until the model breaks, and you achieve the same outcome through paperwork instead of slogans: the work evaporates, prices rise, demand collapses, and the people we claim to protect are the first to lose income. And then what happens? The rich get their old comfort back. Convenience returns without faces. Guilt dissolves. We go back to clean abstractions and moral posturing from a distance. The poor don’t become safer, they become invisible again: back in cash economies, back in backrooms, back in shadows where regulation rarely reaches and dignity isn’t even debated. The gig economy just exposed the reality of inequality to the people who previously had the luxury of not seeing it. The doorbell is not the problem. The question is what we do after opening the door. Visibility is the price of progress. We can either use this discomfort to build something better (which we keep doing continuously as delivery partners are our backbone), or we can ban and over-regulate our way back into ignorance. One of those choices improves lives. The other simply helps the consuming class feel virtuous in the dark.
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Vidhya Ananthakrishnan retweetledi
Boring_Business
Boring_Business@BoringBiz_·
Henry Kravis on VC firms trying to attempt the private equity rollup strategy using AI "The problem today is that [multiple] arbitrage is closing. Small companies are waking up and saying I wont sell my company at 6x when I look at comparables and they are selling at 15x"
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Madhav Chanchani
Madhav Chanchani@madhavchanchani·
Another interesting insight from Andreessen in this interview is his take on spotting market cycles by watching where top MBA graduates choose to work - because of the embedded social signalling. “Employment decisions of graduating Harvard and Stanford Business School students are such a great indicator. They're possibly the best indicator… because if they go into tech, the market’s overblown, and if they go into banking and consulting, it’s a great time to make VC investments.” This observation dates back to the early 2000s during the dot-com bust. At the time, startups were bucketed into two categories: B2C (business-to-consumer) and B2B (business-to-business). But as companies began shutting down, job opportunities in startups dried up, and graduates shifted course. “By 2003, the line was: B2B meant back to banking, and B2C meant back to consulting.”
Madhav Chanchani@madhavchanchani

Andreessen Horowitz (a16z) almost started a hedge fund in 2020, but backed out because of a single stock recommendation. The idea was to bring a venture mindset to public markets, so the firm began searching for the right leader to run the fund. “We needed somebody with public markets experience to even be able to raise the money,” co-founder Marc Andreessen said. “So we ran a long recruiting process and got down to the final candidate. We met with him during COVID.” In September 2021, they asked this finalist to present his best idea - the one company he would commit the portfolio to? Andreessen recalls: “Would you like to guess what it was? Peloton. Oh my God. Which then proceeded to fall 99.9%.” At that time, people believed Peloton wasn’t just a hardware company but a movement — even a cult. “During COVID, people overestimated the permanence of behaviour changes,” Andreessen said. “Fitness has historically been a trend and fad-driven business. So that just felt like a message from God.” He still believes you can apply a venture mindset to mega-caps and get “venture-scale returns” - if you get the calls right. But he also argues that illiquidity is what makes venture work: “I would just tell you, one of the things that saves venture is that we’re locked up and our investors are locked up. It's a feature, not a bug. It’s an incredible feature.”

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Vidhya Ananthakrishnan
Vidhya Ananthakrishnan@byvidhya·
8/8: Incompetence or strategy? Doesn’t matter. Indigo avoided ₹1,000 crore in costs. Got regulatory relief. Competitors still comply with stricter rules. And every airline in India just learned: own enough infrastructure, and regulations become negotiable.
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Vidhya Ananthakrishnan
Vidhya Ananthakrishnan@byvidhya·
7/8: It works because of market structure. 65% domestic share. 10 million passengers monthly. In aviation, capacity is frozen, you can’t add planes or pilots overnight and grab marketshare. If Indigo runs at 75% capacity, it’s a national crisis. They’re infrastructure, not just a company.
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Vidhya Ananthakrishnan
Vidhya Ananthakrishnan@byvidhya·
Did Indigo just pull off the biggest regulatory heist in Indian aviation? 18 months to prepare for new pilot rules. November saw ~1,200 cancellations. Early December: saw a total meltdown. Within 72 hours: rules suspended. Pilot unions are screaming “arm-twisting.” The timeline is unbelievable. (Detailed 🧵 below)
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Vidhya Ananthakrishnan
Vidhya Ananthakrishnan@byvidhya·
One Bad Week Erases 10,000 Good Days @IndiGo6E built India’s most dominant airline. 65% market share. 90% on-time performance for years. 2,700 daily flights. 10 million passengers a month. The benchmark for operational excellence in India. Last week, it collapsed. On-time performance dropped from 84% in October to 8.5% in early December. Over 1,300 flights cancelled in 48 hours. 600+ cancellations in a single day. The CEO called it a “system reboot.” Running an operational business is one of the hardest things to do at scale. The margin for error is zero. The pressure is relentless. And when it breaks, it breaks fast. Your past performance is just marketing. Your current performance is the entire product. Here’s what makes this brutal: Indigo executed flawlessly for years. Lowest cancellation rate among majors. 15th most punctual airline globally. ₹71,000 crore in revenue. They proved they could run 2,700 flights a day better than anyone in India. None of it matters now. Passengers don’t care about last month’s stats when their flight today is cancelled. And rightfully so, because when you’re the customer in that moment, history is irrelevant. Most businesses compound their wins. Ship a great product, it pays dividends for years. Build brand equity, it carries you through rough patches. Operational businesses don’t get that luxury. Every day is the product. Every interaction resets the score. What people miss: operational excellence at scale is a tightrope with no safety net. Everyone sees Indigo failed to plan for new pilot duty rules. That’s obvious. Here’s what’s not obvious: the very things that made Indigo dominant are what made them fragile. Maximum utilization. Lean operations. Tight scheduling. Aggressive growth. These aren’t bugs, they’re features. They’re how you achieve 65% market share and industry-leading margins. Until one variable changes. Then the entire system has no slack to absorb the shock. A roster adjustment cascades into flight cancellations. A software glitch compounds into a multi-day crisis. The efficiency that won you the market becomes the rigidity that breaks you. This is the hidden tradeoff in operational businesses at scale: you optimize for perfect execution, but perfect execution requires perfect conditions. Build in redundancy and buffers, and you lose the cost advantage that let you dominate in the first place. Indigo’s real mistake wasn’t poor planning. It was believing they could maintain monopoly-level efficiency AND have crisis-level resilience. At 2,700 flights a day, you can’t have both. The higher the standard you set, the harder you fall. Indigo set the standard for Indian aviation. That’s exactly why this week destroyed more trust than a lower-tier airline would have lost. Can they recover? Probably. Their 65% market share and network effects buy them time. But recovery in operational businesses is uniquely brutal. They have to fix the problem while still running 2,700 flights a day. There’s no pause button. No relaunch moment. Just the grind of executing correctly again, one flight at a time, while bleeding trust and revenue to competitors who are getting it right today. And even after they fix staffing and rostering, the work never ends. Operational excellence isn’t a problem you solve once. It’s a standard you have to defend every single day, forever. That’s what makes operational businesses so unforgiving. And so deeply impressive and extremely respectful when done right.
IndiGo@IndiGo6E

We are sorry 🙏

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