Anon@Greynxgga69
The histories of all particular animals (including humans) are manifestations of natural history, but the histories of non-human animals do not have logics distinguishable from their basic biological and environmental content. Human history, by contrast, cannot be explained in biophysical terms.
You cannot rigorously explain the distinctions between human social forms by looking strictly at environmental contexts, our tool use, or the structure of the human body, nor can you explain the granularities of an individual humans psychology by pointing to selection pressures and instincts.
This is because human history is characterized by complex forms of social practice that enable the continuous and cross-generational development of social consciousness, which then stamps the resultant social practices with normative content.
Of course, that isn’t to say that the norms and standards baked into social practices are consolidated in a harmonious or uncontested form; all preceding history - the history of class societies - has been defined by struggles, which have resulted in more or less spontaneous reconfigurations of the moral consciousness of society, but this process never terminates in social amorality or the absolute submission of the dominated classes to the morality of the ruling class.
Rather, a one-sided stability prevails, where the ruling classes and state authorities actively fight efforts to renegotiate the moral obligations of their subjects with whatever means they have at their disposal, and in times of revolution the intellectual and moral traditions of the old society perish alongside the forms of production and class dynamics that underpinned them.
So, human social life is stamped with its own normative content grounded in social practice, and the form this assumes is dictated by the forms of social unity/antagonism that prevail in a given conjuncture.
The condition for being *inside* of this process as an agent, is being able to both think and act in ways that directly reflect/are reflected into the nexus of social traditions and struggles which define human societies at any given point in time. Even the most intellectually stunted human being is a part of society as a subject, because they are nothing but a modality of the general socio-historical context that birthed them.
Animals, however, cannot participate in human society that way, because they are lack the reflexive practice/consciousness that is essential to understanding what humanity does as a species. Being is doing, and what we do is not what they do. Animals, consequently, cannot be considered social subjects, which also excludes them from any independent qualification as moral subjects, since moral teems are specific categories for social regulation.
And so, animals only demand moral consideration inasmuch as we collectively act as their custodians, and in the process condition the animals under consideration to occupy various social roles, roles which often come with different degrees of implied anthropomorphism that amplify or reduce the moral gravity of harming them in one form or another.
We have obligations to animals the same way we have obligations to protect the graves and bodies of the dead; neither are human beings, but they are both morally significant because of their specific connections to human social being, and this is ultimately what makes our obligations concerning them important as well.
A person killing a house-pet would be wrong because it is a violation of the social bonds and obligations that have been cultivated between humanity and the animals we have domesticated, but hunting and the slaughter of livestock is permissible because neither of these *must* by necessity reflect or create damage to the integrity of any given social body.
This is ultimately why I find most common cases for veganism unconvincing. If you think Im wrong please explain