Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz
The Collapse of Deterrence Against Iran?
Paradoxically, one of the most serious consequences of this campaign may be the erosion of deterrence vis-à-vis Iran, specifically, the loss of the implicit sword hanging over Tehran as it considers whether to move toward nuclear weapons capability.
For years, one of the main factors restraining the Iranian leadership under Khamenei from openly advancing toward a bomb was the fear that doing so could trigger a large-scale military campaign aimed not merely at damaging Iran’s capabilities, but at threatening the regime itself.
From Tehran’s perspective, however, Iran has now endured precisely such a confrontation and survived it.
More importantly, the conflict exposed the significant limitations facing both Israel and the United States in any future campaign against Iran: the reluctance to commit ground forces, constraints on available munitions, and Israel’s deep operational and strategic dependence on the United States.
At the same time, Iran may have concluded that its ability to threaten or disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, thereby inflicting severe damage on the global economy, gives it a level of coercive leverage that the West is ultimately unwilling to challenge decisively.
It is important to acknowledge that Iran withstood an unprecedented military assault in terms of the scale of firepower directed against it, yet the regime remained intact and did not capitulate. That reality may lead Tehran to conclude that the deterrent credibility of both Israel and the United States has been fundamentally weakened.
This perception could become even stronger after the U.S. elections and under future American administrations, many of which may be even less willing to enter into direct confrontation with Iran. From Tehran’s perspective, Iran’s resilience during the conflict may have shattered the aura of overwhelming Israeli-American deterrence.
Paradoxically, deterrence may have been more effective when it remained ambiguous and untested. Once military power was actually employed, it may have demonstrated the limits, rather than the strength, of Western coercive capacity against Iran.
This is a deeply consequential development. One indication is that Iran reportedly adopted tougher positions in post-war negotiations than it held before the conflict began. The loss of the deterrence card could ultimately convince the Iranian leadership that this is precisely the moment to move toward nuclear weapons capability, believing that neither Israel nor the United States possesses either the will or the ability to stop it.
The core problem is that neither Israel nor the United States was prepared, or perhaps even capable, of going all the way in a confrontation with Iran. Instead, they appeared to rely on external variables, whether Kurdish unrest, internal regime instability, or hopes for political fragmentation inside Iran by supporting Ahmadinejad, as substitute mechanisms that could spare them the enormous manpower requirements and the prospect of a campaign stretching over months or even years.
Once those assumptions collapsed, what remained was essentially an air campaign. While tactically impressive, its achievements may ultimately pale in comparison to the strategic damage caused by exposing the actual limits of Israeli and American power in Iranian eyes.
From Tehran’s perspective, the war may have revealed not overwhelming Western dominance, but rather the boundaries of what Israel and the United States are truly willing and able to do militarily against Iran.
That, in itself, may become one of the most damaging long-term consequences of the entire campaign. This should force both Israel and the United States back to the drawing board. They will need to reassess how deterrence against Iran can be rebuilt under the current circumstances.
That will not be easy. Restoring deterrence after it has been tested , and, in Tehran’s eyes, exposed as limited, is far more difficult than maintaining an ambiguous threat that has never been put to the test. Most importantly, the conflict likely helped Iran better understand its adversaries through direct friction and real-world confrontatio.
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