Kristina Balaam retweetledi

What separates Chinese cyber ops from Five Eyes?
Three things that shifted my thinking about this topic:
1. Early cyber training (90s-2000s) happened on live targets.
Not sandboxes, not simulations...actual foreign infrastructure. The "practice" was the operation. Operational errors caught during IR back then weren't failures of tradecraft... they were the cost of learning on production.
2. The private sector operates as APT infrastructure.
Cybersecurity companies founded by former 2000s hackers (Topsec, i-SOON, Integrity Tech) were later publicly linked to state-directed operations. The line between "legitimate vendor" and "APT contractor" is deliberately blurred (by design).
3. Operators don't stay siloed in their APT group.
They rotate across teams for decades, carrying often the exact same tools, tactics with them. What we label as "different APT groups" is often the same people with different hats.
This makes attribution way messier than the tidy narrative we see in threat reports.
Worth reading this epic report published by the Zurich Centre for Security Studies if this stuff keeps you up at night:
ethz.ch/content/dam/et…
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