I sincerely doubt the number is that high. Insane if so. But the point about using a low float high FDV token to strike deals for exclusive integrations still stands. People used to say to me all the time at Euler: “do more BD.” But lack of integrations almost always was nothing to do with BD efforts. Very few people we didn’t speak to during my time there. It almost always came down to money. “So and so are offering X millions for an exclusive integration, what can you do?” I assume most of those types of deals were done with tokens and not real $ because the numbers were often eye watering. And we had 1/100th of budget or less than competitors because of the depressed EUL token price. So we would always get excluded or pushed aside once someone else came in. Sometimes people talked to us enthusiastically one day and completely ghost us the next once they’d agreed a deal elsewhere. With the benefit of hindsight I think we should have tried to take Euler private and start again with the token. But hindsight is a wonderful thing. It wasn’t the same regulatory environment as we have now and there were lots of arguments against doing that. The point is that you really need a highly valued token to compete for liquidity and integrations in lending though. The tech is very much secondary to your ability to pay in the early years to bootstrap liquidity and integrations. It does make me wonder what will happen when all these pay to play token holders start to take profit after vesting ends or hedge out their exposure though.
