削心亭@eastbind
77.7K posts

削心亭@eastbind
@eastbindAkasaka
バセドウ病で心臓がぶち壊れた老人。あぁ自由に生きたい❗️中国語でいう「時事筆記」を目指します。分野はプラモ、ミリ、電脳。あと、かーいーおにゃのこも一定数愛でております。 vi/git/mantis/c++という前世紀の遺物 height:170cm 5'7 weight:56kg 122lbs


We’re calling it: The war in Ukraine has entered a new phase. @KatStepanenko and I have authored a new special report studying how Ukraine is actively challenging the positional character of the war that has dominated the battlefield since 2023. Data on Russia’s battlefield performance indicates that the character of the war is shifting in favor of Ukrainian forces – at least for now. Russian forces rates of advances are stagnating while Ukrainian forces are employing novel tactics and operational concepts in efforts to break out of positional warfare. Neither Russia nor Ukraine can conduct operational maneuvers yet, however. The bottom line is that the war in Ukraine is competitive and far from stalemated. Ukrainian forces are out-innovating Russian forces in both military technologies and in applying these new technologies in effective operational concepts that can help Ukrainian forces break out of positional warfare. Ukraine is employing mechanized equipment in tactical maneuvers in ways that were impossible 12 months ago. Russia’s ability to conduct infiltration missions will likely continue to degrade as Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign pushes Russia’s logistics and forward operating bases further away from the frontlines, reducing resourcing to sustain infantry tasked with infiltration missions. Ukraine may be able to scale these effects if they resourced properly by international partners. Ukraine’s advantage in intermediate range strikes is notably not permanent, and Russia will very likely eventually develop countermeasures to mitigate Ukraine’s advantages. Ukraine’s international partners thus have a rare and temporary opportunity to help Ukraine exploit favorable battlefield dynamics while Ukraine has the upper hand. Key Points of the report: • Russia’s rate of advance is plummeting during the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive. • Russia is losing more soldiers to make fewer gains, with monthly Russian casualty rates reportedly outpacing monthly recruitment since December 2025. • Ukraine is starting to regain more ground than it is losing for the first time since 2023. • Ukraine’ recent counterattacks feature unique characteristics and deviate from key trends that defined the positional character of the war since 2023. • Ukraine is conducting a pattern of more frequent mechanized counterattacks at the tactical level for the first time since 2023. • The Ukrainian command’s operational planning is maturing. • Ukraine’s early 2026 counterattacks in the south were successful likely due to better planning and preparation of the battlefield. • Ukraine has been conducting a coherent campaign to suppress and destroy Russian air defenses since late 2025, in order to shape the battlefield as part of more sophisticated campaign planning. • Ukraine significantly intensified its intermediate-range strike campaign against dynamic targets in Spring 2026 in order to degrade Russian logistics at operational depths ahead of planned Ukrainian maneuver. • Ukrainian forces started actively disrupting Russian railway logistics in occupied Ukraine and Russian western regions in Spring 2026. • Ukrainian intermediate-range strikes are already achieving notable operational effects, including degrading Russia's ability to use the key Russian highway connecting Russia to occupied Crimea and GLOCs around Donetsk City. • Ukrainian forces decisively seized the initiative in intermediate-range strikes by fielding new technologies such as the US-made Hornet strike UAV, among other systems. • Ukrainian forces are achieving temporary tactical drone overmatch in some frontline sectors, which is slowing Russian offensive operations by degrading the effectiveness of Russian shaping operations. • Ukrainian forces likely achieved tactical drone overmatch in certain frontline sectors after degrading Russia’s drone capabilities in late 2025 to early 2026 - primarily by suppressing drone launch positions and increasingly intercepting Russian tactical UAVs. • Ukraine’s degradation of Russian forces at operational depth combined with tactical-level drone overmatch likely is creating vulnerabilities in the Russian lines. • Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign is likely far from its zenith, assuming continued support from Ukraine’s partners, and will likely intensify over 2026 as Ukraine fields new weapons capable of striking Russian’s operational rear. Link to full report: understandingwar.org/research/russi…

中国外務省が日本を言行不一致と批判。これ、もはやギャグですよね。 🇨🇳中国「日本は防衛費を増やして軍国主義だ!言行不一致だ!」 📊事実👉中国の軍事費は日本の数倍。南シナ海を軍事拠点化。 自分が軍拡してるのは平和のためで、日本が自衛力を高めるのは軍国主義っていう。この自分勝手なロジックを世界が信じると思ってるんですかね?

ショーコレジン届いた! コレで勝つる!(何に) #ショーコレジン


NVIDIA Vera CPUの初ベンチマークが出た。 88コアの独自設計ARM CPUが、AMD EPYC 9575Fを約10%、Intel Xeon 6980Pを約55%上回っている。 前世代Grace比で1.63倍。独立テストでARM CPUがx86最上位を超えたのは初めてだ。 ただしNVIDIAが選んだワークロード限定で、電力計測は未許可。量産出荷は2026年後半の見込み。 全方位の比較は、AMD EPYC Veniceが出揃う下半期まで持ち越しになる。 joho-todai.com/nvidia-vera-cp…


これまで「ステンレス部材」や「建機の燃料」は、中東や中国という地政学リスクに非常に脆弱な供給網で運ばれていました。 このラオス→インド→フィリピンを結ぶ「POWERR Asiaルート」は供給網のリノベーション工事をアジア全体で行っていると言えます。 それぞれの役割を読み解くと 🇱🇦ラオス 地政学的に中国とASEANを繋ぐ要衝であり、これまで中国の影響力が強かったエリア。ここに港湾・陸路インフラを整備し、中国経由ではない新たな搬入口を作りサプライチェーンの可視化し、通関の電子化を進め、有事の資材停滞をいち早く察知するセンサーの役割を担います。 🇮🇳インド POWERR Asiaの最上位概念であるQuad(日米豪印)の政治的・経済的な中心です。Quadという大きな枠組みで、特定の国(中国)の輸出規制などの影響を吸収する。 🇵🇭フィリピン 南シナ海のシーレーン(海上輸送路)を守るための地政学的な最重要拠点。日比EPAアップグレード合意は、この拠点を法的かつ具体的な供給網として固める作業です。フィリピン特産のニッケル(ステンレス・電池材料)の有事の資材供給を契約(EPA)で固める。 この多層的な防壁により、現場が「一国の機嫌一つで資材が高騰するリスク」に怯えず、安心して仕事ができる環境が守られます。このマップはその現場主義を貫くための、高市政権の現実的かつ戦略的な設計図なのです。







