

Greg Grant
4.7K posts

@gregmgrant
Future warfare, drones, autonomous systems, technology & strategy. Adjunct Senior Fellow, CNAS. Avid wargamer. Cyclist, skier, trail runner, climber, dog lover.












US pullback on long-range missiles leaves Europe exposed ft.trib.al/dihA5tN



@Playfra0 Він і намагається, але під Добропіллям росіяни відстали від графіку, отримуючи по зубах з відповідною якістю, тож в такому разі помилитися було приємно. Це при тому, що наступ тут не припиняється ще з минулої зими, коли були перші спроби прорватися через Воздвиженку. 10/


⚔️Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad sector: how the enemy attacks 📍Watch the analysis in the video. Russian forces are focusing their efforts on Hryshyne — a key axis of advance. They use the river, buildings, and tree lines as cover and routes for infantry movement. Does this help? What is the price? 🔁Share this video and follow us to stay updated on the situation in Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad sector!




**BCT COMMAND POSTS ARE SUICIDE MAGNETS IN 2025** and pretending otherwise is getting good leaders killed for doctrine written in the 1990s. The battlefield is transparent. Full-motion video drones loiter 24/7. Commercial satellite imagery refreshes every 20 minutes. OSINT hunters on Telegram geolocate a new antenna mast in under an hour. A single Starlink dish or retrans truck emitting for 10 minutes = precision strike within 35–90 minutes, depending on whose artillery or loitering munitions you’re facing. Yet U.S. Army doctrine (ATP 3-21.8, FM 6-0, etc.) still tells BCTs to place their Main CP a laughable **15–30 km behind the FLOT**, with the TAC CP “within supporting distance.” That’s inside the unblinking kill web of every peer adversary on the planet. Ukraine proved it nightly: - Russian (and Ukrainian) brigade/regiment CPs rarely survive 72 hours once located. - Emission control is a fantasy when every staff section wants Blue Force Tracker, Win-T, JADOCS, and 17 different chat apps running. - A BCT footprint—antennas, generators, CP tents, convoys—glows on radar, thermal, and RF like Times Square. **Result:** Command posts have become the enemy’s #1 High-Payoff Target, outranking even artillery and air defense. When the brigade loses its Main, the entire formation goes blind and stupid in hours. The old geometry is dead. 15–30 km is now **deep inside the enemy’s organic reconnaissance-strike complex**. That distance made sense when the primary sensor was a BMP-2’s optics and the biggest threat was a 152 mm battery with paper maps. **The new reality:** - Detection-to-destruction loop: < 60 minutes - Reliable kill range for cheap drones + precision artillery: 50–150 km (and growing) - BCT C2 nodes must assume they are under constant observation the moment they transmit or concentrate. **The fix is not better camouflage. The fix is distance and dispersion.** BCT command posts belong **80–150 km behind the forward line**, outside the enemy’s routine deep battle envelope, and we must train to fight that way **now**. - Main CP in barns, factories, underground parking garages—never the same grid twice. - TAC CPs reduced to 3–5 vehicles, jumping every 4–6 hours, emitting only in bursts. - Staff trained to run 90 % of the fight over secure reachback (TPE, Starlink, JIPCLITE) instead of co-locating. - Mission Command pushed down hard: battalion commanders own their battlespace because the brigade commander may be 120 km away and silent for hours. If you think “but we can’t do mission command at that distance,” congratulations—you just identified the training imperative. We don’t need new doctrine nearly as much as we need to stop doing CPX-F exercises inside gymnasiums 8 km from the FEBA with 100% comms uptime. The battlefield has voted. Transparent, long-range, cheap precision has killed the legacy CP concept. Keep parking your BCT Main 25 km back and you’re not brave—you’re volunteering to be the enemy’s top HPT. **Adapt or die. Train the new geometry now.**

#Lebanon / #Israel / #Iran / #USA 🇱🇧🇮🇱🇮🇷🇺🇸: #Hezbollah FPV Drones struck an #IDF “Namer” Armored Personnel Carrier in Southern Lebanon. Group used a possible Fiber-Optic FPV Kamikaze Drone — possibly armed with a PG-7 HEAT variant Anti-Tank RPG warhead.




Ukrainian company Carmine Sky has begun installing towers equipped with Sky Sentinel remotely controlled turrets to counter Russian drones, including Shaheds.

