Rob Lee

At the end of August, I interviewed Colonel Serhii Shatalov, commander of Ukraine's 37th Marine Brigade. (0:39) Shatalov's military background and experience in the war (3:28) The Krynky operation (7:55) Current situation and Russian tactics (9:10) Planting flags and social media (10:50) Infiltration tactics (14:00) Defensive tactics (17:00) Percentage of Russian casualties from UAVs (18:30) Use of fortifications and defensive tactics (20:40) When was the last time you saw a mechanized assault? (21:15) 10:1 Russian manpower advantage (22:25) Russian assault units (22:50) Russia's use of fire support (24:00) How far is Russian artillery from the FLOT? (24:40) Performance of DPICM (26:10) Main threat to Ukrainian artillery (28:00) Countermeasures against UAVs (29:40) Fiber optic cable FPVs and countermeasures (31:50) Electronic warfare (32:15) Effectiveness of HIMARS (33:25) Accuracy of FPVs (34:30) Is Russia closing the gap with UAVs? (36:00) Russia's Sudoplatov and Rubicon units (40:00) UAV vs UAV fight (41:00) How many Russian units are you facing? (42:00) How does Russia employ glide bombs? (42:40) Role of infantry and casualty evacuation (44:20) Leading mobilized servicemen (47:00) Performance of AMX-10 and NATO equipment (49:40) What lessons should NATO learn? (50:25) How would you structure a Marine battalion? (51:20) Effectiveness of mortars and MK-19 (51:45) Have UAVs made artillery or tanks obsolete?

@DChwatko @RealCynicalFox Ukrainian helicopters shot down more than 5,000 UAS last year.

@RealCynicalFox @RALee85 can someone tell me why helicopters aren't the best platform to fly around and hunt slow flying drones? Seems like that's the best way.

Today Russians attacked near Lyman. With the help of drones, Ukrainian infantry brigades destroyed 2 tanks, 5 APCs (BTR-82AT and BTR-70M), 5 BMP-3, 2 BMP-2, and more than 40 ATVs(!). A decent number of IFVs were stopped with the help of remotely placed mines. Massacre. We knew that they were planning to attack. Everyone was prepared. Two days ago, at Porkovsk direction, the 6th tank regiment attacked and lost 3 BMP-2, 1 tank, and approximately 10 ATVs. A lot of other equipment and personnel were lost near other villages at Pokrovsk direction. Spring exacerbation?

Strikes by Lasar’s Group on a battery of Russian BM-21 Grad MLRS. t.me/lasars_group/1…

The Iran war coverage focuses on oil. The slower, more consequential story is fertilizers. A near-shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz is triggering a supply shock that will show up in food prices 6-9 months from now. Putin's gains here may be more long-term than simply lining his pockets with petrodollars

Updated maps showing Russian advances near Oleksandohrad and Huliaipole. #14/51.7173539/34.2992306" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">deepstatemap.live/en#14/51.71735…

Wild Hornets (“Дикі шершні”) does not conduct any operational activity abroad In recent weeks, rumors have been circulating among military personnel, defense industry representatives, and the media claiming that representatives of our company have traveled abroad to train and deploy the highly effective STING interceptor drone in the Middle East. This information is not true. None of our representatives are involved in any international activities, training programs, or combat use of STING. We once again emphasize that the entire Wild Hornets (“Дикі шершні”) team is focused on supporting the Defense Forces of Ukraine. The enemy attacks our country daily with Shaheds, Gerberas, and various types of reconnaissance drones, so our defenders must be equipped with high-quality and original interceptors first and foremost.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov makes it official: trilateral peace talks between Russia, Ukraine, and the USA are suspended (apparently indefinitely) thanks to the Iran War. I suspect Moscow and Kyiv are secretly relieved to be done with the charade. kommersant.ru/doc/8515368?tg

Massive blood loss is №1 causes of death among the wounded. How modern technologies stop death on the front line and what the work of Air Assault Forces medics involves,- the Head of Medicine Service of the 7th Air Assault Corps, Colonel Oleksandr Falshtynskyi (@Falshtik), explains. It covers blood component storage systems, mobile solutions for stabilization points, as well as special devices that allow rapid warming and transfusion of blood. Like and share this video and subscribe to our channel!

3 years of war (2023-2026) on the Oskil front from the map of Deepstate showing the russian 🇷🇺 progress

Updated maps showing Russian advances south of Kostyantynivka and east of Kramatorsk and Ukrainian advances near Berezove. #11/47.8721440/36.5817261" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">deepstatemap.live/en#11/47.87214…

@DVKirichenko Congrats, David.

My publication for Modern War Journal, which is produced by the Modern War Institute at West Point. mwi.westpoint.edu/the-class-of-1…

This post is related to my previous one. Efficiency of targeting by artillery and FPV drones from the Russian side. Porkovsk direction. February 2026. - 1232 regiments fired 316 shells (122 and 152 mm). The efficiency was 0.5 and 0.8%. And launched 480 FPV drones. The efficiency was 57%. - 1195, 1438, 1452, and 348 regiments fired 1146 shells (122 and 152 mm). The efficiency was 1,61 %, 0,78 %, 1,65% and 1.55%. 1452 managed to open fire 146 times and hit zero times. At the same time, the efficiency of the launch of FPV drones was 54% (500 FPV were launched), 62% (480 FPV), 64% (691 FPV), and 33% (353 FPV). There are multiple reasons for the low efficiency of the artillery: from bad and different types of ammunition to unclassified artillerymen. Also, I need to add that these regiments are far from being good ones and were created in the 2022-2023 period.

“Russia retains the capability to selectively challenge U.S. interests globally by military and nonmilitary means. Its robust, advanced conventional and nuclear forces are an enduring threat to the Homeland, U.S. allies and partners, and U.S. forces abroad. The most dangerous threat posed by Russia to the U.S. is an escalatory spiral in an ongoing conflict such as Ukraine or a new conflict that led to direct hostilities, including nuclear exchanges. Russia has also cultivated partnerships with China, Iran, and North Korea to further its own interests, and makes use of an array of tools that fall into the gray zone of geopolitical competition below the level of direct armed conflict. At the same time, Russia’s aspirations for multipolarity could allow for selective collaboration with the U.S. if Moscow’s threat perceptions regarding Washington were to diminish. • Even with wartime attrition, Russia’s ground forces have grown, and its air and naval forces are intact and arguably more capable than before the full-scale invasion. Russia has advanced systems, including counterspace weapons, hypersonic missiles, and undersea capabilities designed to negate U.S. military advantages. Russia is also building novel nuclear weapons platforms to supplement its already formidable nuclear air, land, and sea-based triad, complicating U.S. nuclear deterrence calculus. • Russia is likely to remain resilient against Western sanctions and export controls, although at the cost of expanding budget deficits and underinvestment in the civilian economy that increase the risk of long-term economic stagnation and deepening dependence on China. Moscow relies on its partnerships with other U.S. adversaries to evade sanctions. It also is attempting to evade sanctions by setting up alternate payment systems. • Russia’s gray zone tools include cyber attacks, disinformation and influence operations, energy market manipulation, military intimidation, and sabotage. Russia often hides and denies its role, complicating U.S. efforts to counter it.”array of tools that fall into the gray zone of geopolitical competition below the level of direct armed conflict. At the same time, Russia’s aspirations for multipolarity could allow for selective collaboration with the U.S. if Moscow’s threat perceptions regarding Washington were to diminish. • Even with wartime attrition, Russia’s ground forces have grown, and its air and naval forces are intact and arguably more capable than before the full-scale invasion. Russia has advanced systems, including counterspace weapons, hypersonic missiles, and undersea capabilities designed to negate U.S. military advantages. Russia is also building novel nuclear weapons platforms to supplement its already formidable nuclear air, land, and sea-based triad, complicating U.S. nuclear deterrence calculus. • Russia is likely to remain resilient against Western sanctions and export controls, although at the cost of expanding budget deficits and underinvestment in the civilian economy that increase the risk of long-term economic stagnation and deepening dependence on China. Moscow relies on its partnerships with other U.S. adversaries to evade sanctions. It also is attempting to evade sanctions by setting up alternate payment systems. • Russia’s gray zone tools include cyber attacks, disinformation and influence operations, energy market manipulation, military intimidation, and sabotage. Russia often hides and denies its role, complicating U.S. efforts to counter it.

A member of the French military holds a picture of late Arnaud Frion, a French soldier of the 7th Alpine "Hunter" Battalion killed in an Iran-made drone attack in northern Iraq, next to his flag-draped coffin, in Varces, France, March 17, 2026. REUTERS/Manon Cruz

"Russia has been expanding its intelligence sharing and military cooperation with Iran, providing satellite imagery and improved drone technology to aid Tehran’s targeting of U.S. forces in the region, people familiar with the matter said... The technology provided includes components of modified Shahed drones, which are meant to improve communication, navigation and targeting, the people said. Russia has also been drawing on its experience using drones in Ukraine, offering tactical guidance on how many drones should be used in operations and what altitudes they should strike from, said the people, who included a senior European intelligence officer. Russia has been providing Iran with the locations of U.S. military forces in the Middle East as well as those of its regional allies, The Wall Street Journal has reported. That cooperation has deepened in early days of the war, with Russia recently providing satellite imagery directly to Iran, said two of the people, the officer and a Middle Eastern diplomat. The assistance is similar to intelligence the U.S. and European allies have given to Ukraine in recent years, analysts say. In the Gulf, Moscow’s aid is believed to have helped Iran with recent strikes on U.S. radar systems in the region, said the people. Those strikes have included an early warning radar for a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or Thaad, system in Jordan, as well as other targets in Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman." @tggrove @milanczerny @benoitfaucon wsj.com/world/russia-i…

spring moto rally today foosint.github.io/sbs-stats/

Updated maps from the past five days showing Russian advances near Novopavlikva, Kupyansk, Huliaipole, and east of Kramatorsk. #11/48.1257678/36.9573212" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">deepstatemap.live/en#11/48.12576…

@David_Hambling They are using more because they require more to reach the target. Russia's plan for OWA procurement in 2026 is to scale production of Geran-Seeker, Geran-4, and Geran-5 and deprioritize regular Geran-2.

@RALee85 I don't agree. Russia is using more and cheaper drones than ever, and missiles are tailing off in significance.

Many of the early countermeasures to cheap OWA drones are also relatively cheap, such as mobile machinegun teams. This requires the modernization of the drones, employing them in greater numbers, and new methods of employment to overcome cheap countermeasures, which increases their costs. To destroy important targets now, Russia will employ complex and expensive strike packages that can include more than 50 heavily upgraded OWA drones, more than a dozen cruise missiles, and 3-5 ballistic missiles. Likewise, there is a reason why Ukraine is so focused on developing cruise and ballistic missiles to augment its deep strike capabilities with OWA drones. We should be careful about drawing the wrong conclusions about cost ratios and OWA drone effectiveness after only two weeks of war with Iran.

NEW: The number of U.S. troops who have been wounded or injured during the U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran now exceeds 200 across seven countries, a U.S. officials say, providing the most detailed accounting yet of how American personnel have been put in harm’s way.

@SashoTodorov1 Yes, I agree, but I think some people are jumping to other unfounded conclusions.

@RALee85 The investment issue is very true, but I think sometimes the forest is being missed for the trees. Cheap drones have permanently changed warfare in the sense of the greatly expanded portfolio of capabilities that they offer smaller and weaker states.