
Gus Haglund
40 posts

Gus Haglund
@gushaglund
Founder @ DealTeam | PE-Backed Operator Network






We had a client buy a business for $10 million. Shortly after closing, the seller refused to transfer a critical asset. It wasn’t equipment or inventory. It was an intangible account that was still held in the seller’s name. We sent a demand letter. Seller’s counsel responded that they’d never seen a purchase agreement cover something like this. We disagreed. The purchase agreement was broad enough that the account was clearly an asset of the business that had been sold. The seller still refused, arguing he didn’t want the liability of keeping an account in his personal name. We retained an independent expert, who concluded the account represented roughly $3 million of the $10 million purchase price. Then we went back to the purchase agreement. The seller had represented that the business would include all assets necessary to operate in the ordinary course. They also covenanted to take all actions necessary after closing to transfer the purchased assets. The representation had a standard liability cap. The covenant did not. We explained that if the business failed because this asset wasn’t transferred, we’d pursue the seller for the full amount of the damages. The seller still said no. It ended up in business court. The seller lost. The asset was ordered to be transferred. That’s the difference between reading a contract and understanding how it actually works when things go wrong. Indemnification isn’t boilerplate. It’s often the provision that determines who wins after closing. Please watch this episode. And if you enjoy it, we’d really appreciate a 5-star review on Apple Podcasts. I’ll drop the link below 👇







Every burned-out PE associate has the same fantasy: quit, raise a search fund, buy a boring business, escape the golden handcuffs. Stanford just published the data on how that actually goes. 42% of searchers concluded without buying anything. Two years of cold-calling business owners, and back to recruiting. For recent cohorts it’s roughly a coin flip. Make it through? You’ll sign 2.5 LOIs before one closes. Due diligence kills most deals after months of work - valuation gaps - lack of investor support. And the prize at the end is a barbell, not a bell curve: 22% of exited CEOs made $10 million. 22% made exactly $0. Meanwhile the searcher salary is $148K - likely a pay cut from the seat you left. The 33.9% IRR everyone quotes? Remove the top 10% of funds and it’s 20%. The legendary returns came from searchers buying small companies at 4.9x in 2008-12. You’re buying at 6-7x against far more competition. None of this means don’t do it. It means search isn’t an exit from risk - it’s a trade: guaranteed comp for a shot at real equity, with worse odds than the conference panels suggest. The people who win sign LOIs fast (74% acquisition rate if you sign within six months), search with a partner (58% vs 43% solo), and have several years of experience. If you’re going to trade the handcuffs for a search, know the actual price. (And it won’t be discussed at MBA search fund conferences - survivorship bias!)


















