Christopher Isham

One of the common critiques of Trump’s kinetic “maximum pressure” approach is that he doesn’t understand Iran, that Iran will never break, and war won’t deliver the results he wants. The critics might be partially right on tactics. But there’s a deeper, more dangerous illusion: the belief that Iran would ever play ball honestly and sincerely in any diplomatic deal. War might not be the ideal solution. But the so called deal is not a solution at all. Iran is governed by divine doctrine rooted in the messianic mission of the Islamic Republic. The regime will only accept any agreement if it serves as a runway to perpetuate that mission: buying time, legitimacy, and resources to advance it. You cannot negotiate in good faith with a theocracy whose highest priority is ideological expansion, not national interest. Talks and negotiations are legitimate and probably necessary instruments, but their strategic purpose should be explicitly redefined. Not to change the regime's behavior, but to accelerate its terminal phase while simultaneously constructing the post-Iran architecture that prevents the catastrophic vacuum from filling with chaos, nuclear dispersal, or a successor movement more dangerous than its predecessor. By fantasizing about a “better deal”, Trump risks ending this war having achieved less than he promised militarily, delivered worse than expected economically, and having spent the most valuable non-military asset the war actually generated, GCC trust in American strategic commitment, on a fig-leaf exit. The Islamic Republic is already in terminal decline, which sounds overconfident to the diplomatic community still negotiating with it. But, that the post-Iran order must be built now, in cooperation with the Gulf states, Israel, diaspora Iranians, quietist Shia clergy, who are, unfortunately, not currently in the same room for this purpose.

Building takes decades. Destroying takes days. Stability requires hundreds of billions of dollars in defense, intelligence, and cybersecurity. Instability can be achieved with $20K drones. My @TheAtlantic essay on Iran, the UAE, and the global economy. theatlantic.com/international/…

That may be true, but it is a small part of story, and I am surprised NYT focuses only on the production of enriched uranium prior to the start of the June 2025 war. Israel and the United States destroyed Iran’s centrifuge program and its ability to make centrifuges and more feed gas. Iran is no longer enriching uranium. The stocks of enriched uranium are believed to be bottled up in underground sites, where attempts at access can be readily detected. Israel attacked at least 8 sites involved in making the nuclear weapon itself, something rarely reported in the media. While the regime is widely publicly perceived as more motivated to decide to make nuclear weapons, its means to do so are severely degraded. While before the June war Iran could have built a nuclear weapon with near certainty in less than six months, it will face a much more difficult struggle to succeed if it tries in the coming months, and the probability of succeeding in six months is now much less technically certain. That real risk of failing to successfully build a nuclear weapon may be a deterrent against trying. Whatever one thinks of the right or wrong of the bombing campaigns, it sure looks like they achieved some real success in significantly setting back Iran’s ability to make nuclear weapons and its confidence in trying, especially regarding the weapon itself.

From @WSJopinion: Reopening the Strait is now job one in the Iran war. The regime has concluded that the ability to control the route is its ticket to survival and rejuvenation, write Reuel Marc Gerecht and Ray Takeyh. on.wsj.com/48ZW77y

The defeat of the Iranian regime could mean game over for Islamism. Just imagine. washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/…

A growing view holds that constrained oil exports will soon force shutdowns and enough pain to compel Tehran to compromise. In my latest for @MiddleEastInst, I explain why that countdown-clock argument is far too simplistic. mei.edu/publication/wh…

The Hollow Promise of Arab Solidarity @justatareq agsi.org/analysis/the-h…

I’ve helped build coalitions and fully recognize the Trump administration has not made it easy for our allies—but what is the logic of a naval coalition after the war is over? The time to get ships into the Strait is right now. wsj.com/world/europe/e…

The blockade always made more sense than seizing Kharg Island. It stops Iran’s exports, its revenues, is a counterpoint to their closing the Straits. They may attack Gulf oil facilities but it puts greater pressure on Iran. It also puts great pressure on China to pressure Iran.

More here in @TheFP: thefp.com/p/how-to-stop-…

Important statement from Sultan Al Jaber: linkedin.com/posts/dr-sulta…

“Technical limitations?”

🚨 New details from the rescue of the weapons systems officer in Iran: -As the special forces approached "go" time to get him off the mountain, several things happened. Centcom and JSOC received some messages from him. One was a four-digit number. "We said, 'What is he talking about?'" The team asked the person with the officer's radio a question about his dad only the officer would know. -For hours, US bombers had been pounding Iranian targets, including one bunker with 50 IRGC leaders in it, and another bunker sheltering a commander. -After Hegseth greenlit the second rescue operation, he told those with him he wanted to read something he thought reflected what the officer was going through. It was from Exodus. -The team was in touch with the weapons systems officer’s wife. They read her in on a deception operation CIA and Centcom were running. -Trump's team agonized over the clock, watching enemy forces nearing the mountain. Five kilometers away. Three kilometers away. "Every single minute was excruciating." @JimLaPorta and me: cbsnews.com/projects/2026/…

Former CIA operative: regime change in Iran is much harder than the US thinks ft.com/content/293645…

#OPINION: The real battle is between two narratives. The choice is between the vision of the region represented by #Iran and that of the Gulf states: a liberal Islam allied with the West versus a radical Islam in confrontation with the West, writes @Confusezeus arabnews.com/node/2637873

.@ksadjadpour and General Frank McKenzie (ret) w/ @margbrennan Focus: Iran, can they be negotiated with ? Sadjadpour "I don't see any possibility of a resolution to this conflict" McKenzie on Iran " I believe they will break, they will come to terms" 3.29.26

Once this war ends and people have time to look back and reflect, a few things are going to stand out in security and international affairs scholarship. Here are my thoughts on what is most likely (I have a question at the end):

Strong reporting by Jay Solomon on the crazy case of Calla Walsh thefp.com/p/the-radicali…

Here is a link to my piece on the influence of Islamists in Europe titled: “While the Mideast pushed out the Muslim Brotherhood, Europe let it in,” in the @washingtonpost. wapo.st/4szFZkP

The U.A.E. Stands Up to Iran wsj.com/opinion/the-u-…