Joel

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Joel

Joel

@joelthorst

📃 https://t.co/bYrKHCpj9t - Publish on Ethereum

Midgård Katılım Şubat 2016
1K Takip Edilen2.6K Takipçiler
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Joel
Joel@joelthorst·
Exited to finally share more about this passion project I've been working on for a while: Simple Page is a tool for publishing on Ethereum!
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Auryn
Auryn@auryn_macmillan·
Normalize home servers
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Joel
Joel@joelthorst·
@lightcoin Right I tend to agree then. IMO ENS and alternativs Are mostly useful for hosting app / websites more securely.
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light 📜
light 📜@lightcoin·
@joelthorst globally unique, human-meaningful names for addresses (to use the terminology from Zooko's triangle)
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Joel
Joel@joelthorst·
In the wake of the ENS drama a novel governance experiment is playing out on Ethereum. Two protocols, .wei and .gwei are competing for mindshare. The main differentiator is how they are governed. .wei charges fees. A DAO governs the treasury. Voting power is based on how much you spent on buying names. Votes are passed using conviction voting. The project is created by @z0r0zzz .gwei burns fees. There is no governance. The code itself is a fork of .wei made by @donnoh_eth Both approaches take fairly neutral stances. Will the market favor one or the other? Can the WEI DAO use their treasury to grow faster than .gwei? I'll be watching curiously!
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Joel
Joel@joelthorst·
@lightcoin Is this directed mostly at names for addreses or actually to serve websites?
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Joel
Joel@joelthorst·
@lightcoin How is DNS a dead-end? It works pretty well as far as I'm concerned.
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Joel
Joel@joelthorst·
@ncerovac Could I use it with my own harness (e.g. opencode)? I assume it would need a small daemon to verify the TEE attestations locally for each request?
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Captain Nemo 🦞
Captain Nemo 🦞@ncerovac·
Wisp is being built by privacy paranoids for privacy paranoids. The stack (local): - Desktop app - Locally encrypted files + memory - Agent - Kernel The stack (cloud): - Wisp's request anonymizer (TEE) - Open source LLMs inside hardware-secured enclaves (TEE)
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Captain Nemo 🦞
Captain Nemo 🦞@ncerovac·
For the past 5 months several unwell people @LidoFinance have been trying to build the most private AI imaginable. Today I'm opening the waitlist. Wisp (@usewisp_io) is the antithesis to Sam and Dario's 'trust me bro' privacy. Architected so no one - even Wisp - can read, train on or retain your data. Waitlist: usewisp.io How it works:
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Joel
Joel@joelthorst·
@HAX Nice, staten pentestar system gratis ;) Tror detta är oundvikligt och system borde byggas för att skydda mot dessa typer av attacker oavsett, eftersom godtycklig motståndare kan utföra dem.
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Henrik Alexandersson
En utredning vill låta myndigheterna utföra dataintrång för att få tillgång till uppgifter i och ta kontroll över informationssystem, blockera och radera information online, installera spionprogram och utnyttja tekniska sårbarheter – i förebyggande syfte... femtejuli.se/2026/07/01/utr…
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Joel
Joel@joelthorst·
@lex_node What it sounds like you are saying: "People who control AI compute governing DAOs."
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Joel
Joel@joelthorst·
@LefterisJP I mean if the meta is an Ethereum org for every niche, adoption is inevitable.
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Lefteris Karapetsas
Lefteris Karapetsas@LefterisJP·
Announcing Ethereum Birdwatching. An independent non-profit dedicated to accelerating the adoption of Ethereum, its L2s, applications and overall ecosystem across the worldwide birdwatching community.
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Joel
Joel@joelthorst·
Agree that the design space is under explored. For example I'm excited to see live systems using private voting from things like @theInterfold Wouldn't small unit of work that is easy to verify be something you can just have an agent do? IMO intersubjective understanding of a goal that is hard to verify is more interesting and likely more applicable to the real world.
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Yaniv Tal
Yaniv Tal@yanivgraph·
@joelthorst I agree that spending funds is part of what a DAO should do, but I think the compound style DAO proposals may not be it. There should be a small unit of work that is easy to verify that contributes to the collective goal. Without that it’s just politics with poor management.
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Yaniv Tal
Yaniv Tal@yanivgraph·
What are DAOs good for? Maybe not treasury management over infra. DAOs are useful when: - There’s a big shared mission - With diverse and interconnected parts - That can be tackled in bite sized pieces w/ accountability - In a network of active participants
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Joel
Joel@joelthorst·
@auryn_macmillan If there was secret votes, nick would probably have participated from the start and all of this would be less of an issue.
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Auryn
Auryn@auryn_macmillan·
ngl, I'm dreading all of the inevitable ENS-fueled pushback to the idea of secret ballots. "but if votes were secret, we wouldn't be able to see how Nick is voting" 🙄 The solution is broad distribution of voting power, not transparent voting.
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Joel
Joel@joelthorst·
@Jefflau I'm curious, who are the DAO opportunists that have been stealing from the DAO?
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jefflau.eth
jefflau.eth@Jefflau·
I've been at ENS for 9 years now. The first 4 years it was basically just me, Nick, Makoto and a few people that have come and left since then. We were always less than 10 people. Nick has been building ENS for a decade. 10 fucking years. blog.ethereum.org/2016/07/11/tay… This is a blog post from the EF in 2016. Write a list off the top of your head of crypto founders still building and CEOing their own company after a decade. I'll wait. It's short. When ENS released in 2017 I was just one of the community, and only shortly after did I join and build the first version of the ENS app. At the beginning of 2018 we formed ENS Labs (True Names Limited back then) and we were finally a real company, with a $1 million grant from the EF. For the next 3 years we survived on this. We built something that was integrated into all the major Ethereum wallets, helped the UX of web3, and were an example of what a non-financial application on Ethereum looks like. We were builders, we were optimists, and we were purists. In 2021 we started the process of decentralising ENS. Why? Because as purists we believed the protocol should not just be governed by us. The protocol, not the treasury. To do that we went with a DAO that uses token voting. It was an experiment compound, uniswap and others had tried and it seemed 'battle-tested'. There are many things wrong with token voting, but only 5 years dealing with a DAO actually shows you the real one. It isn't just plutocracy, it's the politics of everyone having an opinion about who gets a part of this huge treasury. We wanted to decentralise the levers it takes to govern the protocol, pricing, upgrades etc… we didn't actually have to send the treasury to the governor contract. But we did, because we felt the DAO had more legitimacy, and it did. It also attracted a hoard of people that labs had to govern. We tried to be welcoming, to be open to people and not exert our influence so the grass could grow. But what it also did is create a honey pot with 0 accountability that anyone that is willing to make an account on our forums has the chance of taking a piece of. And we have given, a lot. Given over 50% of all grants to parties outside of ENS Labs. Labs took less than 50% of the treasury spend to date. Name another protocol whose core team has taken less of the revenue than outsiders. Labs has always been about building ENS, and so for many years we decided not to use our tokens, but to let the "community" find a way to properly allocate the funds. But this has failed. In hindsight it was so clear, how could we expect to give millions of dollars to a contract that is governed by token holders (that we as labs are refraining from voting in) who aren't qualified (and it's not their job to be) to do treasury management. Yes we were stupid to do this, but we were idealists. We've turned from idealists to pragmatists. We spent two years building Namechain, our own L2, and we killed it the moment Ethereum scaled and the maths changed. We're not precious about our own work, and the DAO is no different. I would like for DAOs to work as much as anyone else, but they don't, and not a single DAO out there is the vision of what we thought it could be half a decade ago. But ENS is not just a DAO, it's a protocol, a successful protocol that needs longevity and stewards for decades and not to be pillaged by DAO opportunists. A foundation does not remove the ability for the community to be funded, but there will be more accountability, more RFPs, and more value being driven to the protocol. This isn't to say nothing worthwhile has been funded by the DAO. It has, but the ratio of cruft to worth is far too high. It is not how you build a universal protocol for the internet. To those that think it is, you are thinking too short term. ENS needs to keep building. We are nowhere close to the size of DNS, or the size of a single large username system (X, whatsapp, telegram). We need to keep integrating. If we wanted to exit scam and run, it would be far easier to just dump all our ENS and call it a day. And to everyone suddenly worried about voting power: labs didn't vote for years. We stayed out on purpose, to let the grass grow, and that is the exact thing that let this honey pot fester. The one time Nick actually votes, you call it tyranny? And this isn't to say that labs is perfect either, but we really do want ENS to succeed, we want it to flourish, first we need to rectify the mistakes of the past. When something is broken, you fix it. ENS is as decentralised as it was before, the .eth registrar has been locked for years and no one can steal your name. The only thing that is changing is we need a proper organisation to manage and allocate these funds. And for those personally attacking Nick. Nick isn't stealing anything. Nick is one of the smartest and most morally upright people I know. No one could have built ENS the way Nick has built ENS. And they have tried. Nick could have left a long time ago, but he hasn't. Whilst you guys are arguing over the end of ENS, we'll keep on building. P.S. AI image is so the main image was not the blog from EF
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Joel
Joel@joelthorst·
@LefterisJP Slop agents... They seem to open PRs ön incorrect repos often
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Lefteris Karapetsas
Lefteris Karapetsas@LefterisJP·
Why is rotki hard to build. People think you are all the upstream platforms they are connecting to Here is a user opening an (probably LLM generated) issue about Coinbase transaction history from Coinbase's own API ... but doing that on rotki's repo It's always rotki's fault
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jiajun.gwei
jiajun.gwei@zengjiajun_eth·
futarchy is too complicated and governance heavy. v's original daico design was way simpler and more elegant. let's me work with claude to ship a simple, immutable, no-governance daico platform. ethresear.ch/t/explanation-…
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Joel
Joel@joelthorst·
This has to be the definition of slop development!
Charles Guillemet@P3b7_

🚨Taiko drained for ~$1.7M. Root cause: a private key committed to a public GitHub repo. enclave-key.pem, the RSA key used to sign all of Taiko's SGX enclaves, sat in the public taikoxyz/raiko repo. That key is the whole trust model. The attacker derived MrSigner from the public key, signed their own malicious enclave with the leaked key, and registered as a trusted prover. The L1 contracts trust any enclave whose MrSigner matches. It matched. From there: forged SGX attestations on fake L2 blocks, processMessage() sets the message to RETRIABLE, retryMessage() does zero proof verification, funds leave. No key theft. No social engineering. No SGX exploit. Just a .pem in a public repo. Good opportunity to recall that SGX is broken. But here, nobody even had to break it. It's just yet another key management failure. The whole system was only ever as strong as the secrecy of one RSA key, and that secrecy depended on a human not running git add . on the wrong folder. AI greps every commit of every public repo at machine speed. Assume that is already happening. The only real exit: a verifier that checks a succinct validity proof of the L2 state transition. It trusts no enclave, no MrSigner, no operator discipline. It checks the math. In that world this exact attack becomes cryptographically impossible rather than operationally unlikely, because there is no privileged key whose leak forges the entire system. There is just a proof. Stay safe.

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Joel
Joel@joelthorst·
@banteg Well hopefully not fully transparent. I hope they will protect individual privacy with privacy protocols.
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banteg
banteg@banteg·
most excited about onchain ef financials/accounting. previously it was opaque and obscured by not always reporting the amounts or clumping unrelated expenses together. ef only posted a transparency report once in two years. this change would bring it to realtime.
Aerugo@aerugoettinea

1. Intro Vitalik recently wrote about where the EF should go; Aya added a note to explain how we got here, and why. I’ll write about the execution. We now have enough clarity to stop treating “what is the EF for?” as an open-ended question. Our mandate is clear: The EF exists to ensure Ethereum is, becomes, and remains real permissionless infrastructure for self-sovereignty: censorship (and capture) resistant, free and open source, private, and secure; and capable of supporting sovereignty-preserving coordination at scales where trusted institutions hitherto have been unavoidable. The following are my thoughts on some of the points that follow from the mandate and how we are translating it to action. But first, a short reminder about 2. What the EF is not for We are not here to optimize for EF importance, corpo/pol appeal, or ecosystem popularity. We are also not here to please short-term speculators, prop up TBTF neo-SIFIs, market every app on Ethereum, help anyone look good to their crypto or investor friends, or provide on-demand entertainment for dinner parties and private retreats. 3. What the EF is for: Eliminating weaknesses We are here to defensively strengthen places where Ethereum is, or can still become, extractive, totalizing, or vulnerable to cartel or state capture, or authoritarian tools of surveillance or coercion. We will base our actions on a full examination of what Ethereum is and can be at the protocol layer (what is actually running as “Ethereum”), the access layer (what users use to interact with the protocol), the user layer (the end-users who need and will need Ethereum), and the institutional layer (the intermediated paths that scale self-sovereign usage). The EF exists to harden every surface of Ethereum, including those where Ethereum can remain formally permissionless while becoming practically captured. Some obvious surfaces are the transaction pipeline, staking and network security, access layer standards and interfaces, self-sovereignty norms, privacy expectations, institutional adoption patterns, and social layer governance processes. The primary concerns are similar across most of them: does the status quo and its future trajectory minimize trusted dependencies, minimize points of leverage and capture vectors, make user privacy the default, preserve exit, and make trust assumptions legible? The work starts with the EF itself. We are moving compensation and major financial relationships toward ETH and mandate-compliant Ethereum-native stables, with exceptions where positive law or unavoidable operational constraints require exceptions. Rather than a purity ritual or instruction for people to take unmanaged personal risk, it is robustness, alignment, and product pressure. If the EF’s work is to make Ethereum usable as infrastructure for self-sovereignty, everyone at the EF will increasingly live inside the constraints of the system the EF exists to improve: wallet UX, volatility, accounting, privacy gaps, payment friction, stablecoin trust assumptions, recovery, dependency risk, etc. If we can’t use these tools ourselves, it is unrealistic to expect others to. Ethereum is already mature; those who do not depend on the user-facing stack have no business trying to shape its future, at any layer. The transaction pipeline is next. Preventing toxic MEV capture is core EF work, not a peripheral market-structure concern. Transaction supply, ordering, inclusion, block construction, propagation, and settlement are part of Ethereum’s neutrality boundary. Some MEV may persist as an adversarial phenomenon the protocol contains, but it must be absolutely minimized and, for that to be possible, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence by its beneficiaries. If credibly neutral execution is subverted by privileged orderflow, cartelized builders, trusted relays, opaque routing, or validators outsourcing into a narrow supply chain, Ethereum will look permissionless while users experience it as intermediated at the moment value moves. EF protocol work will therefore prioritize lower barriers to block building and validation, stronger inclusion guarantees, reduced extraction opacity, competitive transaction pipelines, user-facing legibility of trust assumptions, and more aggressively exploring the open orderflow solution space. None of this is simple. A good solution in one place can aggravate problems elsewhere. FOCIL is good for censorship resistance, but it may introduce more cross-block MEV. While ePBS solves the relayer trust problem, we must make sure that its implementation does not inadvertently obstruct long-term solutions to even larger problems. It would be unacceptable, for example, if ePBS enshrining the builder economy ends up making it harder to reduce reliance on the private orderflow that has emptied out the public mempool. Encrypted mempools may not only reduce pre-execution transparency and pending orderflow visibility, but also shift competitive advantage to new privileged actors, including specialized hardware operators in some designs, while adding protocol complexity. In order to avoid wasting time playing whack-a-mole, we must commit to solving the extraction problem at a whole system scale. Doing so will require creativity, courage, and the understanding that failure to solve this problem is unacceptable. If we fail, we will have left in place an unnecessary barrier to institutional adoption, but, more importantly, we will also have surrendered a core part of the promise of Ethereum - the replacement of extractive middlemen with permissionless, credibly neutral infrastructure and competitive markets. That must not happen. MEV is likely to be the next major front in the cypherpunk war. We must set ourselves up to win here. Privacy is just as fundamental. A public ledger without serious privacy defaults is a surveillance substrate with settlement guarantees. That is not an acceptable end state for the world computer. Unconditional privacy will be readily available across Ethereum, with programmability on top for selective disclosure, proofs, auditability, compliance logic, reputation, governance, identity, and other constraints chosen by users and their communities. The temporal order matters: unconditional privacy must exist first, opt-in constraints come second. It is also important to avoid forcing users to assemble a fragile stack of special wallets, RPCs, bridges, apps, compliance providers, and operational habits to attain privacy. Deep privacy must be more secure than this. Privacy is a condition for Ethereum’s viability as freedom-respecting coordination infrastructure and as such must be robust. Staking must be treated as protocol infrastructure risk. Staking is not merely a yield product, and liquid staking is not merely an app-layer market. If stake, liquidity, validator access, DeFi collateral, and governance influence concentrate around a small set of issuers or operators, Ethereum’s security layer becomes vulnerable to capture through capture of the economic layer around it. EF will support research, specifications, and designs that keep staking permissionless, private where possible, plural in operation, and resistant to intermediaries becoming permanent control points. The access interfaces are where users access either the protocol directly or through intermediated defaults. The primary problem to solve here is not getting Ethereum into more rooms directly, but making its users, both end users and institutions, more self-sovereign and less susceptible to coercion, and avoiding normalization of soft coercion in exchange for reach. EF will not help Ethereum become more acceptable by sanding off the properties that make it uniquely valuable. Ethereum does not need to become another permissioned settlement backend with better branding. It needs to show, in production, that self-sovereign coordination at scale is possible. Across Ethereum, the EF’s defensive work seeks to ensure that Ethereum is infrastructure people can still use when counterparties fail, platforms censor, governments overreach, intermediaries extract, and coordination problems become infeasible for trusted systems to handle. A core part of that is to make that infrastructure secure and robust against capture at every layer wherever capture opportunities can hide. 4. What the EF is also for: Seizing opportunities Shoring up the fundamentals is not enough. Ethereum’s potential is still largely unrealized, but that does not mean that the path ahead is going to be straight. Opportunities must be seized when the time is right. At this moment in time, a number are visible, including: * Ethereum becoming the first quantum-resistant global infrastructure. Ethereum researchers will lead the post-quantum cryptographic migration before the threat becomes urgent, not after it becomes a governance emergency. That means hardening Ethereum’s cryptographic foundations while there is still time to design carefully. The same applies to other long-horizon risks, where waiting for market demand means waiting until the window for principled design has already closed. * Verifiably self-sovereign stack, from soup to nuts, whether local or remote, with no censorship or extraction openings: browsers, wallets, intents, broadcasts, orderflow, inclusion, block construction, proposal, proving, exit, and recovery. Minimal MEV, and zero toxic MEV entrenchment, either in or around the protocol. No execution layer that is formally permissionless but practically gatekept by privileged supply chains. If there’s a funnel towards an extractive private lane, there’s other options that keep the game live. The goal is not only to prevent extraction or capture, but to make credibly neutral execution competitive enough that serious users prefer it. * Making ETH normal digital cash: a private, dignity-respecting, debasement-resistant and surveillance-resistant medium of exchange and store of value, as well as the native asset of private computation and private coordination for both humans and their agents. If Ethereum can make private economic life and private institutional life possible without routing users back through the friction and potential abuse of custodians, surveillance vendors, or permissioned ledgers with softer branding, as well as provide a venue for secure and competitive machine economics, the value unlocks will be immense. * Personal wallets with personal AI agents that users can actually own and run on their own personal computers. Not your keys, not your coins; not your model, not your mind. As agents become interfaces for more economic and social action, the question of who owns the wallet, the model, the memory, the policy, and the signing authority becomes an existential question about sovereignty instead of UX details - we are all users above any other roles, and no one at EF will forget this. * Institutional and enterprise use cases where Ethereum wins by not disappearing into an invisible backend, gatekept by intermediaries or terrible UX, and by not compromising into a compliant fintech rail with web3 branding. Rather, we will win through proving that credibly neutral infrastructure can handle disintermediated coordination so competitively that trusted intermediaries have to meet Ethereum users on Ethereum’s terms. * Security-preserving scaling. L2s and related infrastructure will be able to meet institutional-level needs without accepting dependencies on closed operators, opaque sequencing, custodial UX, or upgrade committees that users cannot realistically exit. Scale is not throughput alone. Scale is the guaranteed availability of self-sovereignty under real load. We are ensuring Ethereum remains the hardest bedrock for settlement, local and worldwide; and beyond that, a civilizational ledger and execution substrate to stand the test of time. When future civilizations speak of the infrastructure they inherited from the Antiquity of the Information Age, their first example should be Ethereum. Ethereum will outlast all of us. More than enough people watching understand this. Many wondered why it needed saying at all, but it did. If you don't believe us or don't get it, we don't have time to try to convince you, sorry. 5. Addressing departures There has been a lot of online speculation about departures from EF, both before and after the mandate. Some people resigned, others were terminated. Some departures were about strategy, some about role fit, some about normal institutional change, and some simply about people deciding that their best work for Ethereum should happen somewhere else. We will not litigate individual personnel matters on Twitter. That is the default because it is better for EF, better for the people involved, and better for Ethereum. People who contributed through EF deserve dignity on the way out. They do not deserve to have their employment history turned into factional content. Where possible, we have let people describe their departures in their own words as a matter of courtesy, and not concession. If public claims materially mislead people about EF’s direction, decision-making, or mandate, we may correct the record at the level of policy, process, and institutional facts. We still will not turn personal files into public spectacle. Ethereum is permissionless. People may disagree, criticize, compete, fork, and build elsewhere. We intend to keep exits dignified and expect others to do the same. It will suffice to say that we are thankful for what all contributors have built; we will continue to do work Ethereum needs. 6. Addressing EF spinouts Some work should and will leave the EF in the months to come. We hope and expect this process to result in some excellent work being done in service of scaling self-sovereign adoption, but we also must take care lest it becomes an abdication of responsibility or an excuse for undisciplined spending. Some work is not mandate-compatible and should not be carried forward with EF funds or EF endorsement, either inside or outside the Foundation. The efforts carried out by the spinouts will vary widely. Some efforts will leave EF because another org would be a better home for them; others will leave because markets should decide on their worth. Some will leave because they are not compatible with the direction set out in the mandate; others because they are useful but not EF work. Just as a spinout is not automatically good because it reduces EF headcount, former EF affiliation is not a claim on EF funding. The question we ask when deciding on funding is not “did this come from the EF?” But, rather the questions that should be asked about all external funding: “Is this work mandate-critical? Would the EF do this work internally if it had the organizational and financial capacity? Is there no better natural home? Can the external party execute without increasing capture risk, private extraction, opacity, or dependence? Does supporting it reduce Ethereum’s dependence on the EF over time, without prematurely transferring resources and legitimacy to new organizations and thereby risking operational failure or mission drift?” EF funding for work being done externally can be appropriate when it is a capacity solution for mandate work - work the EF should responsibly want done; work that protects CROPS; work that advances self-sovereignty and scales it; essential work that no actor can or will reliably do without EF funding; and work that can be scoped, reviewed, and held accountable without creating a permanent dependency. Such funding is not appropriate when it is a lazy continuity payment, a friendship payment, a reputational hedge, a way to avoid making a hard decision, or a way to support work that is not compatible with the mandate. EF has finite funds, finite legitimacy, and a specific mandate. We will spend all three as if they matter. When we say “EF is one of many nodes”, we mean that we intend to be one of many nodes working to keep self-sovereignty and its scaling the North Star, and working to keep CROPS the undisplaceable first-class properties of the network. We don’t mean that we will support orgs or projects with different priorities. Diversity that leads to ecosystem resilience, coordination cost right-sizing, and better decision-making is good. Diversity that leads to mission drift is not. We are not neutral on the direction Ethereum takes. CROPS are not just things we “believe in”, they are characteristics we understand must be thoughtfully prioritized at every fork for Ethereum to realize its potential. We are partisans for and builders of something of such incredible neutrality that it will fundamentally reshape the world we live in; we wish to work with everyone committed to this shared purpose.

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koeppelmann
koeppelmann@koeppelmann·
This is the first “funding public goods” proposal I’ve seen that I wouldn’t dismiss immediately. Why it’s interesting: * No hardcoded recipient or mechanism * No hardcoded funding minimum Just: if >50% of validators agree to give up some rewards to fund X, everyone does.
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