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@mo4nothing

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Katılım Şubat 2022
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sam
sam@prettywhyoucry·
j’ai mal au cœur purée
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ABC
ABC@idealideas·
according to grok, the outstanding shares was 80-117M that day. April 19th 2023 This was during the final meme-stock frenzy for the original Bed Bath & Beyond (ticker BBBY, later BBBYQ). On that date, over 900 million shares traded hands—extraordinarily high compared to the ~80–117 million shares outstanding at the time (implying multiple turnovers of the float, with heavy off-exchange/dark pool activity) Now here is the real question, as retail owned 96.9% and not many sold so how could you have this volume?
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m4n
m4n@mo4nothing·
@create_q @Giggle_Pufff yes they did, check the CUSIP root number and how it is different to overstock/bbby
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Reese Politics
Reese Politics@ReesePolitics·
As a parting gift from Jerome Powell's Fed, they've announced as of May 15th, that its terminated enforcement actions with UBS Group AG and Credit Suisse AG (Archegos). This stems from the "unsafe and unsound" risk management practices that caused Archegos to collapse. And now they're off the hook. Puzzling. Or rather, troubling.
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Ryan Cohen
Ryan Cohen@ryancohen·
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Ethan Brooks@alt_w_v_g

You used to sell stuff on eBay. Maybe an old camera. Maybe Beanie Babies. Maybe a coat that didn't fit. You paid a small fee. The buyer got the thing. Everyone went home. That eBay is gone. The website looks the same. The logo is the same. The 135 million buyers are still there. But the company isn't really a marketplace anymore. It is an advertising business with a marketplace attached for distribution. Last year, sellers paid eBay $2 billion just to make sure their own listings showed up. Read that again. The board calls this growth. A Canadian who runs a video game store called it something else. Here is what actually happened. In 2020 the board hired a new CEO. His name is Jamie Iannone. He arrived with a strategy called focused categories. In plain English, that means leaning into the stuff people pay extra for. Sneakers. Watches. Trading cards. Auto parts. The everyday seller, the person with the camera and the coat, was no longer the customer. The customer was now the seller who would pay to be seen. In 2025 eBay did $80 billion in transactions. They kept $11 billion of that as revenue. Of that $11 billion, $2 billion came from advertising. Sellers paid them $2 billion to promote listings on a website those sellers already pay fees to use. That is the growth story. In the same year, the number of enthusiast buyers, eBay's own term for their best customers, was 16 million. It was also 16 million the year before. And the year before that. And the year before that. Four years. Zero growth. They mention this on every earnings call without mentioning it. So what does a company do when growth stops? It buys back its own stock. In 2025, eBay returned over $3 billion to shareholders. Most of that was buybacks. In February the board authorized another $2 billion on top. Buybacks shrink the share count. Earnings per share goes up even when earnings stay flat. The stock price follows. The stock was $68 a year ago. It is $108 today. The company did not improve. The denominator got smaller. Then a man from Canada noticed. His name is Ryan Cohen. He runs GameStop. He started his career selling pet food online and sold it to PetSmart for $3.35 billion. He looked at eBay. 135 million buyers. $80 billion in transactions. Real margins. Real cash flow. A board harvesting the business instead of running it. He bought 5% of the company through derivatives and stock. Then on May 4, he offered to buy the rest. $125 per share. $56 billion total. On May 12, the eBay board rejected the bid. They called it not credible. The math is credible. What the board means by not credible is we would have to explain why we sold. Then Cohen went on Piers Morgan. He said eBay is run by a bunch of losers with perverse financial incentives. He pointed out that eBay's CEO has been paid $144 million over six years. He pointed out that he personally takes no salary and has put $128 million of his own money into the company he runs. You do not have to like Ryan Cohen to notice he is making a point that is hard to argue with. eBay used to be a place where regular people sold things to other regular people. Now it is a $48 billion company whose largest growth driver is charging its own sellers to advertise to a buyer base that stopped growing four years ago, while spending billions a year buying its own stock to make the chart go up. The board calls this strategy. A video game CEO from Canada called it what it is. The market is now waiting to see who else agrees. Plz fix. Thx. Sent from my iPhone

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🇵🇸NELA🇸🇩🇨🇴
Un padre abraza a su pequeña hija, que es una mártir, como si estuviera abrazando su corazón que ha dejado de latir. Última despedida, último abrazo. No ignores lo que sucede en #Gaza no dejes de compartir 🙏 y difundir 👇🇵🇸 🍉😥
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Salvatore Linteum
Salvatore Linteum@PhantomBlack699·
Despite the eBay board stating their strengths and performance in rejecting GameStop's acquisition offer, the historic market cap says otherwise. While Amazon thrived post pandemic, eBay dwindled in market cap and the board became lazy, complacent and obese. cc @ryancohen
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International Cyber Digest
International Cyber Digest@IntCyberDigest·
🚨 UPDATE: 19 MILLION exposed NGINX instances hit by the 18-year-old NGINX RCE found by AI. Top exposure by country: - United States: 5,340,011 - China: 2,540,008 - Germany: 1,871,780 Note on ASLR as added security: not all of these instances will have ASLR disabled, but every one of them is running a version inside the vulnerable band. The vulnerability is a heap buffer overflow. ASLR randomizes memory layout, which makes reliable RCE much harder because the attacker cannot predict where their payload or useful gadgets land. But the overflow itself still happens. The corrupted memory still causes the NGINX worker process to crash. ASLR-enabled hosts are still trivially DoS-able. ASLR-disabled or non-PIE builds are RCE-able. Either way, patch ASAP!
International Cyber Digest tweet media
International Cyber Digest@IntCyberDigest

‼️🚨 MAJOR IMPACT: AI just found an 18-year-old NGINX critical remote code execution vulnerability. It has been disclosed on GitHub including PoC code. - Affects NGINX 0.6.27 through 1.30.0 - Triggered via the rewrite and set directives in config - Update NGINX ASAP - NGINX is a widely used HTTP web server, be sure to check its prevalence in other products

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Cognito
Cognito@Cognitobot·
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Anthony Pompliano 🌪
Anthony Pompliano 🌪@APompliano·
FULL INTERVIEW: @ryancohen explains his plan to acquire eBay. He unpacks his pitch to institutional investors, why eBay is so horribly run, and how Ryan plans to create billion in shareholder value. $GME $EBAY
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rnewton
rnewton@rnewton7777·
I asked last week, How do you price this? (eBay + GameStop) There are a lot of models you can try to build but ultimately I think it only really matters for me if I capture Wallstreet's sentiment. Because as I wrote in some longwinded post a few weeks back, they will have an algo parse the filing on deal close and "price" the deal by selling it to that level in the extended market when we can't trade. We have seen this repeatedly lately, that's how this whole thing works. So my model will essentially be wrong automatically because I don't know how the street models these things precisely. And they will absolutely pin the price immediately to what they think is "fair value," via sell action. Then as new details emerge and quarterly progress on optimization and such happens, they'll evaluate the balance sheet and price it again. And again. And again. For anybody that watched my videos, they must laugh, because in 2022 I was so optimistic all the time. Then I watched them price it to $10 and I was humbled. I simply didn't know how aggressively they could price a target down. And so I learned a measure of respect. But then I got excited again and bought in the 30s when Roaring Kitty came back and was re-humbled when we got priced back to the teens. And even with all our balance sheet improvements, our fortress of cash, our operational profit, and our collectibles pivot, I was re-humbled again in late November and December twice. Again, back to the teens. Does it mean we are destined to always price back to the teens? No, it simply means somebody felt compelled to price the stock down for whatever reason. Maybe they sensed weakness. Maybe there was sell side pressure post warrant issuance. Maybe options interest collapsed post Q3 earnings. I don't exactly know why we mark down so badly sometimes or mark up so much other times. So I don't know the model to even use today on GameStop even though I recently said I like knowns and feel I know current dog-form version GameStop. So how can I model a totally new thing? I know I'll mess it up just like I messed up cash per floor several times and still don't feel super confident in it today. So for the time being I'm not settled on any particular model. I see the word accretive thrown around a ton. This deal could work out to be accretive in the sense that per share value could go up over the long term, yes. eBay has value that can be unlocked at scale, so the shareholder value would spill over to us as GME holders post deal optimization period. Does that mean it moves in a straight line? No. Could we compress back to some mark down that represents paying for eBay at premium + cash drag on 20b in loans + unoptimized eBay? Seems likely to me. What's the mark down look like? How fast could Cohen unlock value, deleverage, etc? Well a very simple model would be something like this, Imagine he does de-leverage the 20b loan very quickly. If the combined company has 1.6b shares (even that is unknown), simple division shows: $20,000,000,000 / 1,600,000,000 = $12.50 dollars per share That means if Ryan Cohen and leadership can cost cut super fast, pour operation profit into the loan and pay the balance down, liabilities drop off by $12.50 a share. That's what he means by "not running it hot." That's what I personally mean by paying off your mortgage as fast as possible. Leverage and margin are terrible. That's why eBay leadership doesn't want this deal right now. $20 billion financed at 7 or 8% corporate rate is enormous drag on profitability that they don't currently have. But again, if he can work magic and pay it off very quickly, Assets - Liabilities = Shareholder Equity. Drop liabilities by $20 billion and you immediately increase shareholder equity by $20 billion or $12.50 a share. So while I don't know the immediate post deal compression price, I see a post leverage price as +$12.50. Because that's just basic mathematics. And that is certainly accretive. Because increasing share price on GameStop by $12.50 for leadership is significantly harder right now. That would take something like 5-10 years at current rate using a fundamentals analysis. There just isn't any fat left to cut and while we are making $600m a year or whatever, 600/488 = $1.23 a year. But post deal, to me, looks ugly. People want to do models like: GME $11b Market Cap + EBAY $55b = $66b Doesn't work like that. or, GME $23 a share + EBAY = X Doesn't work like that. You have to do it how the street is doing it and they'll use some formula based on revenue, earnings, assets, liabilities, etc. And the deal burns our assets. The deal burns our earnings (loan coupon). The deal burns our shareholder equity. The deal likely adds something like $25 billion or more in Goodwill to the balance sheet because otherwise shareholder equity would actually be negative. And I am not a fan of goodwill. It is why GameStop was overvalued when it was recklessly acquiring bad companies in 2014 and why it got marked down so badly when they dropped all the goodwill in 2019 or so. Goodwill is, imho, nonsense financial wizardly meant to make assets - liabilities = shareholder equity still make sense on paper when it simply doesn't because of destructive acquisitions. Not to say this is a bad deal, not at all. It is a fine deal if and only if Ryan Cohen can land it at the stated price or better and immediately extract at least $20 billion in savings to de-leverage. Because that right sizes the balance sheet, makes the phantom $12+ in goodwill share value real and protects our downside. I watch tickers all day where stocks trade at 100 PE or 10 PE. Sure, the street could love this deal, ignore the goodwill, and send this thing (up). But I don't know how to model that either. I don't know the rationale for why they send some stocks and not others. For example, Best Buy is trading in the gutter but the balance sheet is fine. Shareholder equity is fine. It isn't in any sort of fiscal distress. But it is out of favor, so it trades at a very low multiple. Meanwhile, name any other stock right now and it might have negative EPS, negative shareholder equity, and be weeks from insolvency, but trading at 40 PE. Why? No clue. So on this one, I have to assume for the immediate term, as much as GameStop would now be 75% eBay 25% GameStop, it would trade post deal a bit out of favor still. Because for whatever reason, we trade as an underdog. How badly do they compress it? Do they respect goodwill or simply ignore it? Do we trade at 30b market cap or 40? Or 50? You can build 20 different models and they will all sound great on paper. Then you'll wake up in the pre market and be trading at 16.50 or 21.50 or 32.50 and be like, Oh obviously. But it really isn't obvious at all, it is totally subjective. And the player with all the ability to price it, all the economic leverage in the world, is going to apply some model to it that is totally different than Best Buy or PayPal or whatever and they'll have all the logical reasoning for whatever it is they do. And we'll just be a leaf on a river wondering why we couldn't see where we were going. So it isn't that I can't price the post deal. I can. 20 different ways. And all of them will be wrong. So do your own modeling however you want, read others' models, and be skeptical of them all. Because at this point we don't even know the final terms. Assuming the deal closes, and I honestly believe it will, just in a long while, because closing on a house takes a long time let alone a 55b company, Is $125 per eBay share the final accepted offer? 50% cash still? 20b in debt? At what coupon (interest rate)? 50% stock still? At what conversion? And is there any other angle we're missing here? Suppose, just for the sake of pure hopium, Cohen has outside backing in the form of a large institutional presence that wants to do a block equity finance deal where they take something like a $20b interest in the new company via common or preferred stock. Well that changes everything immediately. And that isn't altogether that unrealistic. So it is very hard to model this right now. Be careful but have fun with it. Will it immediately send the stock? Very hard to say. But it certainly gives room for immediate upside improvement via debt paydown. And I do like that along with the other things Ryan Cohen is talking about. Because right now upside movement from a fundamentals perspective, on GameStop's balance sheet, is not bad, it is just slow. This could be fast and people want fast. But it could be volatile... I just hope people understand why.
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Ryan Cohen
Ryan Cohen@ryancohen·
🎯
Paul Branham@BoilerPaulie

Allow me to translate this letter from eBay for those who don’t speak legalese: Ryan, We got your unsolicited offer to buy eBay for $125/share (half cash, half stock) supported by your 5% economic interest in eBay. Our board, backed by the usual crew of bankers and lawyers who get paid either way, “thoroughly reviewed” it. We’re rejecting it. Not because the math doesn’t work. Not because the highly confident letter from TD Securities for up to $20B on top of your $9B+ cash pile is fake. None of that. We’re rejecting it because your entire approach to running a company is an existential threat to how we like to operate here. Here are the reasons we feel this way, and the things we considered before paying consultants to write this: 1) We’d rather keep milking eBay as a “standalone” cash cow than let you turn it into something bigger and better. 2) Sure, you’ve got real financing lined up and you “know people” with deep pockets, but we’re going to call it “uncertain” anyway so we don’t have to engage. 3) Your plan would actually force real long-term growth and profitability changes we’d rather not be held accountable for. 4) The debt we pretended you can’t even obtain, the operational integration and focus on seller satisfaction, and most importantly, putting someone like you in charge of the combined entity all sound like a nightmare for our current leadership structure because all of us would have zero job security. 5) The valuation math only looks bad if you ignore the 46% premium you’re offering our shareholders and the upside from fixing eBay the way you fixed GameStop, which we are choosing to do and hoping nobody notices. 6) And I hope we buried the lede far enough here: Your governance and executive incentives are completely incompatible with ours. You and your board take zero cash, no salary, no bonuses, no golden parachutes. You buy shares with your own money and only get paid if shareholders win. We, on the other hand, like our nice, reliable annual payouts regardless of whether the stock is flat or the company is just coasting. We’re not about to hand over our golden goose to a guy who eats only what he kills. Look, eBay is “strong” and “resilient” in the way every entrenched public company says it is while handing out eight-figure checks and perks to the C-suite. We’ve done the usual incremental stuff: tweaked the marketplace a bit, returned some capital, and we’d like to keep doing that without any cowboy from GameStop coming in and demanding actual skin-in-the-game accountability. Can you just leave us alone? Our team remains focused on protecting the current regime and delivering “value”… mostly to ourselves and our consultants. Thanks, but no thanks, Paul S. Pressler
Chairman of the Board, eBay
(And proud beneficiary of the status quo)

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Cognito
Cognito@Cognitobot·
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