Miguel Peral

@StuartDowell_ I strongly believe that if fidesz wins that's the end of Hungary in the EU. There is now way they'll win legitimately and everyone knows that. There's just the way of manipulation of the results and it'll be easy to demonstrate it. Then they'll get the way out of the EU.

Hungarian political scientist Dominik Hejj writing in Interia has set out, in detail, how Viktor Orbán has built an electoral system that gives him multiple layers of advantage, especially at the margins where elections are decided. Postal voting rules, votes cast from abroad, the way recounts are handled, and even the issue of voter rolls that may still include people who are no longer alive. Each of these on its own looks technical. Together, they shape the outcome. If the election comes down to a narrow margin, it will matter a great deal. Below is Hejj’s conclusion, which sets out the implications. "Given that the fate of individual seat and ultimately the parliamentary majority can be decided by several hundred, or sometimes just a few dozen, votes in nearly 30 "battleground" districts, each of these loopholes gains political weight. This system design means that the opposition party TISZA, despite promising nationwide poll results, enters the contest on unequal terms." wydarzenia.interia.pl/zagranica/news…

‼️Statement on the Orbán Government Accusing Me, an Investigative Journalist, of Espionage‼️ Today, the Hungarian government has filed a complaint against me for espionage. Accusing investigative journalists of espionage is virtually unprecedented in the 21st century for an EU member state. This is typical of Putin’s Russia, Belarus, and similar regimes. I have spent over a decade documenting how Russian spies and interests have penetrated Hungarian politics, so I am probably the least surprised by this. Despite growing signs that the Hungarian government acts as a Kremlin ally and copies the Russian model, I still trust that parts of the Hungarian state—and the judiciary—follow the Hungarian constitution, not that of the Russian Federation. I have never engaged in espionage. I see my work as journalistic counterintelligence—from exposing the hacking of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry by Russian actors to revealing the activities of Hungarian pro-Kremlin propagandists. Defending myself publicly would be easier if I were not bound by source protection. But that remains my top priority. I cannot reveal who provides me information or what I receive, including from within Hungarian state structures. If I were not a journalist, I could list many facts proving it is impossible for the Hungarian state to genuinely believe I am spying. Certain meetings, contacts, and information gathering could never have happened otherwise. This baseless accusation now forces me to share details of a specific investigation, including a conversation with a confidential source that appears to have been wiretapped. Normally, this would appear in a finished article or my upcoming book—not here. (It will appear there as well.) Since 2023, I have investigated whether the relationship between Péter Szijjártó and Russian officials exceeds legal limits. The published audio, where I’m heard talking to a source, mentions that communication between Szijjártó and Sergey Lavrov is recorded by EU intelligence services. Less attention has gone to my point that this relationship raises strong suspicion of political intelligence activity and influence operations in Russia’s interest. These are serious claims and hard to prove. As a journalist, I cannot force anyone to speak or hand over documents. That is why gathering this information has taken so long—and why I spoke to that sensitive source (while the conversation was secretly recorded). Serious claims require serious evidence, and I believe I have gathered some. I have not engaged in espionage. I have not cooperated with any foreign intelligence service in surveilling Szijjártó. Instead, I tried to verify earlier fragments of information about Szijjártó–Lavrov communication. I sought to identify the channels and phone numbers used, and whether a secret channel—possibly used by Russian intelligence—exists. In other words, whether Szijjártó uses a hidden device or number unknown even within the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. This was only one part of my research. The other, more serious topic is this: Since at least 2016–2017, EU and NATO intelligence services have had indications that large amounts of cash and precious stones may have been transported from Russia on Hungarian government aircraft or private jets used by government figures. Officials from at least six countries made such claims to me. These signals did not come from monitoring Hungarian targets, but, for example, from intercepting Russian officials discussing or preparing such shipments. Alongside Szijjártó–Lavrov communication, I examined how baggage screening and handling works on such flights, which officials travel with what luggage, whether more packages arrive from Moscow than depart, and how such shipments could be handled discreetly. I know how serious this is, and I would not have written even this much—but since I do not know what else may be taken from the edited recording, or what fabricated accusations (like, for example, that I was seeking such details to commit terrorism) may follow, I believe I must share this now. Why do I investigate all this? According to many sources familiar with the Hungarian state and counterintelligence, there is no independent body in the Orbán system able to investigate or act if a senior official is suspected of espionage. Government members direct intelligence services and set expectations. The services lack both tools and authority to investigate a government member. I knew this would be difficult when I chose to pursue it. But few people in Hungary can or dare to do this, so I felt it was my duty. We have now reached the point where the Orbán government—of which Szijjártó is still a member—aware of my reporting plans and the risk they pose, has preemptively accused me of espionage. I am a Hungarian patriot. I serve the public. As an investigative journalist, my job is to hold power accountable. Neither political theater nor legal threats will deter me.

In the Russian press, no criticism of war on Ukraine. But an editorial slamming restrictions in Russia: “Where's the cut-off point, the line in our personal & collective experience we’re not prepared to cross, where we would say no, we can’t live without this, we don’t want to?”

@Thorkill65 I think I understand your point, and you're right, this poses risks for innocent civilians, but on the other hand, Ukraine is in a war for survival and in an extremely delicate situation. What else do you expect from a country that is fighting to exist? 2/2 Thanks for your post

@Thorkill65 I'm sorry, but I have mixed feelings about this. The Polish army hasn't apparently done much in the past to prevent drones and missiles from hitting Ukraine, nor, for example, protect the Ukraine air space with Polish Patriot systems on Polish land. No help whatsoever. 1/2

Kolejny atak ukr dronów uderzeniowych na cele w obw. leningradzkim z wykorzystaniem przestrzeni powietrznej NATO. Ubiegłej nocy ukr drony po raz kolejny wykorzystały przestrzeń powietrzną krajów bałtyckich do zaatakowania terminalu naftowego w Ust Łudze i innych celów w obw. leningradzkim. Nie chodzi tutaj o ukraińskie drony, które wleciały ubiegłej nocy w przestrzeń powietrzną Estonii i Łotwy od strony Rosji i rozbiły się na ich terytorium. One bowiem faktycznie zboczyły zapewne z kursu na skutek użycia przeciwko nim środków (WRE). Wczoraj doszło jednak do innych incydentów w przestrzeni powietrznej NATO przy udziale jak wszystko na to wskazuje ukr dronów uderzeniowych dalekiego zasięgu. Rankiem zastępca szefa sztabu połączonego Łotewskich Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych (NBS) ds. operacyjnych, generał brygady Egils Leščinskis poinformował bowiem że ubiegłej nocy - jeszcze przez incydentem z rozbiciem ukr drona w rejonie wsi Krasław - odnotowano obiekt wlatujący w łotewską przestrzeń od strony Białorusi, który następnie skręcił i wleciał w przestrzeń powietrzną Rosji. Jednocześnie Minister Obrony Estonii Hanno Pevkur poinformował że w nocy niezane drony naruszyły też przestrzeń powietrzną NATO nad Zatoką Fińską, co wymusiło poderwanie myśliwców sojuszu z Baltic Air Policing. Reasumując, info o rzekomo przypadkowym wkraczaniu ukr dronów w przestrzeń powietrzną NATO podawane obecnie przez stacje informacyjne to bajeczki dla idiotów mające za zadanie ukryć postępowanie władz Ukrainy. W rzeczywistości po raz kolejny stawiają one swoich sojuszników przed faktami dokonanymi i narażają ich obywateli na zagrożenia związane z przelotami nad ich głowami obiektów powietrznych z 30-40 kg ładunkami wybuchowymi. Działania władz ukr to oczywisty krok w kierunku eskalacji konfliktu. Rosja może teraz się zrewanżować i zaatakować Ukrainę poprzez terytoria Polski lub Rumunii, tak jak miało to miejsce we wrześniu 2025 r. w województwie lubelskim. Niewykluczone ze taka reakcja Rosji jest głównym celem działań władz ukraińskich. Poniżej - pojazdy i personel Łotewskich Sił Zbrojnych widziany na miejscu rozbicia ukr drona uderzeniowego w rejonie Krasława.

@UkrReview that's the chamber of lords right?

👏🇺🇦🇬🇧 The British Parliament welcomed President Volodymyr Zelensky with a standing ovation.

@LetsArmUKR @RittOnTwitt75 Are you also one of those that was in favour of weakening NABU because they were supposedly sucking up resources and full of suspicious people?

@RittOnTwitt75 Another ivan-troll pretending his opinion is worth something. to to the ban, katsap

Do you remember how, in his interview with The Economist titled “Ukraine’s commander-in-chief on the breakthrough he needs to beat Russia,” published on November 1, 2023, Valery Zaluzhny stated that at the current stage of military technology development, concentrating forces in one place is impossible? Any buildup of manpower would be detected by drones and destroyed before it could even move to its positions, he said. In the same interview, he complained about allies and partners who, in his view, were too slow in delivering weapons such as long-range missiles, tanks, and F-16 fighter jets. Responding to criticism about dispersing forces, Zaluzhny noted that NATO textbooks are outdated. Under current conditions, it is impossible to form a single “armored fist” capable of striking in one direction. Another interesting detail: after several days of failures at the start of the counteroffensive, Zaluzhny began reading a 1941 military book (apparently not as outdated as NATO’s) written by Soviet Major General P. S. Smirnov to understand where he had gone wrong—right in the middle of the operation. From this, we can conclude that although Zaluzhny is the author of the phrase “a small Soviet army cannot defeat a large Soviet army,” he himself remained a general of the old formation with a Soviet mindset. His accusations against Zelensky regarding the failure of the counteroffensive were a lie and the beginning of his election campaign. Another important fragment from the interview: “The greatest risk of a protracted trench war is that it may drag on for years and exhaust the Ukrainian state.” During the First World War, mutinies intervened before technology could change the situation. Four empires collapsed, and a revolution broke out in Russia. And now Zaluzhny himself is weaving intrigues, accusing Zelensky, and in fact harming Ukraine by provoking conspiracies and discord. In my opinion, this is all you need to know about @ZaluzhnyiUA to understand what kind of “iron 🤡 general” he really is. economist.com/by-invitation/…

@Maks_NAFO_FELLA Immense demonstration of bravery, like usual...

❗️Russian public groups announce strikes on Ukrainian government institutions