Mathieu Duchâtel

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Mathieu Duchâtel

Mathieu Duchâtel

@mtdtl

Policy analyst @i_montaigne Geopolitics of technology, economic security, maritime affairs #China #Japan #Taiwan #EU. Former @SIPRIorg Beijing.

Paris, Taipei Katılım Haziran 2015
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Institut Montaigne_EN
Institut Montaigne_EN@i_montaigneEN·
🇨🇳 A new economic security consensus ? Semiconductor nationalism in China and the United States, and Europe’s choices Read our Director of International Studies @mtdtl and Pierre Sel's latest analysis here ⬇️ bit.ly/4sfQY2I
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Institut Montaigne
Institut Montaigne@i_montaigne·
🇪🇺🇨🇳 Semi-conducteurs et préférence européenne : leçons sino-américaines Retrouvez l'analyse de notre directeur des Études internationales @mtdtl et de notre expert associé Pierre Sel ici ⬇️ bit.ly/4lvjGtT
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Institut Montaigne
Institut Montaigne@i_montaigne·
🇫🇷 [Decoding France] - Nouvelle-Calédonie : test pour la stratégie de sécurité indopacifique de la France Retrouvez l'analyse de notre directeur des études internationales @mtdtl et de Florian Ballier ici ⬇️ bit.ly/4srOM8e
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Institut Montaigne
Institut Montaigne@i_montaigne·
📣 NOUVELLE PUBLICATION 🚨 Nous publions aujourd’hui une note d’enjeux de notre expert @FGodement "E‑commerce chinois : Shein, l’arbre qui cache la forêt". Derrière le cas Shein, se cache un modèle d'e-commerce beaucoup plus vaste et en pleine expansion. #THREAD ⬇️
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Mathieu Duchâtel
Mathieu Duchâtel@mtdtl·
This is likely to continue intensifying in 2026/2027, and Beijing is unlikely to reconsider its strategy unless there is an electoral demonstration in Taiwan that the use of antifascism and targeted extraterritorial actions is counterproductive.
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Mathieu Duchâtel
Mathieu Duchâtel@mtdtl·
China is stepping up antifascist rhetoric, military pressure, and legal instruments to lay the groundwork to legitimize future “targeted actions", whether military in nature or akin to law enforcement operations.
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Institut Montaigne
Institut Montaigne@i_montaigne·
🇯🇵🇹🇼 "Japon-Taiwan : la mobilisation chinoise du registre "antifasciste"". Découvrez l'analyse de notre directeur des études internationales @mtdtl. ⬇️ bit.ly/4bl9aCu
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Ken Moriyasu
Ken Moriyasu@kenmoriyasu·
China's angry statement at Trump's Venezuela strike can't all be about international law. What else might it be unhappy about? Maybe Beijing doesn't like that: 1: Trump now 'runs' Venezuela's oil, at a time when China needs an alternative to Iranian oil 2: Chinese radars didn't work against incoming US missiles 3: A Chinese delegation had just met Maduro. "Whatever assurances Beijing gave in that meeting had a remarkably short lifespan," @michaelsobolik says My take: Trump's Venezuela strike will likely change China's regional calculations asia.nikkei.com/spotlight/trum…
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Kyle Chan
Kyle Chan@kyleichan·
China apparently has a working prototype of an EUV lithography machine. - Secret lab in Shenzhen - Team of former ASML engineers - Reverse-engineered parts - Yet to produce working chips - Deep involvement by Huawei - Aiming for use by 2028-2030 reuters.com/world/china/ho…
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Institut Montaigne_EN
Institut Montaigne_EN@i_montaigneEN·
📢 New publication! We’re pleased to share the second CHIPDIPLO policy paper: “Autonomy or Indispensability? Identifying the EU’s Semiconductor Lodestar”. CHIPDIPLO is a project led by Institut Montaigne with @CEIAS_eu, @CSDS_Brussels, @EU_ISS, and supported by the EU. #Thread
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Mathieu Duchâtel
Mathieu Duchâtel@mtdtl·
"None of this will slow China’s drive for semiconductor self-reliance — not even by a millimeter"
Desmond Shum@DesmondShum

Chips, Deals, and Forbidden City Sequels Since Trump is moving ahead with allowing H200 chip exports to China, Beijing’s priorities will shift almost overnight: 1. Beijing will read Trump as fundamentally transactional — everything is negotiable, and therefore everything is potentially attainable. If advanced chips are once again “tradable,” China will immediately recalibrate. Expect a full-court press in the coming months to secure the most advanced technology available across the spectrum — not just GPUs, but lithography systems, specialty materials, EDA software, and semiconductor manufacturing equipment that seemed untouchable only a day ago. That includes renewed pressure on ASML’s top-end tools. ASML’s EUV systems have been off-limits to China since 2019, and even the most advanced DUV models are restricted under U.S. rules. As Washington’s posture softens under Trump, Beijing will treat that as the first real breach in the wall. In its view, nothing is “permanently restricted” anymore — only temporarily unavailable. 2. None of this will slow China’s drive for semiconductor self-reliance — not even by a millimeter. China’s long-term mission remains unchanged: eliminate dependence on foreign chips. Access to more advanced U.S. hardware doesn’t dilute that goal; historically, it has sped it up. In the 1990s, China’s telecom carriers relied almost entirely on Nortel, AT&T, Nokia, and Ericsson. Its banks ran IBM and Cisco hardware. No export controls, no political constraints — foreign tech flowed freely. Today, you won’t find foreign mainframes or foreign-made core telecom switches inside China’s critical infrastructure. Domestic firms displaced global leaders without needing Washington to push them. So the idea that supplying China with higher-end chips will somehow slow down localization is a fantasy. Every cycle shows the same pattern: when China gains access to the world’s best technology, it uses the breathing room to accelerate its own replacements. Meanwhile, Wang Yi is probably working past midnight trying to outdo that Forbidden City private tour Xi gave the Trumps last time. Good luck to him — topping a made-for-imperial-theatre walkthrough with Xi acting as personal guide is a tall order even in a system built for spectacle.

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Mathieu Duchâtel
Mathieu Duchâtel@mtdtl·
China's "trade surplus is unsustainable because they are killing their own customers". Restricting China's access to the EU market is what has not yet been tried, but threats are unlikely to provoke change - China will only believe it when they see it. straitstimes.com/world/europe/f…
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Mathieu Duchâtel
Mathieu Duchâtel@mtdtl·
Excellent discussion at this EU-Japan economic security policy panel hosted by @EUinJapan and @euronews. Appreciate the invitation! And good to see the partnership advancing rapidly, shifting from intentions to concrete, tangible projects.
駐日欧州連合代表部🇪🇺@EUinJapan

EU代表部で4日、#Euronews 討論会が行われ、代表部のヒンデラー公使参事官が登壇。経産省の「経済安全保障グローバルフォーラム・ウィークス」の一環で、モンターニュ研究所や地経学研究所を含む日欧の有識者が参加し、🇪🇺 🇯🇵双方の経済安全保障政策や協力強化の方向性について活発な議論が交わされた

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Mathieu Duchâtel
Mathieu Duchâtel@mtdtl·
The European Commission and the CHIPDIPLO consortium jointly organised a EU-Taiwan semiconductor industry dialogue yesterday in Munich. Honored that CHIPDIPLO played such a role facilitating matchmaking and exchanges on industrial policy best practices. digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/europe…
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