Nordsint

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Read the full investigation here in English, or in Russian at theins.ru nordsint.org/2026/03/24/gon…

The Insider sent comment requests to the entities and banks investigated, but did not receive any responses apart from Citibank North America, which declined to comment.

In our latest investigation with @the_ins_ru, we contacted Chinese companies under the guise of procuring drone components for the Russian military. Chinese export restrictions prohibit the sale of such items for military use to both Russia and Ukraine.

"How much are drone coils these days?": The Insider and @nordsint go undercover to reveal how Chinese firms supply Russia’s defense industry Despite domestic export bans, Chinese drone tech still makes its way into the hands of the Russian military. theins.press/en/inv/290627

Acting as buyers with open ties to the Russian military, we documented Chinese manufacturers knowingly invoicing critical components for drones, such as fiber optic cable and mesh modems. Our latest, in collaboration with @the_ins_ru: nordsint.org/2026/03/24/gon…

In exclusivity, INPACT and its partners reveal the identity of the SVR officers behind the takeover of Africa Politology to conduct vast influence operations over two continents. Our investigation explains the setup put in place by the SVR to conceal its control through companies: JSC Inter and Intertechtrade LLC. We have also reconstructed the org chart of Africa Politology identifying more than 60 people working for the network @FbdnStories @thecontinent_ @dossier_center @istories_media @openDemocracy alleyesonwagner.org/2026/02/20/ana…

Today we are celebrating the third anniversary of our project! Thank you to all our readers, along with those who have supported and collaborated with us over the last few years.

Following the implementation of a whitelist for Starlink terminals in Ukraine, Russian Starlink vendors claim to search for workarounds.

A day after we made additional requests for comment on their role in shipping Starlink terminals to Russia, the Emaross Group website became inaccessible, displaying an update notice. Thr updated version of the site has not yet been placed online.

Efforts to counter the use of #Starlink on Russian #drones are beginning to take effect. Russian #military channels are already forecasting a rapid end to this capability. Public scrutiny, together with the attention of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense and Elon Musk, is delivering fast results that will be further adjusted and improved.

Як Росія масштабує використання #Starlink на ударних дронах і обходить санкції. informnapalm.org/ua/yak-rosiia-… Матеріал підготовлено у співпраці з автором тематичних #OSINT-досліджень @nordsint

В российских реестрах появились системы Starlink, продажа которых в РФ запрещена. Их поставляют через ОАЭ и Кыргызстан — расследование storage.googleapis.com/kldscp/theins.…

Our latest investigation into Starlink imports, republished by The Insider: x.com/i/status/20146…

Read the full article with all updates and received responses at the link below: nordsint.org/2026/01/06/a-m…

With regards to this discrepancies, Emaross stated that Polarstar Logistics “was an active logistics agent within the UAE infrastructure” at the time of booking and that Emaross has since “tightened vendor vetting processes.”

Following publication of our previous article about Starlink imports, Emaross Group said it had conducted an internal audit, which determined that the shipment identified by Nordsint corresponded with a shipment dispatched on May 10, 2024 from Dubai to Bishkek.