Alireza Talakoubnejad@websterkaroon
Regarding Ghalibaf -
It would not be accurate to call him a reformist, using the word to mean the movement started by Khatami and represented by figures like Pezeshkian today.
He also isn't really hardcore ideological super hardliner. His biggest political rivals in recent years have been people trying to outflank him on the right for not being ideological enough - particularly (though not limited to) the Paydari movement.
In the past two years he's made a sort of alliance with President Pezeshkian & managed to get his entire cabinet approved by Majles, which was unexpected. Though in return in got a lot of his own allies in minister positions, including the powerful Minister of Interior. He also helped Pezeshkian stop several draconian hejab bills from passing despite vocal Paydari complaints.
The support hasn't been unlimited. He still allowed (or perhaps was not able to stop) several of Pezeshkian's ministers from getting impeached. Most notably Abdolnasser Hemmati.
Ghalibaf has a impeccable military credentials. He's very much an IRGC insider & part of a generation of young Sepahis who rose to prominence in the Iran-Iraq War & then rose up in ranks in the 90s & 00s.
He was known to be close to General Ghassem Soleymani (something he made sure everyone on earth knew during his different electoral campaigns).
He is quite a competent manager and very ambitious. During the years he was mayor of Tehran I saw lots of development and change in the city and there's no doubt he deserves some credit for it.
On the other hand, he's also had lots of allegations of cronyism and financial corruption around him. As well as allegations of suppressing intellectuals & students during his police career that have haunted him later when he's run for national office. These aren't unique to him, but are notable.
Allegations about his family spending unbelievable amounts of money during a trip to Turkey severely hurt his 2024 electoral campaign, painting him as an out of touch elite figure. It was widely assumed that if he made it to the second round in a head to head against Pezeshkian he would have won.
Ghalibaf very much falls within the archtype of a strongman ex-military political figure that gets things done. This is a common archtype in Iranian history (and in the wider world). He's not super ideological and has shifted around a lot in the past 30 years (though generally staying on the right of the Islamic Republic spectrum).
Within foreign policy he usually advocates for a 'strong Iran', but hasn't been diametrically opposed to any negotiations or concessions in the same way Paydari has been. But he's also not as open to it as Pezeshkian or Rouhani were.
All in all, he's one of the strongest and most experienced managers within the Islamic Republic's current elites. And because of his background he has the potential of bringing together a lot of the IRGC, but doesn't have the sort of backlash someone like Saeed Jalili does.
But, the idea that he'd be open to giant concessions to the US is quite difficult to believe.
There is a pretty widespread consensus among all the Islamic Republic's elites right now that:
- The current strategy of the war is correct and they are quite likely to survive this war if they follow it
- A premature ceasefire, or one that does not meet certain conditions, would be a grave mistake. The prospect of ending the war early and facing this entire thing again in 6 months again is far more dangerous than whatever damage Iran faces from the war currently (which is immense).
- They made a mistake in the past 6 years of acting with too much restraint. The enemy took this as weakness. They should not hesitate to escalate to extreme levels and inflict real pain on the global economy if needed. Comparing the current war with the previous rounds of conflict shows this has paid off.
- The previous ceasefire was followed by the reimposition of UN sanctions and did not lead to long term deterrence. Instead it was just a breather for Israel to replenish its interceptors.
- The Trump administration is not rational and does not genuinely seek peace. The only way to achieve a sustainable peace with them is to inflict massive pain so they regret their decision and will not think about it again. It is unclear if we are at this point yet.
- As such, while they do eventually seek a negotiated end to the conflict, they are extremely suspicious of Trump now. And are unlikely to accept a basic ceasefire like last time, let alone some of the conditions claimed to be brought forth by Trump. They might show some flexibility on the Iranian conditions publicly stated (these are starting points, not inflexible), but ultimately would not currently agree to something that doesn't have more clear long term durability & sanctions relief.