Sara Nowacka

After long weeks of digging in social media - here it is! A report on preexisting discourses and concerns’ role in spreading proRussian narratives among Arabs and Africans. Find out how this influences Western efforts to build support for 🇺🇦 and what can be done better ⬇️⬇️

Following the UN's removal of HTS from its terrorism list, Turkey follows suit

Quick analysis of the agreement reached between the SDF & Syrian government: • To anyone who followed the negotiations between the SDF & Damascus closely, it is jarring to compare the current deal with what Damascus was willing to accept even earlier this month. In early January 2026, the SDF refused a deal that would have allowed the incorporation of 3 regional divisions (spanning Hassaekh, Deir Ezzor & Raqqa) + mutual control over the borders + constitutional amendments to guarantee Kurdish rights. Now they have to hand over borders, and the SDF will join the Syrian Army as individuals, not units. • The maximalist position of the SDF appears particularly bewildering given their knowledge that they lack genuine support among Arab tribes, and thus, government forces would be able to advance rapidly in Deir Ezzor, Raqqa and southern Raqqa countryside. • The SDF appeared to be counting on 2 main factors to remain in power, despite its lack of legitimacy in Arab areas: 1. Repression: over 2025, the SDF arrested over 800 Arabs on political charges of expressing support for Damascus or engaging with it. More on why the Arab tribes & the SDF Arab commanders flipped to the government's side: x.com/Elizrael/statu… 2. The U.S. preventing any attack east of the Euphrates, despite the growing impatience of the top U.S. leadership handing this file. The U.S. indeed opposed such an offensive, but the rapid pace of advance of the Syrian Army, supported by armed tribesmen and cells it planted and armed by the Syrian government (a months-long project overseen by @zakorahmed0) in Arab SDF-controlled areas, imposed a fait accompli. • There are still many details about the deal that need to be worked out, but now that the SDF lost much of the territory it once controlled & its illegitimacy among Arabs became apparent (with even tribes that have long aligned with the SDF flipping, such as the Shammar), the SDF's leverage is incredibly limited. • What does appear clear from the text of the deal is that Kurds will maintain security in majority-Kurdish areas. This is incredibly important for preventing abuses by Arab Syrian government forces and tribal fighters. • There are multiple issues of concern to Kurds that have not been addressed in the deal. Among them are: 1. The fate of children, mostly Kurdish, who were kidnapped or joined the PKK/YPG/YPJ/Asayiş. Just as the deal obligates the SDF to remove foreign PKK cardo from Syrian territory, it ought to be tasked with returning these children to their families. 2. What the Asayiş's control over internal security in Kurdish areas means for opponents of the PYD/PKK. There are thousands of Kurds exiled from northeastern Syria due to persecution by the Asayiş and PKK structures such as Ciwanên Şoreşger (Revolutionary Youth Movement), who want to return and rebuild political life in Kurdish areas. 3. The integration of the local Kurdish-language education system into the broader educational system in Syria. Tens of thousands of Kurdish youths graduated from the Kurdish-language education system run by the Autonomous Administration, but their diplomas were not recognized anywhere, preventing them from pursuing higher education outside of the unrecognized universities in Kurdish areas. 4. Restoration of Kurdish property in Efrîn, Serê Kaniyê/Ras al-Ayn and Tel Abyad that were illegally seized by Turkish proxy factions and return of IDPs to those towns. Tens of thousands remain displaced. While some Kurds have been able to return over the past year, many of them were forced to pay exorbitant sums to the armed factions (now SAA units) to reclaim their own property. • The implementation of the agreement will surely face stumbling blocks on the Kurdish side. The SDF's leadership (Mazloum Abdî) does not genuinely control all the Kurdish fighters inside Syria. PKK networks answerable to the leadership in Qandil or its representatives inside Syria, have engaged in kidnapping of children into the ranks of the PKK, sent explosive-laden cards into Turkish-occupied areas after 2019, and engaged in cross-border smuggling into Turkey through tunnels, against the wishes of Abdi. These cadros and members refused to abide by the orders of Abdî to withdraw from Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo & kept holed up at a hospital for hours, until they too agreed to surrender & be displaced. • The bottom line: the conduct of the SDF's senior commanders, particularly over the past two weeks, reflects a failure of leadership and judgement. Their maximalism rested on false assumptions, ignoring Western officials and independent mediators urging a course correction. For decades, Syria’s Kurds were denied basic rights, subjected to economic marginalization, and targeted by repeated campaigns of ethnic cleansing and demographic engineering. It is a tragedy that those entrusted with negotiating the future of this community in post-Assad Syria prioritized factional interests and so badly misread the balance of power.

Of course Venezuela being fully under US Influence has implications for oil monarchies of the Gulf! Trump will no longer need Saudi cooperation to control oil prices Riyadh - and others - will have to find other ways to make themselves indispensable

That’s it. Syrian Central Bank Governor AbdulQader Husrieh announced the launch of the new Syrian currency. syria.tv/%D8%A7%D9%84%D… The overall framing is technically sound and, given the context, politically understandable. Still, a few aspects of the plan warrant close attention as implementation begins. First, the 90-day dual-currency period is sensible in principle, but challenging in practice. Coexistence windows are common internationally, yet in Syria’s case dual pricing over three months may generate arbitrage opportunities, confusion, and significant enforcement pressure. Converting the entire money supply within such a short timeframe will be difficult. As the deadline approaches (particularly if any extension is delayed or poorly communicated) Syrians may feel incentivized to exchange old banknotes early, potentially at unfavorable terms. Clear communication on how long old pounds will remain exchangeable through official channels will therefore be crucial. Supervision is already stretched under a single-currency regime, and the temporary circulation of two units of account will inevitably add complexity. Second, the commitment to “free exchange, with no fees or commissions” sets a high bar. While the intention is positive and confidence-building, experience suggests that compliance will be uneven. Even under current conditions, enforcing the ±7% trading band for the Syrian pound with licensed exchange offices has proven difficult. During redenomination, pressures are likely to surface not through explicit fees, but through wider spreads, delays, bundled services, or price rounding. Anticipating and monitoring these dynamics early will matter. Third, the expectation that redenomination will not affect inflation rests on important assumptions. Preserving the monetary aggregate is necessary, but not sufficient. The main risks are microeconomic and behavioral: how prices are rounded, how quickly adjustments occur, and how well consumers understand the new unit of account. These challenges are particularly acute in cash-based, low-trust environments. Finally, implementation capacity remains a key constraint. The governor’s emphasis on market monitoring, liquidity provision, and enforcement reflects clear intent, but execution will test institutional bandwidth. Redenomination is one of the most operationally demanding reforms a central bank can undertake, and Syria’s institutions are still rebuilding. That said, this moment also presents an opportunity. With careful sequencing, transparent communication, visible enforcement, and a willingness to adjust timelines if needed, redenomination could become a meaningful step toward restoring confidence rather than a source of friction. Getting the implementation right will matter far more than the announcement itself.

A Palestinian residing near Douma in the occupied West Bank called the Israeli Police after Israeli settlers raided his home & stole feed for their livestock. They were accompanied by an armed soldier-settler. The Palestinian has been detained incommunicado for the past day.

One year ago a major offensive — the 1st in 4.5yrs, codenamed “Deter Aggression” — was launched against #Assad’s regime west of #Aleppo. #Assad’s regime rapidly crumbled & 12 days later #Damascus fell without a fight. #Syria is now a welcomed part of the world, as it should be.

This is interesting. Neither centralisation nor fragmentation... dev-front.org/syrias-sisyphe…

Parts of #Syria are beginning to see huge improvements in electricity supply, with #Damascus, #Aleppo & #Hama all receiving 16-24hrs of electricity per day in recent days. That's up from 4-6hrs (which has been the norm for yrs) thanks to gas supplies & vast structural repairs.

An extraordinary fact: - #Syria has received a greater number & wider range of foreign gov't visits in 11 months than Bashar & Hafez al-#Assad's regimes did in 53yrs. #Syria's reintegration onto the global stage has come at stunning speed, driven by the opportunity it presents.

Israel will never admit it, but I am confident that so many of the successes Israel has had vs. the Iranian axis is not due to Israeli genius but due to the stupidity of the men who make up the rank-and-file and commanders of these militias & Iranian regime. Having spent 903 days in the captivity of an Iraqi militia servicing Iran, I can tell you that I've never met more ignorant people in my life. Commanders who think tracking devices can be planted in teeth, but don't know white [non-silver] fillings exist. Commanders who think Masons rule the world. Senior commanders who are literally illiterate. An Iranian commander who thinks there is such a thing as spoken vs. written Hebrew (diglossia). What a travesty that Iraqis, Yemenis, Gazans, Iranians and Lebanese are subject to the rule of these brutal ignoramuses.

More of this, less of Russia

🔥 Szukamy Specjalisty/Specjalistki ds. Komunikacji! ❗️Dołącz do zespołu Polskiego Instytutu Spraw Międzynarodowych i współtwórz naszą strategię komunikacji! Masz doświadczenie w: 🔹 Strategii i kampaniach w mediach społecznościowych? 🔹 Tworzeniu wideo, animacji i grafik? 🔹 Montażu podcastów? Jeśli TAK, to czekamy na Ciebie! 🚀Na zgłoszenia czekamy do 5 listopada. Szczegóły ➡️ pism.pl/o_nas/praca/sp…

According to local sources, the Israeli Army is deforesting newly occupied areas in northern Quneitra to create line-of-sight for its forces, but won't allow Sunni villagers from Jubatha al-Khashab & Tranjeh to at least collect the firewood, but is allowing Druze villagers from Hadher to collect it.

Amid persistent rumors & speculation about #Syria's new currency & who will print it, keep an eye on #France-based secure printer company "Oberthur Fiduciaire." Meetings were held this week with Oberthur Fiduciaire officials & former French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin.

The ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel signed at the end of November last year was the impetus for groundbreaking changes in Lebanon🇱🇧. ➡️ After two years of negotiations, Lebanese parliamentarians finally agreed on the appointment of a new president, Joseph Aoun. ➡️ However, the continued presence of Israeli troops in Lebanon and the continuation of their attacks in the region threaten further stabilisation and undermine the Lebanese government’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah. 🔹 @owackasara writes about the future of Lebanon 📎 pism.pl/publications/l…

Very pleased to have contributed to the latest issue of MED This Week, published by the @ispionline, dedicated to post-Assad Syria. Read "Syria’s First Post-Assad Parliament: Political Restructuring in a Region of Uncertainties": ispionline.it/en/publication… In my brief commentary, I argue that the real economic problem lies not only in sanctions, but also in the lack of transparency and credibility within the political establishment. Several structural obstacles continue to hold back Syria’s recovery, including weak institutions, limited economic transparency, and excessive executive dominance. While sanctions still complicate trade and external financing, it is ultimately the uncertainty surrounding governance and asset ownership that deters investors. Without credible institutions and clear rules, sanctions become a convenient scapegoat for much deeper dysfunctions. This issue offers a rare and multi-dimensional panorama of Syria’s transition: •  @silviacarenzi on how the elections sought to balance aspirations and post-war constraints. • @RahmanAlhaj on the local complexities of participation and reconciliation in Sweida. • @HaidHaid22 on representation, legitimacy, and the lingering weight of presidential control. • @vvanwilgenburg on tensions between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces. • @shellykittleson on civil peace, community trust, and post-election reconciliation; • @petro_francesco on Syria–Israel relations and the regional security balance. • Mohamad Bukaei on Syria’s evolving diplomacy and regional reintegration. • @ibrahimhamidi on the geopolitical shifts following Assad’s fall. • @dkhalifa on the challenges of inclusivity and balance in a fragile transition. Many thanks to the ISPI editorial team for assembling such a timely and insightful collective reflection on a country at a crossroads; between institutional reconstruction, regional repositioning, and the search for a new balance between power and legitimacy.

W Syrii odbyły się wybory parlamentarne. Głosowanie wyłoniło część składu nowego Zgromadzenia Ludowego. ➡️ Wybory pozwolą usprawnić dalszy przebieg syryjskiej transformacji, jednak uwypukliły też ograniczenia władz w obliczu podziałów wewnętrznych. 🔹 O specyfice syryjskiego procesu wyborczego pisze @miwojnarowicz 📎 pism.pl/publikacje/wyb… ➡️ W kontekście Syrii polecamy także raport poświęcony jej transformacji i wyzwaniom, którym musi sprostać w nowej rzeczywistości, po upadku reżimu Asada (autorstwa @owackasara, @AMSpancerska i @miwojnarowicz). 📎 pism.pl/publikacje/tra…

The #SDF has forcibly closed x6 Christian schools in #Hasakeh in recent days, due to their decision to teach the curriculum issued by the Ministry of Education in #Damascus. The schools were associated with the Syriac & Assyrian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic & Protestant, Churches.

❗️Dziś w PISM rozmawiamy o Syrii. Raport @owackasara @AMSpancerska i @miwojnarowicz o sytuacji po upadku rządów Asada jest punktem wyjścia do rozmowy z ekspertami o perspektywach dla całego regionu i zaangażowaniu krajów UE w proces transformacji Syrii. 📎Raport dostępny jest na naszej stronie w wersji polskiej oraz angielskiej 🇵🇱 pism.pl/publikacje/tra… 🇬🇧 pism.pl/publications/t… Życzymy dobrej lektury!

🇱🇧 Zawieszenie broni między Hezbollahem i Izraelem było impulsem do rozpoczęcia przełomowych przemian w Libanie. Po dwóch latach negocjacji libańscy parlamentarzyści porozumieli się w sprawie mianowania nowego prezydenta – Josepha Aouna. ❗️ Procesowi stabilizacji zagrażają jednak utrzymująca się w Libanie obecność izraelskiego wojska oraz kontynuacja jego ataków. ➡️ Podważają one działania rządu Libanu na rzecz rozbrojenia Hezbollahu. 🔹 O przyszłości Libanu na zmieniającym się Bliskim Wschodzie pisze @owackasara 📎 pism.pl/publikacje/prz…