Ben Fève

Syria’s 2025 vs 2026 Agricultural Stress Visualized 🌾🇸🇾 2026 is shaping up to be a strong year for Syria’s agriculture. The FAO maps below tell the story clearly: the first three months of 2025 were overwhelmingly red across the country, clear signals of severe drought. In contrast, the same period in 2026 is largely green. What stands out immediately is a clear shift: (1) a reversal in the Northeast, Syria’s breadbasket, (2) a broader recovery of rainfed agriculture, and (3) a marked stabilization extending well beyond the coastal areas. Yet, caution is still needed, with at least three structural constraints remaining: (1) depleted farmer resilience after last year's drought, (2) irrigation remains fragile (Euphrates?), (3) economic constraints for farmers (think 'inputs'). (The maps show the Agricultural Stress Index (ASI), a satellite-based indicator that identifies areas where crops are experiencing drought-induced stress.)

The 10% figure I wrote down for GDP growth is not something I have calculated myself. It's a figure I threw out there because it 'sounds' realistic, or at least more realistic than a 2% or 30% growth all things being equal. But don't quote me on that! (people have already started quoting me lol)

Syrian President Ahmad Al-Sharaa claims GDP grew by 30–35% in 2025. Almost certainly overstated... but before dismissing it entirely, it is worth unpacking what might explain the gap. Syria's pre-liberation GDP estimates (~$20 billion) almost certainly excluded large parts of the country: the SDF-controlled northeast, HTS-controlled northwest, and other non-regime zones. These areas had real economic activity. We have reported time and time again on the dynamism of Idlib's economy, with companies being established with paid-up capital of millions of dollars, industrial zones, and hundreds of millions in exports. I am not entirely sure the government in Damascus took this into account. I am also unsure about the extent to which Damascus was able to incorporate data from the vast agricultural lands east of the Euphrates — even if drought-stricken — or from oil output in those areas. I would argue that unifying these into a single national figure mechanically inflates the number. This also helps explain why the government was able to significantly increase the size of the budget. There is also an exchange rate effect. If GDP is calculated in Syrian pounds and converted to USD, the result is highly sensitive to which rate is used. The post-liberation exchange rate appreciated significantly. The same pound-denominated output produces a much larger USD figure, with no real change in production. Add to this the partial formalization of the informal economy: under Assad, vast activity ran through militia-controlled channels and parallel markets. Money previously lost to checkpoints can now be used for consumption or production (and also imports, of course). In fact, there is also a supply-side confidence effect. My hunch (though this remains to be studied), is that businesses that had been deliberately holding back investment under Assad (fearing expropriation, predation, or instability) began deploying capital rapidly after liberation, also thanks to capital from abroad. Capacity utilization recovered, dormant firms reopened, and new ones were established at pace. This specific point is not hypothetical; company registration data is clear on this. Foreign company incorporation is a very strong indicator (read here: x.com/BenjaminFeve/s…). On the demand side, the return of 1.5 million refugees (which could represent nearly a 10% increase in population) may have brought savings accumulated abroad (though I would argue that most returnees were among those faring the worst in their host countries). Remittances surged, as conversations with bankers and exchange agents will confirm, and there was a genuine injection of activity into retail, construction, and services. Yes, imports mathematically subtract from GDP, but Syrians are not only importing consumer goods, they are also importing capital goods and inputs. Looking at proxies for economic activity, nighttime lights data , a proxy for grid-based electricity use, shows significant increases across most major Syrian cities in 2025, with transitional government-held areas recording year-on-year growth ranging from 17% to 61% (in Aleppo). The national trend points toward structural recovery rather than short-term fluctuation (read more: karamshaar.com/syria-in-figur…). While NTL and GDP are not equivalent, they are nonetheless correlated. So, while it is easy to dismiss the figures given by the Syrian President, I think it is worth examining the potential explanations behind such numbers. Even if I believe the 30–35% figure may be partly an accounting effect, Syria nonetheless grew quite significantly over the past year; and I would not automatically rule out real growth having reached around 10%. The bottom line is that we cannot verify how this number was reached. What we can say is that the direction of travel is clear.

@AhalimT Yep, these are my assumptions based on my observations of the country. Nothing can really be confirmed before we get actual figures...

@TheSyObserver Here you go: eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/…

@BenjaminFeve Now the same energy with the terrorists now in charge who slaughtered Alawites, Druze and Kurds, please.

Assad is gone... but his business networks are not. The EU Court just made that crystal clear in its ruling against an Assad-era crony. In Al-Dibs v Council (Case T-405/24), the EU General Court’s 18 March ruling against Samer Al-Dibs, a prominent Assad-affiliated businessman, is one of the clearest signals yet on how Europe is thinking about Assad-era business networks after Assad’s fall. In brief, the Court argued that even if he no longer resides in Syria, even if Assad is gone, and even if his formal roles or day-to-day business activities have diminished, these elements are not sufficient to break the presumption of influence. As long as his networks, economic footprint, and past ties to the regime remain intact, he can still be considered a potential source of destabilization and therefore a threat to Syria’s transition. Al-Dibs has long been seen as part of the traditional Damascene business community that managed to retain influence under Bashar al-Assad, serving as a parliamentarian, heading the Damascus and Rural Damascus Chamber of Industry, and acting as a visible figure in regime-era business outreach abroad. The EU first sanctioned Samer Al-Dibs on 24 April 2023, describing him as a “leading businessperson operating in Syria” active in several sectors, especially the chemical industry and real estate. It also noted that he was a member of the Board of Directors of the Syrian-Chinese Business Council, chairman of the Damascus and Rural Damascus Chamber of Industry, a member of Parliament, and a close associate of Maher al-Assad. Among the main arguments he raised before the Court in his challenge to the listing were the following: — that the Council had failed to properly explain why he remained listed; — that it had ignored the evidence he submitted; — that he had moved to Lebanon, meaning he was no longer active in Syria; — that his health problems limited or ended his business activity; — that some of the positions attributed to him were no longer accurate; — that Assad’s fall on 8 December 2024 should have fundamentally changed the basis for sanctions; — that the Council lacked a sufficient factual basis for maintaining the measures in 2025; — and that the sanctions disproportionately harmed his property rights, business activity, health, living conditions, and reputation. The Tribunal rejected all of these arguments. In substance, its reply was: — the Council’s reasoning was sufficiently clear and specific; — Al-Dibs had not actually produced the kind of “clear and indisputable” evidence he claimed; — residing in Lebanon does not, by itself, sever ties to the former regime; — the medical evidence did not prove that he could no longer carry out business activity; — even if some of his formal titles had changed, these were secondary to the overall scale of his economic influence; — Assad’s fall did not automatically dissolve regime-linked economic networks; — the Council was entitled to consider that such businessmen still pose a risk to Syria’s transition; — and the interference with his rights remained proportionate given the objective of protecting civilians and supporting a peaceful transition. The point is that for Assad-era business figures, saying “the regime is gone,” “I live abroad,” or “my role has changed” is not enough. What matters now is whether they can demonstrate that their network, influence, and links to the old system have genuinely disappeared. I would tend to think that this will be difficult to strongly argue, seeing how the new authorities have been conducting economic settlements with former Assad-era cronies still under EU sanctions. This is a very interesting dynamic to study. By the way, I’m glad to see that some of the reports and articles I contributed to were actually cited by the Court. In particular, the piece “Tracking Regime Cronies: How to Deal with Assad’s Economic Networks” that I wrote for Syria in Figures with @KShaar_Advisory (read here: karamshaar.com/syria-in-figur…) was used by the Court to support its assessment that “recent evidence points to the fragility of the Syrian economy, large parts of which remain in the hands of businessmen linked to the former Assad regime, whose networks are difficult to dismantle.” The Court also relied on the profile of Samer Al-Dibs that I compiled while at The Syria Report (read here: syria-report.com/profile-samer-…), which was used to substantiate elements of his business activities and background.

Syria, EU discuss reopening Erasmus+ office in Damascus sana.sy/en/syria/22959… I will forever be jealous of the first student who goes to Syria through the Erasmus+ program... I did my Erasmus in Maastricht 😭

Just to be clear, these figures do not show the number of Syrians who entered the EU illegally; they show the number who were caught doing so. This means the true number of irregular entries is likely higher, on top of which there are Syrians entering the EU through entirely legal channels for various reasons. Please do not report about the fact that only 30 Syrians entered the EU in January 2026 😭😭

According to the latest @Frontex figures, only 30 Syrian nationals were detected crossing into the EU irregularly in January 2026, the lowest monthly figure recorded in nearly 30 years (January 2009). This number may be revised upward as data is refined, but the broader 2025 trend is unambiguous: irregular crossings by Syrians have fallen to their lowest level since 2012 (lower even than during the COVID-19 pandemic). Time and again, the data confirms what researchers have long argued: the primary driver of irregular migration is conflict, not the economy. Syria remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with catastrophic levels of deprivation. Yet poverty alone rarely compels people to risk dangerous, illegal crossings. When the immediate threat of violence and arbitrary detention recedes, so does the impulse to flee. The December 2024 transition has not made Syria prosperous... just yet. But it may have made it survivable, which is, in itself, enough for many to stay.

@_night_brain__ I suppose 'night brain' does not work during the day.

Maintaining insane world dictatorial torture zones on the periphery because you are too bored to think of a solution... turns out also bad immigration policy

@redemption4thee USD 20 billion nominal is what we usually consider Syria's GDP was at yearly between 2020-2024

@BenjaminFeve But isn't even an assumption of a $20B nominal GDP in 2025 itself seem overly optimistic that is unlikely? I do not doubt the 30-35% yearly recovery. It's the concrete number he gave where I was shocked and assumed he must be mixing up the PPP and the Nominal metrics

The other day, I broke down how nearly EUR 150 million was allocated to Syria by the EU for development assistance in 2025. But beyond cash, the language is also important to note. Compare how the EU refers to Syrian authorities in the 2024 support package versus the 2025 one (see below) In 2024, the line is, of course, clear: no role is foreseen for Syrian authorities. In 2025, the EU speaks of re-engaging with public authorities, providing technical assistance and capacity building, and consulting Syrian institutions to ensure ownership, even aiming to avoid parallel structures. The geography changes too. In 2024, support is framed broadly as “Syria, and neighbouring countries (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Türkiye) where relevant.” In 2025, it is explicitly “carried out in Syria.” I think that all of this is very telling of the EU's intention to work with the Syrian authorities and make sure that they are involved from top to bottom. Sure, that can make the process more tedious and slow things. But it is likely seen in Brussels as the only viable way to build trust, anchor reforms, and ensure that support translates into something more durable than short-term delivery and simply being seen as spewing cash without much beyond it. The Europeans ARE trying.

To be honest, I am not sure where the figures come from. I don't know how Syria could have reached USD 32 billion in GDP from a growth of 30–35% in 2025. With a starting base of USD 20 billion, we're still far from 32 billion. Maybe if we take into account the unification of the various areas of control and add their local GDP to Damascus', we can perhaps reach a base of USD 25 billion, where 30–35% growth would bring us to USD 32 billion. It really just depends on how they calculated it. Then again, the return of refugees, reduced economic friction following the lifting of sanctions, reconstruction, and pent-up activity, among other factors, might have led to significant growth. Many indicators point in that direction.

@BenjaminFeve x.com/i/status/20348… Hey man! Have you checked the newest claims by Sharaa about the yearly gross? He must have surely meant the PPP equivalent of the nominal GDP with these figures, no?

@aabnour x.com/BenjaminFeve/s…

بما أن الاتحاد الأوروبي قد يكون أحيانًا ضعيفًا جدًا في إيصال ما يقوم به من إجراءات (فإليكم عرضًا مبسطًا لحوالي 150 مليون يورو من مساعدات التنمية التي تعهدت بها المفوضية الأوروبية لسوريا في وقت سابق من عام 2025). بشكل عام، تجمع هذه البرامج بين دعم الحوكمة، ومبادرات التعافي الاقتصادي، وإجراءات الاستقرار الاجتماعي، وتهدف إلى دعم مرحلة التعافي المبكر في سوريا وإعادة بناء المؤسسات. ورغم أن هذا المبلغ ما زال متواضعًا مقارنة بحجم احتياجات إعادة الإعمار في سوريا، فإن طريقة توزيع التمويل تعطي فكرة واضحة عن أولويات الاتحاد الأوروبي الحالية، وهي: تعزيز قدرة مؤسسات الدولة دعم التعافي الاقتصادي المحلي تعزيز الشمول المالي تقوية التماسك الاجتماعي وهي المجالات التي يعتقد الاتحاد الأوروبي أنه يستطيع أن يُحدث فيها أكبر تأثير في المدى القريب. وبالطبع، لا تشمل هذه الأرقام المساعدات الإنسانية التي يتم تقديمها عبر برنامج ECHO التابع للاتحاد الأوروبي الأمم المتحدة أو مساهمات الدول الأعضاء بشكل فردي والتي تصل مجموع قيمتها إلى مليارات اليوروهات. الباحث @BenjaminFeve

Since the European Union can sometimes be painfully ineffective at communicating its own action (and because I did not see this breakdown clearly presented elsewhere) here is a simplified overview of the roughly EUR 150 million in development assistance pledged by the European Commission for Syria earlier in 2025. In total, these programmes combine governance support, economic recovery initiatives, and social stabilisation measures aimed at supporting Syria’s early recovery and institutional rebuilding. While the amount remains modest relative to Syria’s reconstruction needs, the structure of the funding provides insight into the EU’s current operational priorities: state capacity, local economic recovery, financial inclusion, and social cohesion—areas where the Union believes it can have the greatest impact in the near term. Of course, these do not include the humanitarian aid provided via ECHO, the UN, or the action by individual member states, which go into the billions in of Euros.

Read Part 2 of my series on EU–Syria relations, tracing the evolution of the relationship from the 1960s to the present. This piece explores the 1970s, the EEC’s Global Mediterranean Policy, and the negotiations that led to the 1977 EEC–Syria Cooperation Agreement—the legal foundation of relations between Damascus and Brussels for decades. Read it here: open.substack.com/pub/benjaminfe…

In the mid-1970s, Syrian diplomats shocked their European counterparts. 📝 benjaminfeve.substack.com/p/relationship… For years, Syria had shown little interest in deepening relations with the European Economic Community. Then suddenly, Damascus requested negotiations. Why? Because Syria needed: • better access to European markets • financial support • technology for its development plans These negotiations ultimately led to the 1977 EEC–Syria Cooperation Agreement, a landmark moment in the history of EU–Syria relations. In Part 2 of my series, I explore how this agreement was negotiated and what it meant for Syria’s economy. Read the article: benjaminfeve.substack.com/p/relationship…

Thrilled to be part of @EuroMeSCo’s 42nd Joint Policy Study on “The Return of Syria to the Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation Arena.” Honored to collaborate with an outstanding team of experts, @Rim_Turkmani, @AmmarKahf, @JBDacey, and Rabha Allam, to explore how Syria’s evolving political and economic landscape may reshape its engagement with the Euro-Mediterranean framework and broader regional cooperation initiatives. Looking forward to contributing to this important conversation on Syria’s reintegration into regional economic and institutional networks. And if you are an EU or Syria professional working on this topic, closely or from afar, I may be reaching out to you in the near future, so feel free to keep your DMs open. 😉

Did you know that the first official diplomatic contacts between Syria and the European Economic Community were triggered by a trade agreement with Israel? 📝benjaminfeve.substack.com/p/relationship… In February 1964, Damascus summoned representatives of the six EEC member states after learning that the Community was negotiating a trade agreement with Israel. Just two months later, Syria formally requested to establish a diplomatic mission to the EEC in Brussels. This little-known episode marked the beginning of official relations between Syria and what would later become the European Union. In my paper, I trace the origins of EU–Syria relations using diplomatic archives and historical trade data. It is the first article in a six-part series exploring the evolution of economic and political ties between Syria and Europe. This specific piece looks at the relationship between the EU and Syria throughout the 1960s. Read the full article: benjaminfeve.substack.com/p/relationship…