Cilo Sen
58 posts
در گرماگرم تحولات ایران، چهار نکتهی ساده اما حیاتی: ۱- جایگاه حقیقی هیچ دولت، سازمان، حزب، اپوزیسیون و فرد سیاستمداری فراتر از «خواست و ارادهی آزاد جامعه» نیست. احزاب و سازمانهای سیاسی وقتی بامعنا هستند که فعالیتشان به روند عاملیتیافتن شهروندان و خودمدیریتی جامعه کمک کند. ۲- جامعهای که در انتظار «منجی» نگه داشته شود، هرگز به جامعهای دموکراتیک و مدرن مبدل نمیشود، افرادش نیز شهروندانی آزاد نخواهند شد و در جایگاه رعیت باقی خواهند ماند. ۳- دقیقا همانند عملکردی که رژیم جمهوری اسلامی داشته، اپوزیسیون ملیگرای تندرو و جریان راست افراطی سلطهخواه نیز خود را «فراجامعه» میپندارند و در جایگاه «منجی» تعریف میکنند؛ بهجای نهادسازیهای دموکراتیک دست به نمادسازیهای جعلی و فریبنده میزنند و جامعه را به چشم ابزاری برای کسب قدرت نگاه میکنند. بنابراین، اینها مصادرهجویانی هستند که بهرغم غوغای کرکنندهی دستگاه تبلیغاتیشان، شدیدا با آزادی و عاملیت جامعه در تضادند. علت دشمنی آشکار و پنهانشان با «ژن ژیان ئازادی» نیز در همین واقعیت نهفته است. ۴- هر ملیت و هویتی که در پی کسب آزادی و استاتوس (جایگاه) سیاسی باشد، به جهانبینی و فلسفهی سیاسی نیرومندی بهعنوان پشتوانهی مبارزات، استراتژیها و تاکتیکهایش نیاز دارد. این قضیه برای کوردها، زنان، بهحاشیهراندهشدگان و همهی هویتهای تحت ستم ساکن ایران نیز صدق میکند. پژاک این جهانبینی را بهشکل «برساختن جامعهی دموکراتیک، آزادی زنان، حفاظت از محیطزیست و اقتصاد سازگار با آن» صورتبندی کرده و بر پایهی آن مبارزه میکند. #ژن_ژیان_ئازادی
As more details of the SDF-Damascus agreement become available, the contours of the deal can be summarised in five points: 1. Integration and the Hasakah division. The text states that in Hasakah, SDF forces will be integrated into a division that the Syrian government will create in the governorate, with SDF integrated into three brigades. That wording strongly suggests the Hasakah division will include additional brigades beyond the three allocated to SDF personnel, without specifying the total number. In the new Syrian military structure, some divisions appear to have four brigades (as in Daraa), while others have more (one Aleppo division, for example, is described as having six). More importantly, the language implies that division-level command will sit with the Syrian Ministry of Defense, while the SDF presence is capped at the brigade level. This matters because a division HQ is where real authority sits: even if brigades retain cohesion on paper, a division commander who answers to Damascus controls tasking, deployment, and operational priorities. The draft also does not state that the three SDF brigades will be confined to Kurdish-majority areas. In theory, the division commander could redeploy an SDF brigade to places like al-Shaddadi - still within Hasakah governorate, but in areas currently under stronger government control. In practice, the arrangement may be managed more cautiously, but the shift is still significant: before the recent SDF territorial losses, the SDF was pushing for three full divisions; the current text points instead to three brigades (plus a separate brigade arrangement in Kobani) within a Damascus-created division. 2. The agreement stipulates that the Syrian Army retreats to Shaddadi, further south of Hasakah city, but equally important, it conditions SDF withdrawal from Hasakah and Qamishli. It also states: "Prohibit the entry of military forces into cities and towns by all parties, especially in Kurdish areas." However, it permits 15 security vehicles to enter each of Hasakah and Qamishli, a rather symbolic step, as SDF officials have noted. The tension is obvious: other clauses point to much deeper state re-entry, including the handover of remaining oilfields in Rmelan and al-Suwaydiyah, Qamishli airport, and the two key crossings, Semalka with Iraq’s Kurdistan Region and Nusaybin with Turkey, alongside a broader takeover of civilian institutions across Hasakah governorate. If these sites are handed to Syrian ministries, a crucial operational question follows: who provides the armed protection on the ground, and under what chain of command? 3. Another significant provision requires licensing all local organisations, cultural associations, and media institutions in accordance with the laws of the relevant Syrian ministries. Combined with the government takeover of civilian institutions, this substantially reduces the autonomy SDF-held areas currently enjoy. If implemented as written, there will be no distinct legal framework beyond education in Kurdish. 4. Compared to the January 18 framework, this text is more detailed and arguably more workable in the short term. But it also points toward a more centralised outcome, with SDF-held areas absorbing state institutions and laws. Security integration is mentioned, but there is no clear quota or binding formula that guarantees the weight of SDF-affiliated personnel within the new security architecture. The Hasakah security chief, for example, is nominated by the Syrian government, and nothing in the text prevents Damascus from staffing Hasakah and Qamishli with personnel outside the SDF framework. The document also leaves ambiguity around what exactly is meant by “Kurdish areas,” especially given the phrasing “especially in Kurdish areas,” which implicitly acknowledges that not all SDF-held areas are "Kurdish areas". 5. Despite these limitations, the Hasakah governorship and deputy/assistant defence minister positions that SDF is set to receive are meaningful posts with legally assigned powers, not merely token appointments. However, the deputy/assistant minister is appointed by decree specifying their tasks and competences, so the importance of this post will ultimately depend on what responsibilities the SDF appointee is assigned.
