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31 countries. 1800–2012. Tax revenue, broken down by type: income, property, customs, excises, consumption.
New paper out in @EJPR_Journal introducing the Govrev dataset. 🧵
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Per F. Andersson
87 posts
Per F. Andersson
@perfandersson
Comparative Politics, Institutions, and Taxation. Postdoc at Stockholm University.
Katılım Ocak 2020
643 Takip Edilen244 Takipçiler
@tbrambor PS: The paper analyzes data through 2012. The version on the site now extends to 2024 (Govrev v3).
📊 perfandersson.com/data.html📘 Codebook v3: perfandersson.com/uploads/1/2/7/…
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@tbrambor 📄 Paper: doi.org/10.1017/S14756…📊 Data: perfandersson.com/data.html🔍 Explore: perfandersson.com/tax-explorer.h…
Your conclusions are only as good as the data you base them on.
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31 countries. 1800–2012. Tax revenue, broken down by type: income, property, customs, excises, consumption.
New paper out in @EJPR_Journal introducing the Govrev dataset. 🧵
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Under high inequality without redistribution, richer players were punished more. Redistribution wipes this out (Fig 3, C→D). Inequality aversion seems to kick in at high inequality — and redistribution redirects punishment away from the rich toward defection.
In @PLOSOne
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SVO-measured inequality aversion did not predict punishment. Neither inequality nor redistribution shifted total punishment. The clean fairness-driven story — equality-lovers punish more, redistribution satisfies them — doesn't survive our confirmatory tests.
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Scheidel's "Great Leveler" argued equality has historically come from violence. Can peaceful redistribution do the same? In our lab experiment, redistribution doesn't reduce punishment — it shifts it from 'punish the rich' to 'punish free-riders.' 🧵
journals.plos.org/plosone/articl…
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I agree, fantastic opportunity to get feedback on work in progress!
Jan Vogler@Jan_Vogler
🚨 Danish Historical Political Economy Workshop 🚨 Do you work on HPE? If you do, check out Lasse Aaskoven's Danish HPE Workshop, scheduled for Feb. 21, 2025. I had a fantastic experience at a previous one! Several travel + hotel grants available. Deadline: Dec. 31, 2024 ‼️
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Per F. Andersson retweetledi
Deadline for applying to this postdoc coming up! @JStuckatz and I are hiring a postdoc for a revolving door project at @CBScph. 2 years in Copenhagen with our group of political economists. Start: summer '25. No teaching.
Deadline: January 5 '25
Link: cbs.dk/en/about-cbs/j…
Benjamin Egerod@BCEgerod
🚨Job🚨 Interested in working 2 years in beautiful Copenhagen with an excellent group of political economists? @JStuckatz and I are hiring a postdoc for a revolving door project at @CBScph. Start: summer '25. No teaching. Deadline: January 5 '25 Link to job ad in next tweet
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Key takeaway: Investing in state capacity can help an autocrat survive longer, but it may ultimately hasten the regime’s downfall as it pushes elites toward democratic change. From the point of view of an autocrat, state capacity is a strategic gamble. (8/8)
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Autocrats who build state capacity to secure their rule inadvertently plant seeds of regime change. A strong state facilitates organized, nonviolent democratic movements. In strong states autocrats survive, but autocracies die. (7/8)
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In a new paper with Jan Teorell, published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, we present theory and evidence of how state capacity is linked to regime change. A thread (1/8) journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00…
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