peter lavoy

Predicting long-term domestic political trends or election outcomes in any country is likely a fool's errand. This said, advocates of JCPOA and engagement, opponents of pressure campaigns and military action, partisan voices, and participants in Iranian information operations argued that the deal would moderate Iran's politics. There was no evidence to support this assertion although even some in Iran may have believed this to be possible. Neither hope nor the self-serving comments of some Iranian officials are evidence that regime moderation was possible but advocates often passionately presented both as such. Importantly, JCPOA constrained no hardline activity. The deal’s financial relief increased funding for hardline equities (including proxy actors such as Hamas), and Iran's senior most leaders had no intention of allowing the deal’s consequences to undermine hardline authority. Further, ensuring continued hardline support shielded the Islamic Republic against pressure for its non-nuclear aggression. Thus, hardliners enjoyed the benefits of the deal while simultaneously the political capacity to criticize those who made it possible. Whereas the Trump administration withdrew from JCPOA, its concerns were widely - and loudly - noted by Congress on both sides of the aisle and the majority of regional countries who believed the deal would compromise their core national security and questioned the idea that the deal would lead to political moderation in Iran. Although outside your question, JPCOA was likely fatally compromised by its lack of bipartisan support and its transformation from a foreign policy into a domestic political talking point. Deal advocates also undermined their position by downplaying (or ignoring) that whereas JCPOA introduced significant international oversight and real, if temporary and fading, constraints on Iran’s nuclear enterprise, it simultaneously resourced Iran's missile programs and lethal regional adventurism. This meant that over the life of the deal, Iran’s nuclear enterprise and its regional aggression would expand absent moderation of the regime. The international community’s unwillingness to punish Iran (beyond symbolic if numerous sanctions) for its lethal regional actions, domestic oppression, and actions which questioned its commitment to a peaceful nuclear program (e.g., retention of the nuclear weapons archive, dual use activities) likely accelerated JCPOA’s collapse. In recent years, Tehran likely perceived that the erosion of its diplomatic isolation and sanctions enforcement made adherence to the deal unnecessary. We should recognize that this may have been the inevitable outcome of the deal given the hardliner hold on power.

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