Plinian Put

The Asia Century 20 years ago, just 2 of the world's 10-largest stock markets came from Asia. Today, 6 out of the top 10 are from the region. China's equity market, which didn't make the top 10 list in 2006, is about 25 times larger today. Recently, Taiwan and Korea have ripped into the top tier at a mortifying pace. The US definitely remains unparalleled in size and depth. Outside of America, it's clear where the center of growth/innovation gravity is.

I've now visited three provinces and two municipalities in China, and based on what I've seen, there's no clear gap in quality of life between the West and China. Some things are generally better in the West: air quality, real wages, work-life balance. Some things are generally better in China: infrastructure, urban modernity, safety. Overall, the gap that many Westerners assume exists has largely closed.

In a previous tweet, I pointed out that China will have a harder time catching up with the United States. China’s GDP was about 78% of the U.S. level in 2021, but by 2024 that share had fallen to roughly 64%. Some argued this was simply an exchange-rate effect, while others questioned the metric itself and suggested that purchasing-power parity, or PPP, tells a different story. It is true that the renminbi has weakened from around 6.3 to roughly 7.2 per dollar, a depreciation of about 13%. That does reduce China’s GDP in dollar terms. But the divergence between China and the United States is visible in underlying growth. In nominal terms, the U.S. economy has expanded more rapidly. American GDP rose from about 23 trillion dollars in 2021 to roughly 28 to 29 trillion in 2024, an increase of around 25%. China’s grew from approximately 114 trillion yuan to around 130 trillion yuan, closer to 15%. Even allowing for differences in measurement, the gap is widening, not narrowing. The same pattern appears in capital markets. U.S. equities, represented by the S&P 500, increased from roughly $45 trillion in 2021 to around $55–60 trillion more recently. Chinese markets have moved in the opposite direction. Indices such as the CSI 300 and the Hang Seng have seen their combined market value fall from around $13 trillion at their peak to closer to $10 trillion. If this were primarily a currency story, it would be difficult to explain why U.S. markets have surged while China’s have contracted in absolute terms. This points to a deeper structural shift. China’s growth model, long driven by investment, construction and credit expansion, is running into constraints, including diminishing returns and rising debt burdens. The United States, by contrast, continues to benefit from stronger consumption and more resilient capital markets. There is also a historical lesson. During the Cold War, Nobel economist Paul Samuelson projected that the Soviet economy would eventually catch up with or even surpass that of the United States in late 20 century . Those forecasts extrapolated from USSR’s strong growth trends but underestimated geopolitical realities. As for PPP, it serves a specific purpose but has clear limitations. It is useful for comparing domestic purchasing power, yet far less informative when assessing global economic weight, financial influence or technological leadership. For instance, India’s economy already appears significantly larger than Japan’s. Few would argue that India offers a higher level of development. Finally, headline GDP figures themselves have limits. Investment can boost output and employment in the short term while generating little long-term return, especially when financed by rising debt. This concern has long been raised in discussions of China’s infrastructure and construction-led model. Questions around data transparency add another layer of uncertainty. For policymakers, the implication is straightforward. Treating this as a currency-driven fluctuation, or relying on PPP-based comparisons, risks misreading China’s trajectory. The evidence points to a more durable divergence, shaped by structural factors rather than short-term financial movements. This is not simply a cyclical slowdown. It marks a shift in relative economic momentum.