Ryan Lanman

I actually tried to jump on this and found it vexingly dofficult to bridge wstETH or BTC collateral from Eth L1. The only path i found via MegaEth’s native bridge for wstETH had a haircut of a few 10’s of bps on the collateral. If i save 2% on borrowing costs, i need to believe that delta will last for 4+ months to make beidging worth it. Similarly, the UX of going from wBTC —> BTC.b seemed horrible. No native way to bridge wBTC to Mega, even for swaps?

What accounts for there being close to 0% borrow rates? Not enough size? Not the preferred collateral assets? Borrowers aren’t aware?

Ah, perfect an argument so nakedly emotional it saves everyone the trouble of pretending this is about engineering. 🤦 If your justification for a consensus change boils down to "i don't think people hate them enough” then you're proposing that Bitcoin become a vehicle for your personal grievances. Consensus rules are not there to hit someone on the nose. They are there to define a neutral, predictable system that doesn't care who you like, who you hate, or what cultural battle you think you're fighting this week. The moment you cross that line, when you start modifying consensus to punish a class of users, you've already abandoned the core property that makes Bitcoin valuable: credible neutrality. And the irony here is absolutely painful: You're trying to "fight spam" by rewriting the rules… when the system has already done it for you. The fee market worked. Spammers paid. Heavily. Scammers paid. Heavily. JPEG enjoyers lit absurd amounts of money on fire. 🤡 That is the mechanism. That is the defense. There was no need for social crusades, no need for rule changes, no need for moral arbitration. The market priced their behavior, and literally all of it collapsed under its own weight. WE ALREADY WON. The only thing BIP-110-style thinking accomplishes is reopening the door you claim to want closed because once you demonstrate that consensus can be bent to target undesirable use, you invite an endless cycle of new rule changes, new targets, and new attack surfaces. You don't eliminate spam that way you create a ethereum style governance game around defining it. And that's far more dangerous than any JPEG wave ever was. Whats really going on here is an inability to accept that the bitcoin solved the problem without you. That's an ego problem, not a protocol problem. Slay the ego. Recognize that the market already delivered the punishment you wanted. The losses are real, the incentives are clear, and the behavior has adjusted accordingly Bitcoin doesn't need you to swing a hammer at things you dislike (and I know hammers) 🔨 It needs you to _build_ If you've realized that JPEGs don't hold value and that spam is self-limiting under a functioning fee market, then your time is far better spent doing something productive: Make Bitcoin more useful for actual financial activity. Make it easier, cheaper, safer to use for people who derive real value from it. Expand the demand for blockspace instead of trying to curate who is "worthy" of it.

How much time you got? Here’s a few ways that BIP 110 damages Bitcoin: 1) Kills scaling and programmability -Bans OP_IF in Tapscripts that destroys MAST, covenants, Ark, BitVM, channel factories, statechains, and almost every future L2 roadmap. -Removes the foundation for Schnorr and Taproot efficiency gains (30–60% smaller multisig, private scripts). -We do not win if we cannot scale 2) Creates worse spam vectors -Forces spammers into fake-pubkey P2WSH multisigs and other unprunable vectors -Results in permanent utxo bloat instead of prunable OR, which increases node costs, slows sync times, and centralizes running a node. -Every new filter just shifts the attack vector to somewhere more harmful 3) Breaks legitimate use cases and existing users -Makes ~560,000+ real taproot spends (vaults, HTLCs, lightning, decaying multisigs) unspendable on the BIP 110 chain after activation. -Retroactively freezes or devalues tens of millions of utxos that belong to real holders, effective confiscation for those users. 4) Chain split risk -Zero miner signaling plus uasf activation will result in an automatic split when miners keep mining data for fees. -Creates a low-hashrate minority chain with no economic support. Easy 51% attacks, reorgs, and confusion. 5) Destroys rough consensus and governance -Trades public debate, mailing list, and proper review for a single dev pushing directly to main with no review. -Sets precedent that any small group can uasf contentious rules and threaten to split the chain. -Turns Bitcoin development into personality-driven drama instead of technical merit. 7) Hurts adoption and economic security -Alienates builders, institutions, and new users. -Makes Bitcoin look unstable and ruled by moral panic. -Reduces long-term fee security budget by killing L2 growth. 7) Security and centralization risks -Forces constant filter updates and centralizes policy in one maintainer. -Increases attack surface (new consensus rules = new bugs, reorg risks). -Makes running a node more expensive due to forced utxo bloat. 8) Sets terrible precedent -Normalizes retroactive rule changes and moralistic censorship. -Opens the door for future forks over what small group decides is“bad data” -Weakens Bitcoin’s core promise of immutability and permissionlessness. Bottom line: BIP 110 doesn’t “fix” spam, it redirects it into worse forms, breaks scaling tools, risks a split, and sets a dangerous precedent. It’s anything but conservative and completely undermines Bitcoin as global money. It’s radical sabotage dressed as purity.

It’s a never ending treasure trove with these people. BIP 110/Knots/🪢 in the handle tells you everything you need to know. They literally tell you that they are clueless over and over again. Not to mention, this is the same nonsense the big blockers pushed, just wearing a different mask. Core thesis in both eras -Big blockers: Bitcoin must be usable for coffee on L1 -> big blocks or bitcoin dies. -Knots/BIP 110: Bitcoin must be clean & pure on L1 -> no scaling, no scripting or bitcoin dies. Both are wrong for the same reason: They fetishize L1 as the only place money can happen. -L1 = secure, scarce settlement & finality -L2/L3 = fast, cheap, scalable everyday use I’m not one to immortalize every word from Satoshi, but for those that do: BitcoinTalk Forum (July 2010) - Bitcoin scalability problem thread, Satoshi wrote: “The current system where every user is a network node is not the intended configuration for large scale. The current system is for small scale, and for large scale we need a different configuration.” “Bitcoin can scale much larger if we allow the network to be split into layers, with only a few nodes handling the bulk of the traffic.” “It can be phased in, like: initially, the whole network, then gradually, as the number of users grows, more and more of the burden will be shifted to specialized nodes.” The irony of all these so-called purist influencers: -Big blockers wanted more on L1, which would have centralized it (bigger blocks = fewer nodes). -Knots wants less on L1, but which would centralize it (crippled scripting = no real L2 scaling, no way to reach billions). Both paths lead to Bitcoin as a toy-either bloated and centralized (big blocks) or tiny and useless (no scripting/scaling). The reality is Bitcoin wins by staying neutral on L1 (fees decide use) while enabling powerful scripting for L2/L3 to scale to billions. v30’s OP_RETURN increase + Taproot + future upgrades like Simplicity/CTV are exactly that path. The big blockers lost. The Knots purists are losing and they, as their predecessors before them, don’t have a clue what they are talking about.

@nic_carter @jprichardson Doesn’t that same cog/admin load apply for USD stables outside the US? Or are stables getting used for payments by people/in places where that’s less of an issue than US citizens?

Indeed Something bitcoiners dont get is tax + accounting overhead from paying with a volatile asset It's not about whether LN is a superior technical means of payment, it's about the all-in cognitive and administrative cost of making a payment USD is advantaged as the base tax asset for a reason (no need to track a capital gain of USD cash when you buy something), unless that changes it won't be unseated for payments

Bitcoin is fantastic as a store of wealth. What no one wants to say out loud: To date, Bitcoin has failed as a payment method. Lightning hasn't scaled. Stablecoins are needed.

0/ I have to strongly disagree with @IBAT_CLW here. I've written about this elsewhere (and will append at the end of this), but this has the story backwards. Stablecoins + Community Banks together are the counter to the current black hole for deposits that are the big banks. As a reminder for everyone, in 2009, banks outside the top 20 were a shade under 50% of deposits. They are now under 20%. This is trillions of dollars leaving small banks and concentrating in our largest banks. That was not caused by stablecoins. Stablecoins did not even exist until 2014, they did not scale beyond $5B until 2020, and even today, there are roughly $300B of them. More so, they have no net impact on bank deposits in the system! If you don't believe me, read the article I attach. So what are they? And why do I say they are the key for community banks? If you look at community banks like @JillCastilla's Citizens Bank of Edmond / Roger or Dart Bank or Apple Bank, they often have superior product offerings to big banks. Roger has 2% on your checking account (not a typo!) and 3.6% on savings, as an example. Apple is similarly good. They also deploy those deposits into the local economy. You're helping rural America or tier 2 or 3 cities build, instead of just pushing every single dollar in our entire system into NYC or SF, which bluntly, have enough of an advantage as it is. Or, you know, levered lending for hedge funds (see the second article I have attached if you don't believe me on that). Why is this happening? Community banks have a distribution problem (how do you get in touch with people to get their deposits), and they have a backend problem (regulators want all of them to run a first class KYC/AML program for global use, but you're... 12 dudes in Arkansas, not JPM). This is because they got hit by the combo of the internet and regulators demanding every bank be a tiny tech empire due to how they demand third-party risk management work. Apple Bank is a great example of this: core products that have a great value prop, but tech that is genuinely psychotic. There is a separate app for your bank account and debit card! Insane! And yet, this is where you are trying to do this by yourself all too often. Essentially, you are trapped between two forces that are grinding the industry to death despite it having a better core value proposition (as witnessed by the deposit flight I reference). So how can we fix that? Well, what if community banks had a way to: 1. Modernize their tech stacks and UI/UX, like Roger Bank is working on 2. Cooperate to distribute deposits across the entire class to places with the best demand for loans and risk/reward characteristics 3. Share backend costs and capabilities so that they have controls and risk management on par with the big guys You know what you'd need for that? An open-source, open-access, shared language for both money movements and capabilities. A, if you will, blockchain. There is a very straight line between the value community banks bring (which Christopher was correct about), the problems they face (caused by technology and regulators), and the solutions that blockchain-based money creates (stablecoins). These are not enemies. They are allies. And the big banks and the bank lobbies they fund have tricked both sides into fighting each other so that the ultimate winner is Jamie Dimon's bonus. This has to stop. If community banks and crypto can't find a way to work together, we already know who the winners are. It's not the community banks. It's not consumers. It's not the crypto industry. It is the big banks. If you don't understand this, you need to get up to speed, otherwise you will lose the war without even knowing it was happening.

Can you buy a sandwich with CD? Banks pay 0% to users on deposits, earn 3.5%+ risk free, and pay execs huge bonuses. Yet MMFs right now can pay yield and be used for payments. @Fidelity does now! Why the sanctimony from tradfi when this already exists?

@willreeves Good to hear - but not what your support staff or material claim when i reached out. They pointed me to an article explaining it (and credit cards) were cut due to ’historically low volumes’

@ryanlanman1 Temporary. We’re rebuilding everything.

The foundation is set. Fold is about to show what a small, mission-driven, deeply talented, relentlessly focused team can do.

Respectfully Saylor is wrong here on quantum. Specifically, he is wrong on four claims (I'm only focusing on the technical ones). Let me walk through each one. Claim 1: The consensus of the cyber security community is that quantum is not a threat for the next 10 years and thus no immediate action is needed. There is no such consensus. The opposite is true: every major national security and standards body in the world is actively mandating post-quantum migration right now, because the migrations themselves take a decade or more. NSA CNSA 2.0 requires all new National Security Systems to be quantum-safe before 2035 with most of that work being done in the next 5. NIST published finalized PQC standards (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA) in August 2024 and released IR 8547 setting a target to deprecate all quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms after 2030 and disallow completely by 2035. The UK NCSC set migration milestones for 2028, 2031, and 2035. These are not responses to a distant hypothetical. These are programs with compliance deadlines because the organizations that set them have concluded that starting now is barely early enough. Historically, it has taken a long time from the moment that a new algorithm is standardized until it is fully integrated into information systems. Past cryptographic migrations confirm this. The SHA-1 deprecation took about 7 years. The AES migration took around 5 years. The TLS 1.3 rollout took 3-5 years despite offering clear performance benefits. NIST has already concluded that PQC migration is fundamentally more complex than any of these precedents. The timeline argument ignores harvest-now-decrypt-later entirely. Adversaries are collecting encrypted data today for future decryption. The U.S. Federal Reserve published an analysis of this in September 2025, using Bitcoin as a case study. The threat is already active. Claim 2: When quantum hits, everything upgrades; banks, the internet, defense, Bitcoin. The internet is already upgrading. 52% of human web traffic on Cloudflare used post-quantum key exchange by December 2025, nearly doubling from 29% at the start of the year. Chrome ships ML-KEM for TLS. Apple enabled PQ TLS in iOS 26. OpenSSH has defaulted to post-quantum key agreement since version 9.0. Signal has post-quantum encryption. AWS and Google Cloud support PQC in their KMS products. Apple added ML-DSA and ML-KEM to CryptoKit as production APIs. Banks and payment networks are centralized. Visa pushes a firmware update or SWIFT changes a protocol spec. TLS upgrades are invisible to end users (if you use Chrome you use a TLS version that supports post-quantum and you didn't even know). These systems can and will migrate without their customers doing anything. Bitcoin cannot do this. Bitcoin requires a fork with global decentralized consensus. A PQC signature migration is categorically harder than previous forks: ML-DSA-44 signatures are 2,420 bytes versus 64 bytes for Schnorr, a 38x increase that breaks Bitcoin's existing SegWit weight economics, Script stack limits (520-byte maximum), and transaction propagation assumptions. A single ML-DSA-44 signature plus public key is several times larger than an entire typical single-input P2WPKH spend today. BIP-360 and QBIP exist as (great) proposals. Sadly, neither has an activation timeline. Enterprise PQC migration is much easier. These are organizations with executive authority to mandate changes, dedicated security teams, and established procurement processes. Bitcoin has none of these. Blockchain governance is structurally slower than centralized governance. The "everything upgrades together" framing also ignores the permanently exposed key problem. When banks upgrade TLS, old sessions don't matter, they were ephemeral. When Bitcoin upgrades, the ~6.9 million BTC with already-exposed public keys on the immutable ledger are still sitting there. You cannot un-publish a public key from a blockchain. Those coins need to be actively moved by their owners to new quantum-safe addresses. Approximately 1.72 million BTC in P2PK addresses, including Satoshi's estimated 1.1 million BTC, are likely permanently exposed because the private keys are lost. There is no banking equivalent to this. Banks do not maintain a public, permanent, immutable record of every customer's authentication key going back 17 years. Claim 3: Digital assets have the most advanced cryptographic security; more than banking, credit cards, stocks, etc This conflates trustlessness with cryptographic strength. They are not the same property. Bitcoin uses ECDSA over secp256k1. Your bank's TLS connection uses ECDHE over P-256 or X25519. These are the same class of cryptographic primitive, elliptic curve schemes whose security rests on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. Shors algorithm breaks both identically. Neither is "more advanced" than the other. What differs is what we call the defense-in-depth architecture around that primitive. A credit card tap-to-pay transaction involves: TLS with ephemeral key exchange, an EMV chip with hardware-bound keys in a certified secure element, tokenization so the merchant never sees the real card number, session-based key rotation, fraud detection, transaction reversal capability, and regulatory insurance. A Bitcoin transaction involves: one ECDSA signature. That is the entire authorization layer. No fraud department, no chargeback, no identity verification layer that can distinguish a legitimate owner from a quantum attacker holding the same derived private key. Once a forged signature is accepted by consensus, the transfer is irreversible. The systems Saylor describes as less secure are, in fact, already deploying post-quantum protections that Bitcoin has not yet started. They can do this because they are centralized. Bitcoin's decentralization, its core value proposition, is precisely what makes its quantum migration harder, slower, and later than every system he compared it to. Claim 4: The crypto community will be the first to spot the threat and move. This assumes a CRQC will be publicly announced. Nation-state adversaries have zero incentive to disclose a quantum capability. The entire intelligence value of a CRQC is that no one knows you have it. You harvest quietly, you decrypt quietly, you exploit quietly. What would "spotting it" look like on Bitcoin? A quantum attacker does not exploit a bug, bypass a firewall, or compromise a server. They produce valid signatures indistinguishable from the legitimate owner's, because mathematically, they hold the same key. If an attacker begins draining P2PK addresses, each theft is a correctly signed transaction. There is no intrusion detection system for the Bitcoin blockchain. Transactions are valid or they aren't. By the time someone notices a pattern across thousands of UTXOs, the damage is done and irreversible. And the empirical record directly contradicts the "first to move" claim. The current state of readiness: one BIP with no activation timeline, an ongoing debate about whether to freeze Satoshi's coins, and a quantum-vulnerable exposure surface that is only going up. The exposure is increasing, not decreasing, because address reuse continues to add more and more BTC to the vulnerable set. Meanwhile, the rest of the internet has already deployed PQC to billions of users without anyone noticing. Where things actually stand We maintain the Bitcoin Risq List, an open-source, continuously updated tracker of quantum-vulnerable Bitcoin at the address level. As of block height 936,882 (February 2026): approximately 6.9 million BTC across 13.9 million addresses have exposed public keys. Solana is 100% quantum-vulnerable as their address structure exposes the full public key. Deloitte's analysis found 65% of Ethereum is in quantum-vulnerable accounts. The internet started its post-quantum transition in 2022. National security systems have a 2027 compliance mandate. NIST targets deprecating and disallowing all quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms well before 2035. The blockchain industry, which directly protects bearer value with the exact cryptographic primitives that a quantum computer breaks, has a BIP and a debate. The question is not whether quantum is a threat to digital assets. It is whether the industry will begin its migration before the window closes. The gap between the internet's pace of PQC adoption and the blockchain industry's pace is not a gap in awareness. It is a gap in urgency and importantly, the gap is not closed by asserting that the threat doesn't exist.

Easy to shade firms generating tens of billions of profits, especially in the context of the India penalty, but the reality is Arb is Arb, and this is just crypto. Jane Street has historically been #1 in ETF trading for around 2 decades, dominating bond ETFs where the arbs are 25 bps+ and international ETFs where the underlying is closed relative to the basket so there is a lot of probabilistic arbitrage . They also get first look at RFQs because they quote the tightest spreads and the largest size. The "Shorting BTC" narrative is a myth. I'm friends with ~20 of their traders and have worked with/for them at their next gigs. These guys don’t "bet" on direction; they obsess over EV and risk. They aren't making money by dumping Bitcoin; they’re capturing the basis between spot and the ETF. Since the liquidity ($Binance) is USDT-denominated and ETFs are USD-fiat, the trade is similar to the ETF and to the ADR trade. Case in point: Bear Stearns. Jane Street got investigate for making >$100M on the default, but they were just hedging their counterparty risk. They crushed everyone else ($100mm+) shorting XIV in 2018 because: 1. Most arb shops weren't set up to bypass the uptick rule via the short sale exemption. 2. HFTs were too slow to realize the fixed price (triggered by the knock-in) was $6. People were still buying high while Jane Street was trading a pure contract-based arbitrage. Arbitrage is just making prices efficient. If not them, SIG or somebody else would have taken down the trade. They're just smarter and faster than the rest.

That’s a coherent moral position to take, and I respect it, but you gotta own the tradeoff too - that the majority of these coins have no owner with control of keys, and that you’re cool with whoever being fastest to a capable QC taking them for themselves. Does that not negatively impact BTC’s ideals as well?

@yindoh I understand the stakes perfectly — that’s exactly why we cannot let the “community” decide whose coins get frozen. Quantum resistance upgrades must be voluntary user migrations to new addresses. The moment the protocol (or a soft fork) selectively freezes any addresses — Satoshi’s, “lost”, or anyone else’s — Bitcoin stops being immutable, permissionless money and becomes “decentralized until we vote otherwise.” That’s not an upgrade. That’s the end of Bitcoin. Satoshi’s coins are his. Full stop. No one else has the right to touch them, pressure him, or “save” them via committee. Private keys, private property. Always has been.

“Should Satoshi’s $BTC be frozen, or risk being lost to quantum hackers?” — @ki_young_ju, CEO of @cryptoquant_com

@yindoh @Cointelegraph @ki_young_ju @cryptoquant_com 5 years to upgrade, then over how long do old addresses have balance decay / demmurage? Seems like another 3-4 years is about right, at most. But overall ‘return to coinbase’ seems more sensible than a full burn.

Neither. You make it optional to upgrade wallet to quantum resistant. Announce it and give several years to comply. For wallets that don’t comply within, say a 5 year timeframe, you slowly start transferring those BTC in a trickle back to the coinbase pool and give them out as mining rewards once again. If someone is alive and paying any attention to their BTC 5 years is more than enough time to respond to quantum resistance wallet upgrade and then the trickle of BTC flowing back to protocol to be redistributed as rewards is yet a further motivator to take action if indeed someone is paying attention. This method is almost guaranteed to give enough time/notice to everyone that is alive and hasn’t lost their BTC

We'll soon find out whether the Senate is going to protect neutral software developers or leave them exposed. The choice should be clear. No market structure without the Blockchain Regulatory Certainty Act (BRCA). 1/

bitcoin’s failure to trade like gold as part of “the debasement trade” since sep. ‘25 damaged its narrative with new entrants but when bitcoiners said “digital gold” they were describing its fundamental properties, not that it’s high beta to gold today it comes from satoshi in a famous august 2010 post on the bitcointalk forum, satoshi posited a thought experiment: “imagine there was a base metal as scarce as gold but with the following properties: - boring grey in colour - not a good conductor of electricity - not particularly strong, but not ductile or easily malleable either - not useful for any practical or ornamental purpose and one special, magical property: - can be transported over a communications channel If it somehow acquired any value at all for whatever reason, then anyone wanting to transfer wealth over a long distance could buy some, transmit it, and have the recipient sell it.” — satoshi is describing the fact that bitcoin’s fundamental properties — its scarcity, divisibility, durability, self-sovereignty — are very similar to base commodity metals. but he then posits: what if it was transferable anywhere around the world instantly? this is what bitcoiners mean by digital gold. the delta between bitcoin’s fundamental gold-like properties and the market pricing it in relation to gold, and the likelihood that bitcoin will eventually close the gap, is the “digital gold” investment thesis. and if you believe that the market will eventually value bitcoin like gold, that’s your alpha

@Bitkey @newyorkhodl bitkey could also allow for creating ‘child accounts’, with your kids establishing a mobile Key of their own, with your same bitkey hardware used for co-signing and recovery. Probably niche demand, for now, but interesting in the future?

@newyorkhodl Love this idea 👏 A few things to consider: – Fingerprints change over time (we have fingerprint reset for that) – You can add up to 3 fingerprints per device – Use separate cloud accounts for separate wallets If you build one for the long haul, we’re happy to help.

I wonder if I can set up a @bitkey for my kids so they can have it in self custody as they grow for when they hit 18

It’s time for bitcoiners to step up and build. You don’t need to know anything about software development anymore, you just need to know how to write words! We have a golden opportunity to build out agentic payments based on open money, rather than letting agentic payments be captured by megacorps yet again. But we’re squandering it arguing about useless crap instead of building. Play with openclaw, give it a bitcoin wallet (moneydevkit makes this super easy! Also Lexe and phoenixd!), make it do things. If it fails to do what you want, go fix it! Have your agent build that bitcoin domain reseller, that bitcoin airline ticket reseller, or whatever it is you want! Bitcoin doesn’t just happen, it’s built. Join in.

Bitcoin just made a meaningful step toward future quantum resistance 💪 An updated version of BIP 360 has just been merged into the official Bitcoin BIP GitHub repository. The update introduces Pay-to-Merkle-Root (P2MR), a proposed new output type that omits Taproot’s quantum-vulnerable key-path spend while preserving compatibility with Tapscript and script trees. It also includes: - Removal of Taproot’s quantum-vulnerable key-path spend in a separate opt-in new output type. - A foundation for introducing post-quantum signatures while using Tapscript/script tree for spend time optionality. - The change is a soft fork that does not affect existing Taproot outputs. - Addition of Isabel Foxen Duke as co-author, to ensure the BIP was clear and understandable to the general public, not just the Bitcoin developer community. The BIP also addresses criticism about Bitcoin devs not taking the quantum threat seriously. We are grateful to every Bitcoin contributor who took the time to review and provide feedback. Check the fully updated version of BIP 360: github.com/bitcoin/bips/b…