Simon Cox

In 2009 Robert Lucas wrote a guest column for us defending economics from @TheEconomist, followed by a blog roundtable including posts by @tylercowen, @delong, @MarkusEconomist et al. Links in the thread below. economist.com/finance-and-ec…

@andrewbatson @JonathonPSine you can also read about it here :) economist.com/finance-and-ec…

@JonathonPSine Mesmerizing data indeed! Thanks for the tip

"Experimentation under hierarchy" has, more data confirms, increased under Xi. Below is a comprehensive data set—from a just published study (June 2025) in JPE— showing the 652 distinct formal policy experiments from 1980-2020, and whether they were rolled out nationally:

@JonathonPSine 4) I think the working paper may be using a revised GDP figure for 2021. At the time of the 2022 budget, 2021 GDP was thought to be lower, iirc.

@JonathonPSine Other ideas: 1) the CPI "target" is really a ceiling, so both the MoF and the CFEAC expect to undershoot it. 2) The GDP deflator will often undershoot the CPI. 3) The deficit target might be rounded off to the nearest 0.1% of GDP. That can make a big difference to implied growth.

An interesting feature of China's policy-making is that nearly every year the Ministry of Finance and the State Council produce wildly different forward-looking GDP growth numbers, with the MOF's implied nominal forecast sometimes even below the State Council's real target:

@greg_ip @rhodium_group @shehzadhqazi @ChinaBeigeBook The NBS does disclose that it revised its fixed-asset investment figures stats.gov.cn/english/PressR…

@rhodium_group 2. China's National Bureau of Statistics says fixed asset investment rose 3% last year. But the *level* of investment is 12% *lower* than its reported level for 2022. And this anomaly occurs regularly. HT: @shehzadhqazi @ChinaBeigeBook

How does China keep growing 5% amidst so many headwinds? Very likely, it doesn't. In this column i dig down on the many anomalies in official Chinese data that suggest growth may have been a lot lower than 5.2% last year. A summary follows. wsj.com/world/china/wh…

@greg_ip @rhodium_group Not sure I understand this calculation. AFAICT, the official figures imply total consumption grew by about 8%. Total consumption was about 54% of 2022 GDP. It contributed 82.5% of growth in 2023. 82.5% of 5.2 is 4.29 and 4.29 is about 8% of 54

1. Real retail sales supposedly grew 7% last year. But consumption (retail sales + services + government) reportedly grew 11% (HT: @rhodium_group's Logan Wright). That flies in the face of countless other evidence (rising bank deposits, lower Alibaba sales)

@berthofmanecon Thanks Bert. TSF is in line with the "projected" growth of GDP and the CPI.

China government targets and outcomes 2021-24. You are welcome (and I welcome any corrections!)

@berthofmanecon @Sino_Market Other countries count current students who are nonetheless in the labour market (eg looking for a part-time job) but unable to find work. I guess the NBS no longer counts those people. ec.europa.eu/eurostat/stati…

@Sino_Market I presume this means that NBS does not count former students who just started looking for work, or whose status on the labour market is unclear. Any experts that can enlighten me?

CHINA DEC. YOUTH JOBLESS RATE EXCLUDING STUDENTS 14.9%: NBS *NBS Modified

@adamkwolfe @TheEconomist …at least two people I respect clearly hate the article so something has clearly gone wrong in the execution!

@adamkwolfe @TheEconomist Well the premise of the story was: here’s an interesting, neglected bit of data that might alter the way you think about the causes of China’s low consumption and recent progress to raise it. But…

@adamkwolfe @TheEconomist (Thanks for bearing with me)

@adamkwolfe @TheEconomist It also points out that China’s social transfers in kind are not high compared with the OECD average. 15/15