sandervesik

I am Catholic. This👇is not my Pope.

🇱🇧 Dans ce quartier de Beyrouth, on ne compte plus les morts civiles des bombes israéliennes. On est dans le centre ville, dans une zone civile densément peuplée ; gens ici sont terrorisés Le crime de guerre dans son absolu

Today, March 30, 2026, the Knesset votes on the Palestinian prisoners’ death penalty law ⚠️ A move that throws thousands of prisoners into the face of death. Ben-Gvir and his party members wore a noose-shaped pin, demanding it be turned into an enforceable law. 🆘Save the prisoners✊🕊️

First look at the live-action ‘HARRY POTTER’ series.

QUINTANILLA: Do we think the Russians have shared intel about the location of US military assets, and if so, why would we be giving waivers on Russian oil sanctions? WITKOFF: I'm not an intel officer, so I can't tell you. I can tell you that on the call with the president, the Russians said they have not been sharing. That's what they said. We can take them at their word.

For Russia, the war in Iran is an operational environment that can be used against the West. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 became a signal: rules can be broken by force, and then one can live with the consequences. Since then, the world has rapidly shifted into a mode where multiple crises occur simultaneously, and uncertainty and the constant threat of escalation are the "norm." When the Middle East is on fire, for Russia, it means less strategic focus by Western allies on Ukraine and more "opportunities" for pressure. In this situation, the Iranian war and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz are a short-term lifeline for the Russian economy. According to the EIA, in 2024, an average of ~20 million barrels of oil per day passed through Hormuz, which is approximately 20% of global petroleum liquids/liquid hydrocarbons consumption. The gas situation is even more acute: the EIA estimates that about one-fifth of global LNG trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, with the main flows going to Asia. Therefore, not even a full closure, but the threat of it, creates a "risk premium" in oil and gas, which automatically strengthens Russia's resource resilience in the war. That is why any crisis, even if it means the destruction of an ally, which raises energy rents and allows the war and the security apparatus to be financed for longer, is beneficial to Russia. However, the Iranian war also poses reputational risks for Russia - at present, Russia does not look like an influential global power, but rather a secondary player that can only helplessly watch as its main ally is torn apart. On the other hand, if we remember that Iran is only a functional asset for Russia, which can probably be replaced, then we might think that Russia's "helpless concern" about the destruction of the regime in Iran is not accidental at all. Moscow has already received what it wanted from Iran - drones - and has scaled up its production domestically. Now Iran, with its cheap, sanctioned oil, was more of a competitor to Russia. Moscow does not need to preserve the Iranian regime, nor does it need to end the war. ‼️ Moscow needs controlled instability in the Middle East, especially in the Strait of Hormuz, enough to keep prices and fears high, but not so complete as to collapse demand and destroy the opportunity to profit from energy exports. If the regime in Tehran is destroyed or radically reformatted towards normalization with the West, Russia will look for a new "anti-system" ally whose task will be to maintain a high level of tension in the Strait of Hormuz. And this could be anyone who can periodically launch missiles at oil tankers. ‼️ The Iranian war and Russia's war with Ukraine have a common root of evil - the Russian regime. And as long as Russia produces and launches missiles and drones, there will be no peace in Ukraine or the Middle East.