(((Sebastian Bassi))).🐍
15.8K posts

(((Sebastian Bassi))).🐍
@sbassiEN
Bioinformatics🧬 Hacker @ Toyoko. sbassi🦋https://t.co/brajWVTjCu 💚🌈🇵🇹🇮🇱🗾🇺🇸 Lic. en Biotecnología orientación genética molecular.


Most airlines are partnering with @Starlink. The others will have terrible WiFi and lose customers as a result.






Esta violando la prisión domiciliaria, cuando la justicia la mande a cárcel efectiva se va a victimizar?





Está clarísimo que los sofás están hechos a medida. El asiento de Xi Jinping es visiblemente más alto que el de Trump, a pesar de que Trump le saca unos 10 centímetros de estatura. El PCCh no deja ningún detalle al azar y se esmera al máximo en este tipo de cosas en todas partes.















"PUEDE MANEJAR EL AUTO QUE QUIERA CON LA PLATA QUE GANÓ TRABAJANDO" Martín Menem negó haberle pedido a Manuel Quintar que retirara el Tesla Cybertruck, valuado entre US $250 mil y US $300 mil, del estacionamiento del Congreso. La decisión del diputado jujeño de asistir en ese vehículo desató polémica en medio de los ajustes impulsados por el Gobierno en áreas sensibles como salud y educación. Testimonio de Martin Menem “Puede manejar el auto que quiera con la plata que ganó trabajando. Eso es libertad”. (+) en Clarín: clar.in/4eGYeRt

🇦🇷 A threat actor is advertising the alleged sale of a massive database purportedly linked to Argentina’s Ministry of Health (“Ministerio de Salud de Argentina”), claiming the dataset contains information on virtually the entire Argentine population. According to the underground post, the actor claims: • approximately 52 million records (“lines”) • roughly 700 GB of total data • nationwide citizen coverage • segmented database access available upon request • direct sales conducted through Session messenger The post explicitly claims: • “all Argentinians are in this database” • full ministry-related database access • the ability to provide specific subsets of the data to buyers The screenshots shown in the listing appear to reference: • citizen profile photographs • identity-linked medical or administrative records • large-scale structured datasets • government-related health infrastructure If authentic, exposure of a dataset at this scale would represent an extremely serious national-level privacy and security incident involving: • sensitive personal information • healthcare-related data • citizen identity records • biometric/profile image exposure • administrative government datasets The scale being advertised is notable because large centralized healthcare or government datasets can potentially enable: • mass identity theft • healthcare fraud • nation-scale phishing campaigns • biometric correlation efforts • impersonation attacks • social engineering operations • intelligence collection • large-scale doxxing activities At this time: • the authenticity of the dataset has NOT been independently verified • the actual source of the records remains unknown • it is unclear whether the data originated from direct compromise, aggregation, prior leaks, insider access, or reposted archives • no official confirmation from Argentine authorities has been observed • the actor’s claims may be exaggerated for visibility and monetization purposes Threat actors frequently inflate: • record counts • exclusivity claims • access levels • operational impact • “entire country” narratives to increase underground market value and attract buyers. However, the healthcare sector and public-sector identity repositories remain among the highest-value targets in the underground economy due to: • long-term fraud utility • rich identity attributes • credential reset usefulness • correlation with tax and healthcare systems • high phishing effectiveness The reference to selling “specific databases” separately is operationally important because attackers increasingly: • fragment large datasets • resell subsets multiple times • bundle government and healthcare records • monetize targeted demographic groups independently • provide custom-filtered exports to buyers If legitimate, datasets of this type could potentially contain combinations of: • names • national identifiers • healthcare information • addresses • contact details • demographic records • profile photographs • administrative metadata Healthcare and government organizations should continuously monitor for: • unauthorized bulk exports • exposed APIs • weak identity federation controls • cloud storage misconfigurations • privileged insider abuse • exposed citizen registries • insecure image/document repositories • dark web redistribution activity If verified, response priorities would likely include: • national-level incident response coordination • citizen notification procedures • credential and identity protection measures • fraud monitoring initiatives • law enforcement coordination • infrastructure access auditing • API exposure reviews • underground monitoring for secondary resale activity DDW is continuing to monitor: • additional validation attempts • sample analysis activity #CyberSecurity #ThreatIntelligence #DarkWeb #DataBreach #Argentina #HealthcareSecurity #GovernmentSecurity #CyberCrime #DDW



El Senado votó incorporar al temario de la sesión un reconocimiento al Equipo Aegentino de Antropología Forense tras los nuevos descubrimientos en La Perla, Córdoba. La única que se abstuvo fue la senadora cordobesa Carmen Álvarez Rivero.









