Stormkrow

Is Russia losing influence in Africa? Mali has become a test of Russia’s presence in Africa. The events of April 25-27, 2026 - coordinated attacks across the country, the death of defense minister Sadio Camara (one of the architects of Mali’s alliance with Moscow), fighting for Kidal, and the withdrawal of Russia’s Africa Corps from the city - have shattered a key Russian narrative: "security in exchange for loyalty." The Africa Corps is often described as a replacement for Wagner. But the reality is more complex. After the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Kremlin did not simply rebrand Wagner. It began dismantling Prigozhin’s empire into separate components: military, political, media, economic, and intelligence. What had previously functioned as a semi-private system was gradually integrated into Russia’s state structures. ▪️ The first layer is the military component. The Africa Corps, linked to Russia’s defense ministry, has taken over Wagner’s functions in Mali, Libya, Burkina Faso, and Niger. In the Central African Republic, the process has been more complex: Wagner’s existing infrastructure retained autonomy for longer, and local authorities preferred established personal channels. As a result, the state takeover proceeded more slowly. ▪️ The second layer is intelligence and influence. Investigations by Forbidden Stories, Dossier Center, iStories, openDemocracy, and All Eyes on Wagner found that Wagner’s political and information network - known as Africa Politology or "the Company" - came under the oversight of Russia’s foreign intelligence service after Prigozhin’s death. This network includes political consultants, media intermediaries, analysts, and influence agents working with local elites, elections, journalists, legislation, and Moscow’s resource interests. According to investigators, by May 2024 the network operated in around 30 countries across the Global South. Its estimated budget for ten months of 2024 was about $7.3 million (or euros). The documents describe not only information campaigns but attempts at political engineering. In Senegal, Russian operatives reportedly developed scenarios for forcibly reshaping power structures. In Mali, "the Company" claimed involvement in a new mining code that opened the door to revising contracts and strengthening the position of Russian actors. In the military sphere, several figures are frequently mentioned: Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, Andrey Averyanov, Konstantin Mirzayants, and Gennady Timchenko. Yevkurov became the public face of Russia’s restructuring of its African strategy after Prigozhin’s death. Averyanov, a GRU major general linked to unit 29155, was sanctioned by the EU in December 2024 for his role in destabilization operations. Mirzayants, associated with Redut, is cited as a possible organizer of the new military framework. As for Timchenko, assessments are more cautious: the Institute for the Study of War suggested the Kremlin may have expanded his influence over the Africa Corps amid structural challenges. The Africa Corps is not Wagner 2.0 - but neither is it entirely different. It represents a state-controlled model built on Wagner’s legacy infrastructure. The military component is handled by the defense ministry, the GRU, Redut, and affiliated structures. The political and media component, according to investigations, has shifted under the oversight of the foreign intelligence service. The economic component is tied to resources, contracts, mining legislation, ports, and supply routes. A change in name has not meant a change in methods. In December 2025, the Associated Press interviewed 34 refugees from Mali on the Mauritanian border. Their testimonies described village burnings, abductions, sexual violence, executions, and bodies with missing organs. Refugees directly stated that the Africa Corps operates in the same way as Wagner. Human Rights Watch separately documented at least 12 executions and 81 enforced disappearances carried out by Malian forces and allied Russian formations, which HRW still referred to as the Wagner Group as of July 2025. Data from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data make the picture even starker. In 2025, Malian government forces together with Russian formations - Wagner and the Africa Corps - killed 918 civilians. Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin and Islamic State Sahel Province killed 232. This does not absolve jihadist groups. But it undermines the core argument of Bamako and Moscow: that the Russian presence brings stability. In practice, it often means more violence against civilians. That is why Kidal in April 2026 matters as a political symbol. Moscow and Bamako turned it into proof of the effectiveness of their model. If Kidal again falls under rebel control and the Africa Corps withdraws, the narrative of "Russian stabilization" loses credibility. Russia can protect a regime. It can provide a junta with weapons, advisers, and coercive force. But it cannot replace institutions, trust, legitimacy, and control over the periphery. 📹: vehicles leaving the Russian base in Kidal

The Norwegian Holocaust Center’s decision to host events drawing parallels between the Holocaust, the “Nakba,” and the war in Gaza is a grotesque distortion of Holocaust memory. It dishonors the memory of more than 750 Norwegian Jews murdered by the Nazis and their Norwegian collaborators, and betrays the very purpose for which this institution was established. A center founded to preserve Holocaust remembrance has chosen political activism over historical responsibility. This is not education. It is moral failure. The planned events should be cancelled immediately, and the center must return to its core mission: safeguarding Holocaust remembrance and confronting antisemitism - not legitimizing its modern forms.