idk

304 posts

idk

idk

@taketheroot

Katılım Şubat 2022
154 Takip Edilen18 Takipçiler
idk
idk@taketheroot·
@NearLeVrai Tu peux finir perquise dans 2 ans 3 ans 5 ans
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near
near@NearLeVrai·
si j'ai arrêter c'est pour une autre raison je sais que le mal est déjà fait que je risque tôt ou tard de me faire arrêter par la justice.
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idk
idk@taketheroot·
@bati21675 Comment ça mon reuf
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mistah_batista
mistah_batista@bati21675·
j'ai oublier de mentionner mais je suis homosexuel, ça va de soit
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mistah_batista
mistah_batista@bati21675·
pour ceux qui ont lue sa vie (renfermer sur lui même, droguer aux breachs etc) vous serez pas déçu quand je serais arrêter vous allez apprendre l'immonde dêché sociale sans ami que je suis vous serez probablement pas étonner
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idk
idk@taketheroot·
@bati21675 Tu t toujours aps fait perquise j espère deja que normal y a moyen qui s est fait perquise
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mistah_batista
mistah_batista@bati21675·
bon un certain CB à fait sauter 3 de mes tweets et m'a bloquer mon compte pendant 8 heures mais ne t'inquiète pas le plus drôle reste à venir !
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R1s
R1s@R1s666·
Just got a reward for a vulnerability submitted on @yeswehack -- Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected (CWE-79). Waf bypass: <mctx%2FOnCoNtEnTvIsIbIlItYaUtOsTaTeChAnGe%3Dalert%601%61%09STYLE%3Ddisplay%3Ablock%3Bcontent-visibility%3Aauto>
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Dark Web Informer
Dark Web Informer@DarkWebInformer·
🚨🇫🇷 Lagrange Vacances allegedly breached: 44K holiday rental reservation records exposed from French travel booking database A threat actor claims to have leaked a database tied to Lagrange Vacances, a French holiday rental and vacation accommodation provider offering apartments, holiday homes, and leisure stays across France and Europe. ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ Target: Lagrange Vacances Sector: Hospitality / Travel / Holiday Rentals Incident: Database Leak Exposure: 44K records / 35MB Actor: ChimeraZ Country: France Date: 19/05/2026 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ What’s allegedly included: ▪ Reservation records allegedly linked to Lagrange Vacances bookings ▪ Customer and participant identity fields ▪ Booking references and reservation IDs ▪ Vendor, lodging, and product-related records ▪ Guest count fields including adults and children ▪ Stay dates, arrival/departure times, and accommodation details ▪ Pricing, commission, fees, and payment-related booking metadata ▪ Customer comments and special booking notes Potential impact: The exposed data could be used for booking impersonation, targeted phishing, travel fraud, customer scams, and social engineering against travelers, guests, and booking partners. Status: Unverified underground forum claim. The actor posted structured JSON reservation samples and claims the download links are hidden behind forum access. Stop guessing what's redacted. Subscribers see everything → darkwebinformer.com/pricing
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cyber_shree
cyber_shree@shreerajaput·
Pretty good hunting session — multiple findings and all made it through triage, each with its own path and impact. Now waiting on the final outcomes #BugBounty #SecurityResearch
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idk retweetledi
Dark Web Informer
Dark Web Informer@DarkWebInformer·
‼️🇫🇷 Madeindesign (madeindesign.com), a French online retailer specializing in designer furniture, lighting, and home decor, has allegedly been breached, with a partial database of 464,000 records leaked. ⠀ ‣ Threat Actor: ChimeraZ ‣ Category: E-commerce Data Leak ‣ Victim: Madeindesign ‣ Industry: E-commerce / Furniture & Design ⠀ The actor leaked a partial database covering customer orders and invoices. ⠀ What's in it: ⠀ ▪️ 464,000 records ▪️ Format: JSON ▪️ Size: 205 MB ▪️ Order IDs and invoice IDs ▪️ Customer full names ▪️ Home addresses (street, postal code, city, country) ▪️ Phone numbers ▪️ Payment method (Visa, MasterCard) ▪️ Delivery method (Colissimo, etc.) ▪️ Order totals ▪️ Product details (name, dimensions, brand) ▪️ Order dates (records dating back to 2013)
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mistah_batista
mistah_batista@bati21675·
ça va faire 3 jours que notre normal ne c'est pas co sur les forums, tu va bien @normallevrai ?
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Divyansh Sharma
Divyansh Sharma@divyansh2401·
Yay, I was awarded a total of $5,500 in bounties on @Hacker0x01! hackerone.com/eliteoffensive Vulnerabilities Found: 1. Privilege Escalation (Trial User → Platform Admin)   1. While reading the site's JavaScript files, I found an API endpoint and noticed it accepted an "author" parameter in the request body.   2. The JS hinted that the "author" value was used to identify who the request belonged to — and that this value needed to be an admin's email for certain actions.   3. I collected 15–20 employee emails through public sources (OSINT).   4. I tested them one by one as the "author" value. One matched a platform admin account, and that request was accepted.   5. Using that admin's email as "author" along with my own account ID, I changed my account "plan" from "trial" to "internal". The request went through, and my role was updated.   6. Root cause: the endpoint was authorizing the request using a value from the request body instead of the role from the user's authenticated session. 2. SSRF → Cloud Metadata Credential Exposure   1. The app had a feature that fetched user-supplied URLs from the server side.   2. Confirmed by pointing it at a public echo service — the response showed a cloud server IP, not mine. The server was making the request.   3. The URL filter blocked the metadata service IP in its standard dotted form, but didn't normalize alternate representations. Converting the same IP to its decimal form bypassed the filter cleanly.   4. From there, the standard two-step metadata flow worked: first request returned a session token, second request used that token to return temporary instance role credentials.   5. Root cause: block-list URL filtering without IP normalization. A single canonicalization step on the resolved address would have caught this. 3. IDOR Exposing 285,000+ Customer Invoices   The invoice download endpoint used sequential IDs with no ownership check. Changing the ID returned other customers' invoices. 4. IDOR Enabling Cross-Tenant Audit Log Manipulation   A "log move" endpoint trusted client-supplied IDs, which allowed moving log entries across tenant boundaries and tampering with audit history. 5. Unauthenticated Path Traversal   A public endpoint accepted file paths without sanitization, allowing partial file reads across the platform with no authentication required. Key lessons: → Never authorize based on request-body fields. Use the session/JWT role. → URL-fetch features need allow-lists, and must normalize alternate IP forms. → Sequential IDs are fine; missing ownership checks are not. → "Unauthenticated" doesn't mean "untrusted input is safe." #bugbounty #securityresearcher #ethicalhacker #cybersecurity #vulnerability #penetrationtesting #securityaudit #digitalsecurity #tech #innovation #hackerone #freelance #freelancer #pentester #ssrf #idor #privilegeescalation #pathtraversal #appsec #infosec #TogetherWeHitHarder #bugbountytips
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