To Karvuvu (rtrd/acc)

香港大会去不了？没关系！我开发了一款文字冒险游戏：Web3 香港大会模拟器 🔗 web3hk.vercel.app 5分钟模拟跑完三天会，你将会收获怎样的未来……？11 种未来结局等你来测🥳 内测邀请了 20 个朋友 3 个坐牢 2 个去缅甸打工了 仅有1人成了交易之神，我决定抱紧他的大腿 📱 已优化手机版，但建议电脑端食用，视觉效果更佳。 ⚠️ 仅供娱乐，切勿当真。 🤫 若有雷同，纯属巧合。 灵感来源于@Cryptobtcmiko 老师的爆款推文

@Haiteng_okx 你为什么要防 @Mercy_okx ？

世界杯我来单防梅西，想要这么帅的衣服成为OKX VIP即可领取！

快来 #XCLUB 🔥#OKX 时 代 の 精 华

Vitalik 最近在开L2 批斗大会： Base: 收到，我们要做AI agents 的家园 Lighter: 收到，我们会继续专注于高频金融 Starknet: 收到，但我们还没想好要怎么做 ZKsync: 收到，我们专注于企业级的隐私并致力于成为以太坊的Bank Stack Optimism: 我们接受挑战，会把OP Stack 做得更好 Scroll: 你在教我做事？

I run Clawdbot on 3 old Android phones. Twitter research. Market monitoring. Telegram chats daily summaries. Private groups signals flashing to my main phone. Running on cheap models like glm-4-flash when ok to save on Claude sub Combined power: same as one Mac Mini. Cost: $0 total. That old phone in your drawer? Turn it into a 24/7 AI server: Download Termux from F-Droid. Run: pkg install nodejs-lts git npm install -g clawdbot clawdbot gateway start Remote access from your computer or main phone. Deploy skills. Cron jobs. Telegram bot. Code. 3-5W per device. Built-in UPS lmao! 🔥 Don't have one? Buy Redmi Note 10 Pro ($60). Pixel 4a ($80). Galaxy A52 ($100). Mac Mini energy. Junk drawer budget. VPS companies hate this setup too.

为什么交易所不公布项目信息？ 因为整体项目的质量太低太垃圾了，都公示的话交易所不用上币不用赚钱了。 有一个悖论，真正有收入的项目，大多数不想发币，最后就劣币驱逐良币。 Bybit 我记得做过项目财报公示的尝试，最后好像就 sosovalue 响应了，然后似乎就无疾而终了。 x.com/i/status/18914…

【双语字幕】川普前首席竞选顾问策略师-史蒂夫班农2019年访谈爱泼斯坦的2小时：从三边委员会内幕到2008狱中密电，关于全球金融崩溃、科学局限及“灵魂”的终极对峙 | 极为罕见的对话与内容深度揭秘爱泼斯坦是谁 youtube.com/watch?v=KtKhiO… 00:00:00 跟我说说圣达菲研究所 00:00:36 为什么你在华尔街巅峰时决定资助最前沿的数学家群体？ 00:01:46 像你这样的人是怎么进入洛克菲勒董事会的？ 00:03:57 大卫·洛克菲勒与三边委员会的创立 00:06:12 加入三边委员会：比尔·克林顿与全球精英名单 00:07:23 世界领导人是否普遍缺乏金融和经济知识？ 00:09:18 银行视角的“资产”：别人欠你的钱 00:10:48 什么是普通民众难以理解的“部分准备金制度”？ 00:12:12 在洛克菲勒基金会董事会与诺贝尔奖得主共事是什么感觉？ 00:14:11 1990年东京会议：对有地位的人不感到惊叹 00:16:04 为什么通货膨胀的幽灵总是央行行长最关心的问题？ 00:18:03 为什么银行系统、世界货币体系没能被彻底理解？ 00:20:58 圣达菲研究所：尝试用算法理解“复杂系统” 00:23:05 人工智能与神经网络：我们建造了自己无法理解的东西 00:24:45 2008年9月14日雷曼兄弟破产时你在哪里？ 00:26:22 监狱里的消息：在单独监禁中听闻华尔街崩溃 00:28:54 狱中博弈：拨打对方付费电话给贝尔斯登总裁与摩根大通 00:29:58 这种人生处境的巨大反差：你从未有过片刻的清醒反思吗？ 00:34:40 雷曼兄弟破产、道德风险与贝尔斯登的“僵尸化” 00:36:34 金融危机的死亡证明：衍生品并非根本原因 00:44:06 谁导致了金融危机？比尔·克林顿与房屋所有权政策 00:47:14 “次贷”一词的由来：将风险包装成政治选票 00:51:00 会计准则GAAP的改变如何引发银行系统的多米诺骨牌效应 00:57:18 寻找金融模式：每十年一次的危机是必然吗？ 01:00:03 圣达菲研究所的复杂性研究实验是否已经彻底失败？ 01:02:45 监狱生活细节：穿着印有拼错单词的棕色囚服 01:04:47 你从未想过自己是怎么落到要打对方付费电话的地步吗？ 01:07:54 复杂性理论与“沙堆效应”：多一粒沙导致的崩塌 01:08:58 曼哈顿计划、洛斯阿拉莫斯与高能物理的“大祭司” 01:12:10 如果数学无法解释奇迹，那慈善的意义在哪里？ 01:14:51 从牛顿到莱布尼茨：微积分与变化的理论 01:21:10 极限就是神：人类可以接近但永远无法达到 01:24:03 万物皆数学？牛顿力学对行星运动的精准预测 01:27:48 你相信人类存在灵魂或精神吗？ 01:31:38 为什么现代科学界不再讨论哲学与生命的本质？ 01:34:03 科学无法描述浪漫：女性直觉与情商的智能维度 01:37:37 顶级交易员的直觉判断：那是无法公式化的“感觉” 01:40:29 人类生命何时开始？它是一个无法衡量的奇迹 01:44:57 量子物理学：微观世界里的“奇异”与不可解释性 01:47:01 滥用“衡量”概念：芝诺悖论与精确性的局限 01:51:21 苏格拉底的智慧：为什么伟大的思想家从不写作？ 01:53:51 慈善伦理辩论：哈佛大学等机构该不该收你的钱？ 01:56:58 最后的尖锐追问：你认为自己是魔鬼本人吗？

We are revising our developer API policies: We will no longer allow apps that reward users for posting on X (aka “infofi”). This has led to a tremendous amount of AI slop & reply spam on the platform. We have revoked API access from these apps, so your X experience should start improving soon (once the bots realize they’re not getting paid anymore). If your developer account was terminated, please reach out and we will assist in transitioning your business to Threads and Bluesky.

@tongtongbee 你在说啥呢这明显是商量好的营销.......

昨晚Solana和Starknet俩大公链官推互怼把大家都看笑了。Solana直接喷Starknet没用户，送他归零。Starknet直接配图大猩猩回怼Solana是侏儒。 我第一时间还以为是小编切错号，随后发现是他们的舆论策略。 中西方企业在舆论战上处理风格迥异。西方都是明着干，官方互怼，而中国的企业往往喜欢暗战，通过黑稿等手段抹黑对手。前些年几家大的交易所打的不可开交的时候，隔三差五就能看到不知名公众号的黑稿。 这种差异化的风格，实际上源于文化传统、法律环境以及政治制度的差异。 文化传统：西方公开、透明和竞争 VS 东方注重面子、关系 法律监管：西方言论自由、企业行为不会受到政府过度干预 VS 东方公开舆情容易引发政府的规管 政治制度：西方民主辩论、政客贴脸开大互怼是常态VS东方要保持伟光正形象。 但随着东方的Crypto项目出海，适应国际化的舆论环境，我发现越来越多的项目/机构也开始效仿西方的玩法了。去年开始就看到有些大佬开始放飞自我，直接不服就开怼。

Last quarter I rolled out Microsoft Copilot to 4,000 employees. $30 per seat per month. $1.4 million annually. I called it "digital transformation." The board loved that phrase. They approved it in eleven minutes. No one asked what it would actually do. Including me. I told everyone it would "10x productivity." That's not a real number. But it sounds like one. HR asked how we'd measure the 10x. I said we'd "leverage analytics dashboards." They stopped asking. Three months later I checked the usage reports. 47 people had opened it. 12 had used it more than once. One of them was me. I used it to summarize an email I could have read in 30 seconds. It took 45 seconds. Plus the time it took to fix the hallucinations. But I called it a "pilot success." Success means the pilot didn't visibly fail. The CFO asked about ROI. I showed him a graph. The graph went up and to the right. It measured "AI enablement." I made that metric up. He nodded approvingly. We're "AI-enabled" now. I don't know what that means. But it's in our investor deck. A senior developer asked why we didn't use Claude or ChatGPT. I said we needed "enterprise-grade security." He asked what that meant. I said "compliance." He asked which compliance. I said "all of them." He looked skeptical. I scheduled him for a "career development conversation." He stopped asking questions. Microsoft sent a case study team. They wanted to feature us as a success story. I told them we "saved 40,000 hours." I calculated that number by multiplying employees by a number I made up. They didn't verify it. They never do. Now we're on Microsoft's website. "Global enterprise achieves 40,000 hours of productivity gains with Copilot." The CEO shared it on LinkedIn. He got 3,000 likes. He's never used Copilot. None of the executives have. We have an exemption. "Strategic focus requires minimal digital distraction." I wrote that policy. The licenses renew next month. I'm requesting an expansion. 5,000 more seats. We haven't used the first 4,000. But this time we'll "drive adoption." Adoption means mandatory training. Training means a 45-minute webinar no one watches. But completion will be tracked. Completion is a metric. Metrics go in dashboards. Dashboards go in board presentations. Board presentations get me promoted. I'll be SVP by Q3. I still don't know what Copilot does. But I know what it's for. It's for showing we're "investing in AI." Investment means spending. Spending means commitment. Commitment means we're serious about the future. The future is whatever I say it is. As long as the graph goes up and to the right.

说一个行业内幕，让大家知道一下好不？ 之前公司的部门有位美女同事被公司辞退，离职了。 我隔壁的程序员同事，总会时不时的看向美女同事的工位发呆..... 我仿佛明白了什么，于是告诉他 "想做什么就去做吧，现在还来得及" 然后他开开心心的，把美女同学的显示器搬到了他的工位上。

Your credit card rewards exist because someone else is paying 25% APR. Cap that at 10% and the points don’t survive. I spent years working inside fintech and card programs. That interest margin is the invisible buffer that makes rewards, lounges, and credits pencil out. Capping credit card APRs at 10% sounds like an obvious consumer win. Cards charge 20 to 30%, many consumers revolve balances, and the system feels punitive. But credit card economics are not just about interest rates. They are a cross-subsidized system where revolvers subsidize transactors, rewards rely on behavioral inefficiency, and risk-based pricing subsidizes access. Remove one leg of that stool and the system does not become fairer; it rebalances. And the costs show up where consumers notice most. Lets look at how this would impact 3 programs 1. AMEX Platinum A 10% credit card APR cap would not make your card cheaper or better. You would still have access, but you would almost certainly get less value for the same or higher price. The Platinum brand survives because its customers are affluent, pay in full, and tolerate high annual fees. What quietly supports that ecosystem is portfolio-level profitability, which allows AMEX to tolerate loss, overuse, and inefficiency in premium benefits. When that margin shrinks, the cost shows up directly in your (lesser) benefits. In a world where: - Rewards economics tighten - Devaluations become more likely - Flexibility is reduced Points become a liability to the issuer, and liabilities get repriced. So what this likely means for you as a Platinum cardholder: - Lounges do not expand to fix crowding. Instead, access tightens or amenities are reduced. - Statement credits become harder to use, more fragmented, or less generous. - Annual fees go up - New approvals become more selective, even for high earners. Your card still works, but the value proposition shifts. Platinum becomes more explicitly pay-to-play, with fewer hidden subsidies propping up premium perks. You pay the same or more, and you get a little less in return. Which is why some people are already warning that points devaluations become more likely in this environment (like @BowTiedBull this morning saying "Dump ALL your credit card points. All of them.") 2. Bilt Card This program is the canary in the coal mine for what to expect. Bilt’s super popular rent rewards worked because Wells Fargo was willing to subsidize them. The card offered 1 point per dollar on rent with no fees because Wells Fargo paid Bilt roughly 0.8 percent (80 bps) of each rent payment to fund rewards... despite earning little or no interchange on those transactions. But that is some actuarial level math with a number of variables at risk that proved wrong/ unsustainable. Wells Fargo was getting hosed $10 million a month on the program, so they exited the partnership years before the original end date and forced Bilt to restructure its rewards with a different bank What does that teach us? - When interest and interchange margins shrink, banks stop tolerating loss-leading reward programs. - Interest income does not fund every reward directly, but it provides the buffer that allows experiments like Bilt to exist at all. - Remove that buffer and rewards must be paid for explicitly. Bilt’s shift to a three-tier lineup with annual fees is not an anomaly. It is the direction rewards go when credit stops quietly absorbing losses. Pay-to-play rewards. What feels like consumer protection will shows up as fewer perks, pay-to-play rewards, and less room for innovation. 3. Credit One & other Subprime Cards Now the least glamorous corner. Subprime cards get criticized for high APRs, annual fees, low limits, minimal rewards. But they exist for a reason. They serve thin-file borrowers, damaged credit, people shut out of conventional loans, households using cards for liquidity not perks... but they charge high APRs because charge-offs exceed 8-10%, fraud and servicing costs are higher, and credit limits are small while fixed costs remain significant. A 10% cap makes these products mathematically impossible. These cards don't become cheaper. They cease to exist. As @sytaylor noted this morning - "You realize this will push many more customers towards loan sharks?" The demand for credit doesn't disappear... it migrates to BNPL with opaque effective APRs, chronic overdraft usage, fee-heavy installment loans, and less regulated lenders like loan sharks/ payday loans. So who WOULD win? Debit-First Fintechs One of the least discussed consequences: where would reward customers migrate? I think 1% cashback programs are an obvious winner. Chime, Varo, Current and niche cards like Greenlight and Privacy. (If you have not worked in a fintech or a bank you probably don't know what the Durbin Amedment is - but the TL;DR is that very large banks (BoA, Wells, JPMC) have capped interchange rates of around 27 bps on debit swipes. Small banks with < $10B AUM, however, do not - they can earn 1-2% on interchange (avg was 160 bps or so last I checked). Which is why all of the debit card fintech companies you've heard of are partnered with these smaller banks - they can offer rewards like 1% cashback programs and still have margin sufficient to build a business around.) In a world where credit rewards shrink, access tightens, and annual fees rise, debit-based fintechs look better by comparison. But consumers lose: credit protections, payment float, stronger dispute rights, credit-building opportunities. TL;DR An APR cap feels like consumer protection. In practice it reshapes the market in ways that are easy to miss: - It will shrink access to credit - Eliminate rewards programs that aren't tied to high annual fees - Force risk into less regulated channels - Unintentionally advantages debit over credit - Help affluent transactors more than vulnerable borrowers Credit doesn't become cheaper. It becomes scarcer, less flexible, less transparent. But banks will adapt. Fintechs will adapt. Consumers caught in the middle do not get protected. They get fewer choices, worse products, and priced out.

This guy opened a fake 5 star ramen restaurant and then this happened

Reddit 神贴（转译）： 我是一家大型外卖应用的开发者。“优先配送费”和“司机福利费” 100% 都进了公司的腰包，司机一分钱也拿不到。 我现在躲在图书馆连着公用 Wi-Fi，用一台“一次性笔记本电脑”（Burner Laptop，指为了隐匿身份、用完即弃的廉价电脑）发这篇帖子，因为严格来说，我背着一份巨额的保密协议（NDA）。但我不在乎了。昨天我提了离职，说实话，我甚至希望他们来告我。这些秘密在我心里憋了八个月，眼看着那些代码被推上线（Production，指正式向用户开放的生产环境），一想到我亲手帮着造出了这台机器，我就整夜睡不着觉。 你们总觉得算法在针对你们，在搞鬼，其实真相远比阴谋论更让人压抑。我是个后端工程师。每周的冲刺规划会（Sprint Planning，敏捷开发中的周期性计划会议）我都得参加，听着那些产品经理（PM）讨论如何从“人力资产”（Human Assets）身上再榨出 0.4% 的利润——没错，数据库架构里真的是这么称呼司机的。他们谈论这些人时，就像在聊电子游戏里的资源采集点，完全忘了那是为了付房租而奔波的父亲和母亲。 首先，“优先配送”完全是个骗局。在内部宣传时，它被称为“心理附加值”。就像我在标题里说的，当你多付那 2.99 美元时，订单的 JSON 数据里确实有个布尔标记（Boolean flag，只有真或假两种状态的代码变量）变了，但派单逻辑（Dispatch Logic）完全无视它。它根本不会加快你的配送速度。 实际上，去年我们做过一次 A/B 测试（A/B Test，对比两种方案效果的测试方法）。我们没有加快优先订单的速度，而是故意把非优先订单延迟了 5 到 10 分钟，这样一对比，优先订单就“感觉”快了。管理层对结果满意得不得了。我们不需要提升服务质量，只需要把标准服务搞得更烂，就能凭空多赚几百万纯利润。 但真正让我作呕——也是我辞职的主要原因——是“绝望评分”（Desperation Score）。我们有一个针对司机的隐形指标，通过分析他们的接单行为，来追踪他们到底有多缺钱。 如果一个司机通常在晚上 10 点上线，并且毫不犹豫地秒接每一个只有 3 美元的垃圾订单，算法（Algo）就会给他打上“高度绝望”的标签。一旦被打上标签，系统就会故意不再给他们展示高价订单。逻辑很简单：“既然我们知道这人缺钱缺到 6 美元都肯干，干嘛要花 15 美元让他跑这一趟？”我们把小费丰厚的好单子留给那些“偶尔跑跑”的司机，以此把他们钓住，让他们的体验像玩游戏一样爽，而那些全职司机则被彻底榨干。 然后是“福利费”。在最近的劳动法通过后，你可能在账单上见过 1.50 美元的“监管应对费”或“司机福利费”。这种措辞就是为了让你觉得自己在帮助劳动者。 实际上，这笔钱直接进了一个企业的秘密基金，专门用来游说反对司机工会。我们在内部有一个专门的成本中心叫“政策防御”（Policy Defense），这笔费用就是直接输血给它的。说白了，你付的钱，其实是雇了顶级律师，去跟你的外卖小哥作对，让他们继续无家可归。 至于小费，我们基本上是在搞“偷小费 2.0 版”。我们现在不再通过法律上定义的“偷”来拿小费了，因为那样被起诉过。相反，我们利用预测建模（Predictive Modeling）来动态降低基础薪资。 如果算法预测你是个“豪爽的给小费者”，很可能会给 10 美元小费，系统就会只给司机区区 2 美元的基础运费。如果你不给小费，系统就会开出 8 美元的基础运费，只为了有人肯接单把饭送出去。结果就是，你的慷慨并没有奖励给司机，而是补贴了我们。你在帮我们给司机发工资，这样我们就不用掏钱了。 我喝高了，也很愤怒。在帖子被删之前，有什么想问的尽管问。 reddit.com/r/confession/c…

Chamath Palihapitiya on the growth principles that got Facebook to billions of users “The most important thing we did was I teased out virality, and said, ‘You cannot do it. Don’t talk about it. Don’t touch it. I don’t want you to give me any product plans that revolve around this idea of virality. I don’t want to hear it.” Instead, Chamath urged the growth team at Facebook to focus on “the three most difficult and hard problems that any consumer product has to deal with”: 1. How do you get people in the front door? 2. How do you get them to an aha moment as quickly as possible? 3. How do you deliver core product value as often as possible? Chamath warns that focusing on virality is why you see so many startups experience this amazingly steep rise and then fall off a cliff. The second thing he set out to do at Facebook was invalidate all of the lore: “In any given product, there’s always people who strut out around the office like, ‘I have this gut feeling.’ It’s all about gut feeling. And most people’s gut feelings are morons. They don’t know what they’re talking about. Gut feel is not useful because most people can’t predict correctly. We know this. So one of the most important things that we did was just invalidate all of the lore… You can’t believe your own BS. Because when you do, you start to compound these massively structural mistakes that don’t expose core product value… You don’t listen to customers because you think it’s all about your gut. You don’t bother doing any of the traditional, straightforward, obvious things, and you lose yourself.” As Chamath explains, a maniacal focus on delivering core product value as frequently and fast as possible is what led Facebook to its most important realization: “The single biggest thing we realized was to get any individual to 7 friends in 10 days. That was it… There was not much more complexity than that. There’s an entire team now of hundreds of people that have helped ramp this product to a billion users, based on that one simple rule — a very elegant statement of what it was to capture core product value… And then what we did at the company was talk about nothing else. Every Q&A. Every all-hands… It was the single, sole focus.” He continues: “You have to work backwards from: What is the thing that people are here to do? What is the ‘aha moment’ that they want? Why can I not give that to them as fast as possible? That’s how you win.” Chamath recommends starting with a cohort of your most engaged users — What features are they using? What pathways in your product did they take? Then work backwards and try to get all of your other users to that same state.