Republique

@Docoplat Hama-humus hattı heterojen bir bölge. Bu açıdan maraş-malatya-sivas'a da benziyor. Ama tribal sorunlar da var orada.

Suriye’deki Sednaya kaçkını selefiler hıncını yine silahsız başka bir unsur olan Hristiyanlardan almış. Hizbullah, Merkava vurdukça; İran, Tel Aviv’e füze atınca Hama/İdlib vahabileri sinir krizi geçiriyor 😂🤡

@korcanf2 @cevad_ulunay Balkan göçmenlerinin de mühim bir kısmı etnik türk ama onları bile dahil etsek yerlileri geçemezler egede

@cevad_ulunay Sunulu bölgelerde Giritli etnik Rum, Boşnak, Arnavut, Pomak yerleşimleri de epey yer kaplıyor. Etnik Türkler yukarıda sayılan kesimler kadar seküler değiller ve İç Batı ya da Akdeniz nüfusuna kayıtlıdırlar.

“Seküler” denilerek “etnik Türk”kastediliyor bir süredir. Hayırlar ola

@Docoplat Yahudiler ve almanlar sadece bilim ve sanatla meşgul olması lazım. Devlet işlerinde cozutuyorlar.

Cermen kavmi, daha özelinde ise Almanya; son 150 senede dünyanın yaşadığı birçok sorunun kaynağı. İsrail’in dahi başımıza bela olmasının kökünde Almanlar var. Trump’un da bir yanı Alman. Her dalaverenin altından bunlar çıkıyor.

@recep_muderris @CaneRedd_ @fyassew Müslüman yalan söylemez. 1- TCK'da cinsel saldırı suçunun cezası vardır. 2- Mer'i TCK Atatürk döneminde çıkmamıştır. 3- Atatürk dönemindeki eski TCK'da ırza tecavüzü geçelim zina bile suç idi.

@CaneRedd_ @fyassew Şeriat zaten tecavüz eden müslümanı öldürmek için var. Dinle imanla bitiyor iş. Senin sevdiğin atanın kanununda ise her şey serbest. Adam tecavuz ediyor disarda yaşiyor. Gel şeriata, dinsizlikte hayat yok

@Arsariyunus @kycnyusuf32 Afganistandaki türkmenlerin doğurganlık düzeyi çok farklı mı iran ve türkmenistana göre

@kycnyusuf32 Hayır ne alaka? Oran olarak Aşgabat daha türkmendir de ben sayı olarak dedim, güncelde Belh vilayet nüfusunu 3+ milyon olduğu tahmin ediliyor yerli nüfus memurları tarafından ve bunun kabaca %40+ Türkmen

Belhte Aşgabattan daha çok Türkmen vardır sayı olarak

@WhiteTurkNoticr @Ali2022432 Şehirli veya eğitimliler de ayrı bir seküler grubu olarak kabul edilmeli. İstanbul, ankara ve karadenizde şehir merkezlerini cehap domine eder

Türkiye'de "sekülerler" diye etnik bir grup yok. Herkesin 2 jenerasyon ötesi hacı, herkesin ailesinde dindar var. Seküler denilen insanların bayası inançlı Kırsal-şehirli, eğitimli, yaşlı-genç ayrımı daha belirgin

@ltdaniel34_5 @Ali2022432 Yörük kökenliler manavlardan daha seküler. Göçebeler çiftçilerden daha az dindar olur genelde. Muğla, izmir, denizli, uşak ile kütahya, afyon, balıkesir ve bursa'nın manav ilçelerini kıyaslayın.

@Ali2022432 Kesinlikle sekülerlik etnik kökenle bağlantılı. Rumeli ve Manav kökenliler seküler, Yörükler ortada, Romeikalar, Gürcüler, Türkmenler, Araplar, Kürtler(çoğu) islamcıdır.

@R_Busoni @merkezden_haric Anadolu Türklüğünün de kızılbaşlar üzerinden İran'da tesiri var. Aslında Türkiye ve İran arasında sanılandan daha güçlü tarihsel kültürel genetik bağlar var.

@merkezden_haric Anadolu Türklüğü/Müslümanlığı İran üzerinde kültürel tesirde bulunmadı İran Türklüğü/Farslığı/Müslümanlığı ise Anadolu üzerinde çarpıcı bir tesirde bulundu, hatta onu "doğurdu". Arada kademe farkı var. 2 asırdır asıl referansımız Batı olsa bile bu iz duruyor.

Yalnız Türkiye'de şaşırdığım bir husus var. İran'a benzer şekilde ABD tarafından saldırıya ve işgale uğrayan çok memleket oldu. Fakat hiçbiri İran kadar methedilmedi bu kadar. Üstelik Sünni, Seküler, Milliyetçi, Solcu fark etmeden İran'daki Rejimi takdir eden insanları görünce iyice garipsemeye başladım. Kabul etmek lazım ki İran propaganda hususunda gayet başarılı bir memleket. Türkiye'deki İrancı ve Şiici damar bulunsa da İran'da Sünnici ve Türkiyeci damar bulunmamakta. Bu tek taraflı bir sempati olarak kalıyor.

@tripoli187 @punicist @cremieuxrecueil researchgate.net/publication/31…

@punicist @cremieuxrecueil In Lebanon only the French helped them become what he calls the elite, because the country of Lebanon was literally built to be a country for minorities, so I don’t see how his theory stands. In Jordan and Palestine they are also just normal citizens.

I remember reading a similar post by @cremieuxrecueil in which he makes a similar argument: Jizya (Islamic taxation on Christians and Jews) made poor non-Muslims convert, while the rich retained their faith, and that's why today they outperform the others. This is a very silly reading of Islamic history And it misses one obvious fact: Until not so long ago, think the end of the 19th century, the aristocratic elite in most Muslim countries was Sunni Muslim. The argument incorrectly identifies minority groups as stable elites, or at least, those who were filtered out due to jizya. I don't contest that these groups (Jews, Copts, Maronites, etc.) on average outperform Muslims, sometimes by shockingly wide margins today (even though it's closing). But until recently (19th c.), the elite of Egypt were the Cairo urbanites, the elite of Lebanon were the Sunnis of Beirut, the elite of Morocco were the Fez and Rabat Muslim Andalusians/Moriscos, and so on. In the 19th century, things changed. You still had this Sunni elite but also those minority groups that started to urbanize and outperform them. So what happened? Simply put: access to missionary and/or Western education. I'll illustrate this with three groups: North African Jews, Egyptian Copts, and Lebanese Christians. As I mentioned, urban Sunni Muslims were the elite, they had access to education, as rudimentary as it was. The majority of Muslims, however, were rural, and did not. The situation of Jews in North Africa tells a similar story. While urban Jews (usually of Sephardic descent) were often doing well, rural Jews were not. There are writings by Ashkenazi French Jews about the condition of Jews in French Algeria that describe their synagogues in rather harsh terms, likening them to horse stables. French Jews were shocked to find that Algerian Jews and Algerian Muslims were indistinguishable in their misery. (If you understand French, I'd suggest watching this amazing interview by Joel Sebban, a historian of Jews and Judaism in France : youtube.com/watch?v=tDyPq7…) That's the context in which the Alliance Israélite Universelle emerged. The Alliance Israélite Universelle, founded in Paris in 1860, systematically established French-language schools across the Ottoman Empire and North Africa. Its explicit mission was to "civilize" and modernize Oriental Jewish communities, which the Parisian Jewish elite viewed as backwards. Before the AIU schools, the gap between urban Jews and rural or lower-class Jews was enormous, similar to the gap between urban Sunnis and rural Sunnis, or between urban Sunnis and rural Jews for that matter. The AIU introduced secular French-language education, vocational training, and European cultural norms. Within a generation or two, this produced a class of French-speaking, professionally trained Jews who could integrate into colonial administrative posts. Urban Sunnis also had access to modern schools, often built by late Ottoman reformers like Kheireddine Pacha in Tunis, but because they carried nationalist claims favoring independence, they were naturally viewed with suspicion by the colonial administration. The Crémieux Decree of 1870 is the other half of the story, at least for Algeria. It granted French citizenship en masse to Algerian Jews, immediately giving them access to the French public school system, French universities, and the colonial civil service. Algerian Muslims were offered nothing of equivalent scale (and would have refused it if they were). So by the early 20th century, the gap between Algerian Jews and Algerian Muslims was not some residue of medieval jizya filtering, because prior to French Algeria, no such gap had existed between Jews and Muslims of the same lifestyle (urban / rural). There are even records of Jews in eastern Algeria living as nomadic Bedouins. The gap was the product of roughly 5 decades of differential access to French/Western education institutions. Now let's turn to Lebanese Christians, namely the Maronites, whose case is loosely similar. The Maronites began as a monastic community formed around the Saint Maron. Established in Mount Lebanon, roughly around the Bsharré/Ehden area by Saint John Maron, this community gradually converted the mountain dwellers, already living there, to their faith. The Maronite case is distinctive and deserves its own treatment, because it's the one where the "merit" argument has the most legitimacy, but even here, it is inseparable from structural access to education, and has nothing to do with jizya filtering. The community's relative isolation, surrounded by Muslims, was disrupted during the Crusader period. The Maronites had maintained ties with Rome since then, and these were formalized with the establishment of the Maronite College in Rome in 1584. This is extraordinarily early. It meant that a small but consistent stream of Maronite clergy and intellectuals was being trained in European institutions centuries before the modern missionary wave. Figures like Istifan al-Duwayhi and the Assemani family, who became Vatican librarians, are products of this pipeline for example. So there is a genuine case that the Maronite community had a head start in institutionalized education that most other communities in the region simply didn't have. In the 19th century, French Jesuit and Lazarist missions dramatically expanded educational access for Maronites and other Christians, in Mount Lebanon and beyond. The Université Saint-Joseph, founded in Beirut in 1875, is the landmark institution here. American Protestant missionaries did the same: the Syrian Protestant College (later AUB, founded back in 1866) had a mixed but disproportionately Christian student body. These institutions created a bilingual, professionally educated Christian class at a time when comparable Muslim institutions quite simply didn't exist at scale. The Ottoman education system was not producing graduates equipped to navigate a modernizing, increasingly European-dominated economy or modern administration. The Maronites weren't an elite in a traditional aristocratic sense, but they were ready to fill the needs of a new state, and so they moved into banking, finance, and administration within the institutions France inaugurated in Lebanon. They were, in short, a readily available French-speaking professional class that was far more educated than other major groups as a whole. The Coptic case in Egypt follows a similar logic, if at a smaller scale. And they, of course, deserve a lot of credit. Like Maronites, Copts were a somewhat isolated group. Also a community with strong monastic traditions, they lived mostly in Upper Egypt (=Southern Egypt/the Sa'id) The driving figure behind Coptic upward mobility is Cyril IV, the Coptic patriarch from 1854 to 1861, sometimes called the "Father of Reform." He established modern Coptic schools with secular curricula, invited European teachers, and pushed for the education of both boys and girls, a conscious community-level decision to modernize through education. He was also under pressure which Protestant missionaries were exerting on the community. Alongside this, the Church Missionary Society and other Protestant missions opened schools in Upper Egypt that served Copts, sometimes converting them, sometimes simply educating them. By the late 19th and early 20th century, Copts had disproportionate access to modern education relative to the rural Muslim majority, which translated directly into overrepresentation in the civil service and the professions. Before Western education reshaped things, the elite, in a traditional aristocratic sense, was verifiably Sunni Muslim in most places. You did have merchant middlemen and rising commercial/mercantile families in certain communities, like Armenians in Ottoman Turkey, for instance, or the then-new bourgeoisie of Beirut composed of Greek Orthodox families like the Bustros, Sursuk, and Tuwayni (whose origins seem to trace back to Cyprus and Anatolia, at least per traditional accounts, genetics can shed light unto that) or commercial families like Abillama and Mudawwar families among the Greek Catholic Melkites in Beirut. That said, the elites were not always locals/natives. There was always a local element, but the ruling classes of Tunis, Morocco, Algiers, and Cairo were, more often than not, Andalusian or Ottoman-derived, Turks, Georgians, Greeks. In Cairo, Albanians (like Muhammad Ali) and Circassians were disproportionately prominent. And most of these were not elite by origin either: many had actually entered as slaves, but rose through the ranks precisely because they were the backbone of authority. Governments preferred them to locals, because empowering local tribes risked giving them leverage, whereas men with no ties or loyalties beyond the state were far more convenient. Both the Sunni Muslim elite and the minority nouvelles bourgeoisies demonstrate that there is nothing static about elite groups in MENA. Access to the right institutions, in the span of just a few decades, can change everything about a group or a country.

@tripoli187 @punicist @cremieuxrecueil Sunni Islam were more urbanite due to political(state power) and educational (madrassah, sharia courts etc.) reasons. However westernization/secularism spread among sunni elites. Therefore sunni Islam have more rural traits nowadays.

@punicist @cremieuxrecueil The Maronites, Shiites and Druze were the peasants of the Levant. The Sunni Muslims & orthodox were the elite of the Levant, also it wasn’t only Beirut Sunnis, Tripoli Sunnis were one of the biggest elite class of the Levant. The city slowly deteriorated after French rule.

@tripoli187 @punicist @cremieuxrecueil İn lebanon yes. İn Iraq no. İn palestine not sure. İn syria there is great variation among muslims.

@usrev12 @punicist @cremieuxrecueil The only difference is SSA, Arabian admixture which comes up as natufian is pretty much the same, also Muslim both Sunni and Shia Levantines carry European hunter gatherer which is completely absent in the Maronites, Druze & orthodox DNA.

@punicist @cremieuxrecueil I think the part of your article about Egypt is a bit weak. The presence of a foreign elite population doesn't suggest the average Muslim Egyptian Arab is more educated or wealthier than a Coptic Christians.

@aliosmanihanefi O bayrağı amerikalılar icat etmedi 100 sene önce de benzer bir bayrak vardı.

Afganistan’ın bayrağı değişmeli. Hâlâ cumhuriyet rejimi bayrağı duruyor.

@BheriaMS To be fair Baghdad did not produce so much scientists after mongol invasion...There were jewish scientists in Islamic world during medieval era. İt seems andalucian jews were smart. Sephardic Jews introduced the first printing presses

Jews made up nearly 1/2 of Baghdad at the beginning of the last century, however, their representation in the actual cognitive elite (not talking musicians, etc), that is, writers/scientists/polymaths produced by Baghdad over the centuries is way, way less.

@cremieuxrecueil France is better than Germany

Germany has the most undeservedly good reputation there is.

@arctotherium42 @GYakov1990 @JeremyB85043222 İ think that ww1 was not fault of communists.

@GYakov1990 @JeremyB85043222 Russia was in ruins when Stalin came to power because of the Civil War, which wrecked the country. It was not in ruins and was rapidly improving (economically/technologically, at least) in 1913 and was still doing OK even on the eve of the Revolution in 1917.

The important thing to understand about (rapid) Soviet industrialization and economic growth 1928-40 was that it was driven by sectoral reallocation from agriculture to industry, not rising productivity within these groups (agriculture in particular badly suffered).

@arctotherium42 @VittorioAmadeus USSR was more competent to defeat internal and external enemies.

@VittorioAmadeus Communism was a disaster for Russia and wrecked it economically, demographically, and intellectually, but the USSR was exceptionally good, possibly the best ever, at mobilizing existing resources and espionage.

@RWApodcast @AyushSi48483809 İt is not true after 1930. Soviet elite(politburo) were largely ethnic russian. Various ethnic groups were deported by soviet regime.

@AyushSi48483809 Because the USSR was a schizophrenic affirmative action regime with the guiding principle of exploiting ethnic Russians in favor of lifting up minorities

Over a hundred thousand people died in the Tajik Civil War, which was just one out of the 14 or 15 armed conflicts that started as a direct result of the Soviet collapse

@turkenkugeln Boy farkından mı