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xyukix
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how do we long broscience
MTS@MTSlive
.@balajis's thoughts on Clavicular and looksmaxxing: -"Bro science" is going to be the next major market; will transition from a joke to reality - We currently have Ozempic for weight loss, but we'll soon get Ozempic for longevity, Ozempic for cognition, etc.
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peptides just went from grey market to government policy
- RFK confirmed 14 of 19 banned peptides are coming back to legal compounding
- FDA officially moved to reclassify a dozen restricted peptides this week. formal policy, not just a promise
- Stanford discovered a natural Ozempic with no side effects using AI. new peptide class, zero known downsides
- Syneron Bio closed a $150M Series B for next-gen macrocyclic peptides. AstraZeneca and Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth backed
- Endpoint Arena launched a prediction market for clinical trials. you can now bet on whether a drug works before it gets approved
what felt taboo got normalized in a week
we've been backing this thesis+more at Superhuman Fund before it was a conversation
Fund II is open DM if you want in
bio/acc.
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TxAnalyzer now supports Solana transaction analysis.
One upfront caveat: Solana analysis is currently not as accurate as our EVM analysis.
This is not because the analysis logic is weaker, but because standard Solana RPC does not expose EVM-style primitives like debug_traceTransaction, opcode traces, or universally available verified source code. For some programs, we also need to go to GitHub to match source code with the deployed version.
So the current positioning is closer to this: it can systematically reconstruct what a Solana transaction did, but for some custom programs or exploit scenarios, the confidence level will still be lower than on EVM.
Feel free to throw real Solana transactions at it and stress-test it.
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#TxAnalyzer Analysis Result:
A single required DVN (0x589dedbd…236b, 2-of-3 multisig) signed an attestation for a packet the source chain never emitted.
Everything downstream
→ ReceiveUln302.commitVerification
→ EndpointV2.lzReceive
→ OApp peer check
→ OFT decode
→ rsETH.transfer
→ executed exactly as designed.
txs:
• DVN attest: 0xfe575668…0d6f
• Commit: 0x68eb14e2…b564
• Drain: 0x1ae232da…4222
Hard evidence the source event never happened (source chain = Unichain, eid 30320):
• Unichain endpoint.outboundNonce[OFT → ETH] = 307, never advanced to 308
• 400k-block scan of Unichain PacketSent: only nonces 306 & 307 emitted, no 308
• rsETH totalSupply on Unichain = 49.26 — cannot burn 116,500 that doesn't exist
• Nonces 1..307 match ETH lazyInboundNonce perfectly; only 308 is forged
Root cause:
• off-chain DVN fault (key compromise?) on the
(DVN, srcEid=30320) path
• on-chain requiredDVNCount = 1 config.
Same single-DVN config is used for 5 eids (Unichain, Hemi, Swell, Ink, MegaETH).
Kelp's RSETH_OFTAdapter had requiredDVNCount = 1 for srcEid = 30320 — meaning the
entire inbound trust for a ~$300M-notional path was gated by one DVN (a 2-of-3
multisig), so one compromised signer set was enough to unlock 116,500 rsETH with no
independent attestor to contradict it. The other 4 eids share the same single-DVN
dependency and remain exposed until the DVN is patched.
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