Greg Dennis
1.7K posts

Greg Dennis
@VotingNerd
Software Engineer, MIT PhD, Electoral Reform Enthusiast
Arlington, MA Entrou em Haziran 2009
1.5K Seguindo747 Seguidores

#ELB: Was Mamdani the “Condorcet Winner” in NYC mayoral primary? ift.tt/63lQ2kd
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Greg Dennis retweetou
Greg Dennis retweetou

New resource alert, by @VotingNerd and @DebTheOtis! Best practices for using #RankedChoiceVoting to endorse candidates. fairvote.org/report/best-pr…
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A new piece I wrote for @DemocracySOS arguing that RCV is a superior tool for depolarizing our politics than Condorcet voting methods:
democracysos.substack.com/p/the-magnet-a…
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Greg Dennis retweetou

Ranked choice voting honors the foundational principles of representative democracy.
And with widespread efforts to suppress the vote, we must act at every level of govt to empower the electorate.
TY @Ruthzee, @juliaforboston & @ClrHenrySantana for leading the charge in Boston.
Boston.com@BostonDotCom
Boston City Council renews push for ranked choice voting trib.al/xan7x2y
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@cdory28167 @alexjago51 Those 2-winner elections are to boards with an odd number of seats, so in a three year cycle, the majority would still retain majority control.
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@alexjago51 We have locals with one winner, two, three, four and five, and every ten years, fifteen. All non-partisan, so there is no particular majority/minority. The voters can be divided all sorts of ways by issues, demographics, etc.
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With 3 candidates and 2 winners, if 66% of voters want A and B, and 34% want C, C wins 1/2 the seats.
Greg Dennis@VotingNerd
@cdory28167 That isn't true. Multi-winner elections decided by RCV are proportional, so the will of the majority will capture a majority of seats and maintain majority control.
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@cdory28167 That isn't true. Multi-winner elections decided by RCV are proportional, so the will of the majority will capture a majority of seats and maintain majority control.
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I support the concept of RCV but opposed Brookline’s (flawed) proposal. Multi-winner elections decided by RCV can override the will of the majority of voters, in ways some of the strongest proponents of RCV failed to grasp.
GBH News@GBHNews
Ranked Choice Boston is looking to get enough support to reinstate ranked choice voting in Boston on a municipal level. wgbh.org/news/local/202…
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@hapi_phace @GBHNews Eric Adams won a plurality, so he would have won under the prior system as well. Has the current system only produced good candidates?
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Ranked Choice Boston is looking to get enough support to reinstate ranked choice voting in Boston on a municipal level.
wgbh.org/news/local/202…
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@anthonymamore @GBHNews The people of Boston already voted, and more than 60% clearly said they wanted it. electionstats.state.ma.us/ballot_questio…
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@GBHNews The people have already voted and clearly stated they don't want it.
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@newrepublic How many columns has David Masciotra written calling for Ranked Choice Voting for presidential elections? As far as I can tell, zero. All this energy expended to blame candidates and not an ounce for fixing the system.
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Cornel West has the potential to seriously damage, perhaps even doom, the campaign of the sole candidate in the race who generally shares his politics and has a chance to win. trib.al/UZsWvH6
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@Nahanni_ @ParnurChris @DrJillStein @CommunityNotes Again, please read the thread above. Wikipedia is imprecise there or at least highly debatable. The first mathematical formulation of "vote-splitting" was Independence of Clones (IC). IC violations are a subset of IIA violations, a subset that RCV prevents.
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@VotingNerd @ParnurChris @DrJillStein @CommunityNotes The RCV election in Alaska was classic vote-splitting (aka the spoiler effect).

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Ranked choice voting eliminates any possibility of a split election. 🗳️
tiktok.com/t/ZPRchoWRc/
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@Nahanni_ @ParnurChris @DrJillStein @CommunityNotes Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. You should read the full thread above to come up to speed.
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@VotingNerd @ParnurChris @DrJillStein @CommunityNotes What is IIA? Nick Begich was the Condorcet winner in the Alaskan election and the clear favourite. But vote-splitting with Palin resulted in a Peltola win. Here is another paper which directly disputes the Independence of Clones: jstor.org/stable/2689808

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@Nahanni_ @ParnurChris @DrJillStein @CommunityNotes Those are failures of IIA, not of IC (vote-splitting).
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@VotingNerd @ParnurChris @DrJillStein @CommunityNotes The failure to eliminate vote-splitting and other #RCV flaws are discussed in this paper: tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108… 2/
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@GameTheoryGuys @damnitruben @Annie_Kallen @DrJillStein It should be a controversial axiom, in my opinion. As Tideman argues in his book, the addition of a new candidate elicits new information about voter preferences. To say we shouldn't derive a new "best winner" in light of that new information is suspect.
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@VotingNerd @damnitruben @Annie_Kallen @DrJillStein Interesting how Nash uses IIA in his cooperative game bargaining solution (The Bargaining Problem, 1950). IIA was his most controversial axiom, but he related it to the Pareto boundary, with symmetry and scale invariance as idealisations also. Is #Bitcoin designed on these?
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@damnitruben @DrJillStein IIA implies IC, but not the inverse. That is, it is possible to satisfy IC without satisfying IIA, as Ranked Pairs, IRV, & other methods do. These methods eliminate "vote-splitting" but not necessarily all other "spoiler" scenarios (again, accepting your formulation of "spoiler")
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@damnitruben @DrJillStein You continue to confuse 2 concepts. (1) IIA, which you claim is a mathematical formulation of the "spoiler effect." That's debatable but for the sake of argument let's accept it here. (2) Independence of Clones (IC), which Tideman offers as a formulation of "vote-splitting." ...
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@damnitruben @DrJillStein Well, you could have just found it on Wikipedia among other places:
#Compliant_methods" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independe…
But at your request, here is the relevant section of the Tideman paper:

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@VotingNerd @DrJillStein I can’t access the paper due to paywall. Screenshot and highlight the part that says “Ranked Choice Voting ie the Alternative Vote eliminates vote splitting.”
The abstract talks about Ranked pairs. Not Ranked Choice Voting ie the Alternative Vote.

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@VotingNerd @Annie_Kallen @DrJillStein I believe you when you cite a source that says that “Ranked Choice Voting ie Instant Runoff Voting eliminates vote splitting.”
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@damnitruben @Annie_Kallen @DrJillStein You are trying to define all failures of IIA as "vote-splitting." That dog won't hunt. Vote-splitting cases are violations of Independence of Clones, and these comprise a proper _subset_ of IIA violations.
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@VotingNerd @Annie_Kallen @DrJillStein Instant Runoff Voting ie Ranked Choice Voting fails Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives means it’s susceptible to vote splitting like the spoiler effect regardless if it passes Independence of clones criterion. Also if RCV/IRV doesn’t allow you to rank all candidates it fails


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