Cory Combs

We assembled our 4th cohort fellows on campus @perryworldhouse for 2 days of intensive discussions about their early stage policy papers at the start of their fellowship year. Many thanks to Sarah Beran for her keynote remarks, and all the great discussants who offered feedback!

Ironically, China didn't have to name indium metal to impact it anyway -- which leaves even a top non-Chinese InP producer in a bind.

The metal is, as noted, not under dual-use export controls. But Chinese exports of the metal tanked along with those of the controlled products, as demand for the latter (now largely cut off) was evidently driving production of metal for export.

@kyleichan glad you're flagging this. For a bit more color: Coherent produces its own InP. In principle, it should be more secure than most...but it is still dependent, as far as I can tell, on Chinese indium metal (in HS code terms, unwrought indium).

In our latest #IranConflictBrief, Daniel Sternoff sits down with @coryjcombs (@triviumchina) to break down the volatile triangular relationship between Washington, Beijing, and Tehran, and what it means for global energy security and the Strait of Hormuz. 🎧 Listen here: energypolicy.columbia.edu/iran-conflict-…

Sharing a new paper by David Zhang of @triviumchina and yours truly on China’s ongoing property market drag. Yes, it will likely bottom out this year. But yes, it is still a major, major drag on the macro. This year, property and its connected upstream + downstream industries will likely drag down nominal GDP by 2 percentage points. That is significant. Exports can bridge some of the gap, but there are two critical issues: Unlike property, exports-- especially high-value exports related to AI + energy demand, where China shows the clearest strength / resillience-- do not have the same pull on employment and consumption. And the sheer magnitude of the property sector cannot be written off... As Morgan Stanley report pointed out, to offset the 2 percentage point drag, nominal export growth would need to be around 15%... no easy feat! cc @AsiaPolicy

We are thrilled to announce the selection of our fourth fellowship cohort, sixteen truly outstanding next generation China scholars and analysts you can read more about here: global.upenn.edu/future-of-us-c… Check out the full announcement at: global.upenn.edu/future-of-us-c…

This week on the Trivium China Podcast from @triviumchina, @coryjcombs is back on the show to talk about what China did and didn't agree to in the talks in Busan when it comes to REE and other strategic minerals. @andrewpolk81 hosts as always! Link below.

@gabewildau @ChorzempaMartin @pstAsiatech That said, MofCom specifically flagged a focus on AI R&D. Duplication offers a second control point. Say an export is approved for sputtering targets; now Beijing can (in theory) then restrict use of those sputtering targets to make chips used in applications it wants to block.

@gabewildau @ChorzempaMartin @pstAsiatech Trade compliance lawyers are working overtime interpreting these. But short version, yes, I do expect there's a degree of duplication.

I'm struggling to understand China's new foreign direct product rule. If the export from China of motors with rare earth magnets needs a license, then I'm not sure the re-export of that motor within Europe would require another license. @coryjcombs @ChorzempaMartin @pstAsiatech

@CarbonBrief @_AN_Patel @tony_benchmark (Also the critical minerals classification updates -- by far the most important piece being the long-overdue inclusion of copper..!)

@CarbonBrief @_AN_Patel @tony_benchmark @CarbonBrief @_AN_Patel in the wake of the US's OBBBA, FEOC updates, etc., could be a great time for a follow-up!

Q&A: What could a US-China trade war mean for the energy transition? | @_AN_Patel w/ comment from @tony_benchmark @coryjcombs John Johnson #CBarchive Read here ➡️ buff.ly/426poLo

🌎 Who controls the minerals that power the future? @annatashton (Ashton Analytics) and @coryjcombs (@triviumchina) join #PIPFellow @jessicamdicarlo (@UUtah) to unpack how China became a global leader in critical minerals. Watch: bit.ly/4fsxaUa

We're still working through everything for clients, but I'll be posting more on the issue soon. Thoughts/questions? Be in touch. (For industry folks: yes, these materials have more uses -- ~70 that we track internally -- but these are top econ, security, and political concerns.)

3/5: Bismuth (including powders, blocks, and other forms) – an alloying agent, among its other niche industrial purposes 4/5: Molybdenum (including alloys) – used in various "superalloys" 5/5: Indium (including semiconductor material InP) – key to myriad electronics

China has just issued arguably its most significant critical #mineral #export controls yet. (Quite an eventful return from the Lunar New Year break!) In short, using the dual-use export control list, #China will now require export licenses for the key products of:

Like other analysts, we're skeptical of Beijing's current international enforcement capabilities -- but Beijing will invest in developing them moving forward.

2) The ban's extra-territorial application sets a new precedent and trajectory for export controls. - Beijing aims to prevent domestic firms from seeking loopholes, incl. re-exports via third countries. - But it also warns US trading partners not to circumvent China's controls.

Last week I spoke with Bloomberg @business about China's ban on select critical mineral exports to the US. bloomberg.com/news/articles/… Key takeaways: