Delaney Soliday

Very proud to announce that @Shivane478123 and I published our first white paper with @CNASdc earlier this week on post-war governance and social services in #Gaza. 🧵 [1/8] cnas.org/publications/r…

A great piece on #Pakistan's role in ongoing negotiations between the U.S. and Iran by @LisaCurtisDC 👇🏼 "The improved relations are a positive development that could help Washington’s goals in the region as well as reset longstanding areas of tension between the two countries."

Passive defenses — bunkers, hardened shelters, dispersal — aren't glamorous. The Pentagon has underfunded them for decades. Now, with U.S. troops under fire in the Middle East, DoD is scrambling to find vendors who can ship prefabricated shelters within 30 days. 🧵

1/x We may be seeing a third attempt at using talks to stall for time to prepare for a ground operation against a) Kharg Island, b) the southern tip of Iran to push their missile and drone forces back from the Straits, c) the Iranian stockpile of HEU or d) all of the above.

I'm curious as to whether these attempts at negotiation are genuine or a way to buy time so the MEUs can arrive in the region. Also, what does 'de-escalate' mean? End the war? End strikes on energy targets? Remove highly-enriched U-235 from #Iran? Lots of outstanding ?s here.

If/when the GCC's patience runs out with the consequences of the Israeli and U.S. military operation against Iran, @WhiteHouse needs to keep in mind that whatever its war goals may be and however long it intends to pursue them, it cannot fight this war w/o its Gulf allies.

Our Gulf allies have been invaluable in assisting w/regional missile defense, but the region is also bearing the economic brunt of this conflict. Its citizens and migrant workers are dying, and several states have had to shut down oil production. nytimes.com/2026/03/10/wor…

Some really valuable analysis from @nytimes and a # of highly respected D.C. think tanks. The bottom line: #Iran is committed to targeting U.S. assets in the region and expanding the conflict to impact American allies in the region. nytimes.com/interactive/20…

Really fantastic analysis (and killer graphs) by @CNASdc experts @StaciePettyjohn and @PhilSheers. "At this stage, Operation Epic Fury is a military success funded by strategic risk."

There is a price to pay for not being able to clearly explain one's objectives, much like there is a price to pay for clearly stating your objectives and failing to carry them out.

Is @WhiteHouse's goal actually regime change? Is it trying to destabilize #Tehran and force internal collapse? Or is it simply focused on degrading Iran's ability to threaten its neighbors? Remains unclear. @realDonaldTrump has yet to make his case to the American public.

@WhiteHouse is intentionally keeping its objectives on #Iran as vague as possible, giving @realDonaldTrump the ability to define 'victory' ex post facto.

Iran fired 1200+ projectiles at five countries in the first 48 hours. Most were drones. These saturation attacks aim to overwhelm air defenses and drain interceptors. $20-50k Shahed drones vs. $4.19M PAC-3 interceptors put US and its partners on the wrong side of the cost curve.

It’s early and uncertain, but a few things are clear: 1. Khamenei’s death opens the region’s largest Pandora’s box. He served as either Supreme Leader or President since 1981, and defined Iran’s post-revolution trajectory. No one knows what follows his departure. 2. Regime change via air power is extremely difficult. Trump called on protestors to rise up, but the IRGC and Basij will still have the guns and the people still won’t. The security forces will need to crack or dissolve for a true political transformation. 3. That said, the transformation of Iran, either domestically or in its foreign policy, was impossible while the Supreme Leader ruled. It might be possible after his departure. 4. Trump has framed this as the necessary response to an imminent nuclear and missile threat. Not really. Iran wasn’t enriching uranium and doesn’t have ICBMs. The forcing function was the opportunity to topple a dangerous, repressive, and bloody regime while it is dramatically weakened. 5. Iran’s response so far has mixed predictable actions - shooting at Israel and U.S. bases - with others, like its attacks on civilian areas in Gulf countries. All the latter will accomplish is to unite the region against Tehran. 6. We’re witnessing the anti-Powell Doctrine in force. No attempt to build a national consensus behind war, no ground component to attain overwhelming force, no clear objective. 7. Instead Trump has preserved the flexibility to adapt based on how things unfold. He could stop in a couple of days and say the nuke and missile threat is taken care of and it’s now over to the Iranian people. He could instead continue for weeks, aiming at decisive regime change. It’s a different approach to war. 8. Hamas’ terrorist attack aimed to destroy Israel. Instead it lit a fuse that blew up the Axis of Resistance, Assad’s Syria, and now Khamenei’s Iran. For all the risk and danger, there is unprecedented opportunity for a better Middle East. 9. For all its military might, the U.S. will have only a limited role in determining the outcome. Events are in motion with no one actor calling the shots.

NEW: In a Situation Room meeting last week about plans for Iran -- that went 3 times longer than scheduled -- Chairman of Joint Chiefs Gen. Dan Caine was unable to predict what the result of a regime change operation would be, sources said. But at the same time, Caine has prepared military options for striking Iran, including plans aimed at toppling the regime. Inside Caine's delicate balancing act as Trump's top military adviser. w/ @NatashaBertrand & @halbritz cnn.com/2026/02/25/pol…

Wise analysis on the potential of direct conflict w/ #Iran from @SchneidermanDM. Raises another ?—does @WhiteHouse expect that military action can sufficiently pressure Tehran into a nuclear deal? And is it willing to commit the DoD resources necessary to accomplish that goal?

4. Any U.S. action would also have to take into consideration the fact that most Gulf states don't want their airspace used for a U.S. strike on Iran—for fear of making themselves a target for Tehran's retaliation. Many of these countries also host thousands of U.S. troops.

3. However, @POTUS has proven willing to take on big risks with his #Iran policy. Remains unclear what the regional and long-term implications of a U.S. tactical strike could be in a situation where there is no clear target or single motivating factor behind intervention.

Some very smart analysis on ongoing tensions between the U.S. and #Iran by @CNASdc adjunct @SchneidermanDM and @KamranBokhari on @AlJazeera's 'Min Washington.' 👇 youtu.be/Y5JbbD9mP80?si…