Fengming Lu

84 posts

Fengming Lu

Fengming Lu

@FengmingLuPE

Lecturer (Assistant Professor) of Chinese Politics at ANU | Chinese Politics, Political Economy, and Elite Politics | EV expert | Car guy for 30+ yrs | 陆风鸣

Canberra, Australia เข้าร่วม Haziran 2026
138 กำลังติดตาม8.9K ผู้ติดตาม
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Fengming Lu
Fengming Lu@FengmingLuPE·
Why did private firms, not state-owned enterprises (SOEs), come to dominate China’s EV sector? My new @ChinaJournal article (co-authored with Xiao Ma @maxiaoalex) challenge the "top-down industrial policy" narrative. The real engine? Strategic alliances between local governments and private capital. 🧵 Based on 3+ years of fieldwork, 60+ interviews (with officials, entrepreneurs, and engineers), and rich first-hand accounts, we show how strict central regulations inadvertently drove local states to bet big on private EV players. Here is the story: (1/15)
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Fengming Lu
Fengming Lu@FengmingLuPE·
FAW's purpose was to consolidate Leapmotor's sale figures so that they have a better looking annual report. Hangzhou Guoshun owns 4.16% of domestic shares of Leapmotor (Leapmotor issues both H shares and domestic shares, so the denominator is both categories combined), which accounts for only 0.91% of the total equity (by the end of 2025). Go learn some basics before doing your research.
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Apreza Renaldy
Apreza Renaldy@RenaldyApreza·
@FengmingLuPE For leapmotor true FAW Only (5%) but there is also Hangzhou Guoshun Equity Investment Co., Ltd. Has (4.26%) So Combined State-Owned Entities (SOEs & Municipal Funds) 15% leapmotor share own by government .
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Fengming Lu
Fengming Lu@FengmingLuPE·
Why did private firms, not state-owned enterprises (SOEs), come to dominate China’s EV sector? My new @ChinaJournal article (co-authored with Xiao Ma @maxiaoalex) challenge the "top-down industrial policy" narrative. The real engine? Strategic alliances between local governments and private capital. 🧵 Based on 3+ years of fieldwork, 60+ interviews (with officials, entrepreneurs, and engineers), and rich first-hand accounts, we show how strict central regulations inadvertently drove local states to bet big on private EV players. Here is the story: (1/15)
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Fengming Lu
Fengming Lu@FengmingLuPE·
@RenaldyApreza Ridiculous. The employee shareholding platforms do hold about 18% of Chery's equity, but Yin Tongyue himself owns 17.2% of Chery's equity and that counts toward the 18%. Do your research so that you are not outwitted by AI.
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Apreza Renaldy
Apreza Renaldy@RenaldyApreza·
@FengmingLuPE Chey is 36.34% owned by state-owned enterprises and 18.25% by workers organizations. So the communists have 54.59% of the vote. Even private companies that hold 21.64% Chery have a small portion of their shares ±10% is by another SOE.
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Fengming Lu
Fengming Lu@FengmingLuPE·
Most local people’s congresses in China are window-dressing. But the one of Huangyan District in Taizhou, Zhejiang has been quite defiant since the 1990s.
联合早报 Lianhe Zaobao@zaobaosg

中国浙江一地的人大代表,以过半的反对票数否决总投资超过10亿元(人民币,下同,1.89亿新元)的政府重大投资项目。中国媒体指出,以往中国各地人大代表较少参与政府重大投资项目决策,否决项目的情况更为罕见。 #Echobox=1781533576" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">zaobao.com.sg/news/china/sto…

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Adam Y. Liu
Adam Y. Liu@AdamYLiu1·
My first book, Authoritarian Markets: The Politics of China’s Banking Explosion (Cornell University Press), is officially out today! It explores the political foundations of China’s banking market development—and how that development both drove the rapid growth of the Chinese economy in the past three decades and incubated its deeply intertwined challenges: shadow banking, the housing bubble, and local government debt. The China story isn’t sui generis—not once you see how contract-intensive markets expand in other autocracies. Authoritarian states produce authoritarian markets: markets with three coherent properties, the three “Rs”—rationed entry, reflective competition, and rigged regulation. I won’t give away details but post the epigraph to each chapter below :) I hope you find the book readable, rigorous, and refreshing—a different set of three Rs, but ones I hope characterize the book as much as its argument. Finally—here’s a promo code (40% off!): 09EXP40. #bookTabs=1" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/978150178… p.s. So many teachers and friends to thank---see my acknowledgement :)
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Zichen Wang
Zichen Wang@ZichenWanghere·
When China’s Industrial Policy Works — and When It Doesn’t Wei Chen and Shiping Tang @ShipingTang argue that China's industrial policy succeeds when a powerful lead agency can coordinate procurement, technology transfer, firm discipline, and research support. Excerpt from paper:
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Fengming Lu
Fengming Lu@FengmingLuPE·
@vshih2 @ShipingTang Thanks, Victor. In this paper, we talked briefly about failures and losses in the conclusion due to the word limit. In my follow-up projects, I will talk about failures under different models and how they are dealt with in greater details. Thanks again for your great suggestions.
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Victor Shih
Victor Shih@vshih2·
@ShipingTang Thanks will read. I read Fengming’s paper but these cases do not talk about the failed cases and how financial losses are dealt with. I think that’s an important part of the story
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Shiping Tang
Shiping Tang@ShipingTang·
Some (shameless) piggybacking: Chen Wei and I actually published a piece on China's industrial policies earlier, not on EV, but on high-speed train. Sadly, we did not get much attention at all, guess because we focus on a centrally-planned case! tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.108…
Xiao Ma@maxiaoalex

🚗🔋 Many think Beijing masterfully planned China's EV takeover. Fengming Lu (@ANUBellSchool ) and I spent 3 years and 60+ interviews finding out what actually happened in our latest article @TheChinaJournal. A thread 🧵

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Enthusiasm × Sarcasm
Enthusiasm × Sarcasm@Enthusiasm2024·
本人汽车行业从业近15年(2004-2018),这里面关键之一是一个准生证问题。 你有生产汽车的能力,但工信部其实对要进入汽车生产的企业有严格的审核流程。基本上三大国企(一汽,二汽(东风),和上汽)和他们的合资公司(SGM/SVW等)才能通过。 所以对于民企的奇瑞,吉利比亚迪确实有个巨大的门槛。
Fengming Lu@FengmingLuPE

Why did private firms, not state-owned enterprises (SOEs), come to dominate China’s EV sector? My new @ChinaJournal article (co-authored with Xiao Ma @maxiaoalex) challenge the "top-down industrial policy" narrative. The real engine? Strategic alliances between local governments and private capital. 🧵 Based on 3+ years of fieldwork, 60+ interviews (with officials, entrepreneurs, and engineers), and rich first-hand accounts, we show how strict central regulations inadvertently drove local states to bet big on private EV players. Here is the story: (1/15)

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Fengming Lu
Fengming Lu@FengmingLuPE·
Thanks, Kyle, for your warm recommendation! Btw, the photo in this post is an interview of Mr. Yin Tongyue, Chery's CEO since its foundation, in 2001. I first read it 25 years ago. He was quite frank. If you read Chinese, you will find that the interview itself speaks volume.
Kyle Chan@kyleichan

Wuhu-> Chery Baoding -> Great Wall Motors Zhejiang -> Geely Even before EVs, there was a new generation of Chinese automakers built on “local-private alliances.” Great thread 👇

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Donald J. Gorbachev
Donald J. Gorbachev@donaldgorbachev·
三年田野调查,六十个访谈,一篇China Journal,块”EV专家”招牌挂咗几年——然后畀一张卡片激到瞓唔着,憋咗成十个钟,挤出嚟九个字。仲要係抄返厨房把刀,加个撚字当原创。后生仔,呢个就係你条产线嘅产能?难怪转行写论文。 你问厨房造过几多架车?睇清楚块招牌先,呢度写嘅係厨房,唔係车厂。厨房唔做车——唔係做唔到,係睇唔上。车呢行,公差去到几条丝就算交货,监管盖个章就放行,出咗事召回搞掂。厨房出身嗰几个行头,公差比车紧,监管比车恶,出事唔係召回咁简单。边几行?唔话你知。厨房唔挂招牌。挂招牌嗰个係你——“车迷三十年·EV专家”,自己写,自己钉,而家畀人照住块招牌点菜,就发烂渣。 而且你谂清楚自己做咗乜:嗰条问题係照你块招牌度身订做嘅,你原封不动掉返转头,即係企喺大庭广众同全场讲——呢条问题,我都觉得伤。多谢确认。厨房连追问都慳返。 至于”乜都唔撚识”——讲得啱,厨房乜都唔识,仲一蚊都唔收。但係一个乜都唔识、分文不取嘅厨房,喺你开工做田野之前三年,已经识晒你两个”重大发现”。所以条数係咁计嘅:免费嘅嘢赢咗你收费嘅嘢,咁唔係厨房叻,係你件货唔值钱。 仲有,教授,讲你嗰篇早就出咗街,张卡仲印埋你个履历。你读完,谂咗一晚,倾尽三十年功力,反击係借厨房条问题加一个字。呢个数据点先至最伤:全场最贵嘅专家,回帖要问对家借刀。 本来真係留咗对手套畀你。而家睇返你呢种出货速度同质量——手套收返,扫把先啱你。产线缺人手,唔缺你呢只手。 落地。
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Fengming Lu
Fengming Lu@FengmingLuPE·
很高兴看到我们最近发表在 @TheChinaJournal 的论文被纳入一些读书摘要和研究简报之中,也感谢作者们对这篇文章的关注。 不过,任何几百字的摘要都难免会简化一篇上万字论文的论证。对于希望引用、讨论或进一步使用本文观点的读者,我还是建议直接阅读原文,而不要仅依赖二手摘要。 I'm grateful to see our recent @TheChinaJournal article being discussed and included in various digests and reading lists. As is often the case, however, short summaries necessarily simplify a much longer argument. For readers interested in citing or engaging with the paper, I would encourage consulting the article itself rather than relying solely on secondary summaries. 📖 Read the full article at@ChinaJournal: (in comment)
何頻@MJTVHoPin

x.com/i/article/2065…

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CY2026
CY2026@CY20260212·
@FengmingLuPE @ChinaJournal @maxiaoalex You are probably not aware that there was a time, in the 90’s, when most coal mines were privately owned and operated. Then they were all forced to sell to SOEs. Learning some history would do you good.
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Fengming Lu
Fengming Lu@FengmingLuPE·
其实我的研究也会涉及这些问题。一部分在后续的研究里(当然早期从零到一的部分也并非是完全国家主导),另一部分在我们的这篇文章里,请各位同行去读全文。 另外需要注意的是,西方传统汽车大国在从零到一做的并不差。我们不要忘了,十年前全球电动车和插电混动(包括增程)的领导者除了特斯拉,还有Nissan Leaf, Chevrolet Volt和VW e-Golf。理解一到一百的过程,对于中国电动车产业的崛起同样重要,因为中国真正拉开身位是在这个阶段。 最后需要指出的是,实际上这并非是刻板印象中西方市场经济的无序竞争。民营企业也得到了地方政府很大的支持,有的甚至是地方政府创办的。另一方面,中国现在电动车产业的巨头大多脱胎自我们论文中概括的这一模式,如比亚迪、吉利、奇瑞、赛力斯,以及新势力如蔚来、小鹏、理想、零跑都是如此。为什么这类企业没有出现在美国、欧洲、日本、韩国?这本身就是一个值得思考的问题。
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何頻
何頻@MJTVHoPin·
我收到一位研究者的回應(後續可能還有): 如果这本书叫《中国是如何把电动车产业发展起来的?》,那陆教授的报告就是60-100页,可以叫“过去十年中国电动车的发展”部分。但这部分西方其实都会,基本都是市场经济法则下的无序竞争,西方基本不用学,中国都是从你们那儿抄的。但要回答西方疑惑的大问题“如何从零发展到今天的状态的?”,那这本书的前面60页就是空白的。
Fengming Lu@FengmingLuPE

多謝何老闆的大力推薦!大約從2008至2018年,政府採購是中國電動車產業發展中很重要的一環。當時大部分動力電池企業的主要業務都來自政府採購車輛,而一部分成立比較早的電動車車企(如比亞迪),很大一塊業務也是地方政府採購的公交車與出租車(如深圳、長沙、太原等)。這在我們的論文中有所涉及,因為這也是民營資本與地方政府聯盟中很重要的一部分,但由於篇幅有限未能詳述。我之後的論文與專著將對這一方面的產業政策有詳細論述,敬請期待! 然而,畢竟政府採購的規模與汽車企業的規模經濟要求(一年至少8-10萬輛)相去甚遠,隨著2018年後個人用車成為新能源汽車消費主流,依賴政府採購的企業逐步掉隊。這也是為何政府採購起到的作用是階段性的。如北汽新能源長期依賴北京市採購的出租車、公務車及網約車,2020年以後日子就很不好過。

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Fengming Lu
Fengming Lu@FengmingLuPE·
多謝何老闆的大力推薦!大約從2008至2018年,政府採購是中國電動車產業發展中很重要的一環。當時大部分動力電池企業的主要業務都來自政府採購車輛,而一部分成立比較早的電動車車企(如比亞迪),很大一塊業務也是地方政府採購的公交車與出租車(如深圳、長沙、太原等)。這在我們的論文中有所涉及,因為這也是民營資本與地方政府聯盟中很重要的一部分,但由於篇幅有限未能詳述。我之後的論文與專著將對這一方面的產業政策有詳細論述,敬請期待! 然而,畢竟政府採購的規模與汽車企業的規模經濟要求(一年至少8-10萬輛)相去甚遠,隨著2018年後個人用車成為新能源汽車消費主流,依賴政府採購的企業逐步掉隊。這也是為何政府採購起到的作用是階段性的。如北汽新能源長期依賴北京市採購的出租車、公務車及網約車,2020年以後日子就很不好過。
何頻@MJTVHoPin

剛剛有一位對中國電動車發展很有研究的投資家對我說,他認為陸鳳鳴教授的研究有突破性的洞見,但沒有對幾代政府官員的訪問,是重要的缺失。例如,政府採購,對電動車的發展有非常大的幫助,不能忽視。

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Fengming Lu
Fengming Lu@FengmingLuPE·
It is largely a myth that cheap credit from the state-owned banking system drives Chinese tech sectors. If you read annual reports of Chinese EV makers, you’ll find that most rely on equity financing or alternative forms of financing (like delayed repayment to suppliers).
Zichen Wang@ZichenWanghere

OECD's Subsidy-Centric Narrative of China’s Emerging Industries Is Increasingly Flawed & Outdated: CF40 Zhu He & Guo Kai examine over 5,300 A-share companies & argue they are increasingly driven by internal cash flow, equity financing, $ profitability rather than cheap credit

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Zichen Wang
Zichen Wang@ZichenWanghere·
OECD's Subsidy-Centric Narrative of China’s Emerging Industries Is Increasingly Flawed & Outdated: CF40 Zhu He & Guo Kai examine over 5,300 A-share companies & argue they are increasingly driven by internal cash flow, equity financing, $ profitability rather than cheap credit
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CNBC
CNBC@CNBC·
The rush of capital into China’s tech start-up world hit a speed bump this month. Within hours of each other last Friday, a Chinese city government ordered companies to disclose their financial ties to robot vacuum maker Dreame Technology, and China’s State Council issued sweeping rules to tighten oversight of the country’s 23 trillion yuan ($3.4 trillion) private fund industry. Click here to read more: cnb.cx/4uwPEsC
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