History With Izzy

Part 1/4 - OTD 160-years ago - The Battle of Bentonville, NC, March 19-21, 1865 (continued from yesterday - a thread 🧵) The Three Days of Battle The Battle of Bentonville: Day One (March 19, 1865) By March 18, Johnston had selected his battlefield at Bentonville and began deploying his forces. The terrain offered several advantages for the outnumbered Confederates. The area featured dense woods, marshy ground, and limited approach routes, restricting the Union army's ability to fully utilize its superior numbers. Johnston positioned his army along the Goldsboro Road, with Lieutenant General Alexander Stewart's Army of Tennessee corps and Hardee's corps concealed in the woods north of the road, while Major General Robert Hoke's division blocked the road itself. Johnston's plan was straightforward but ambitious: he would block Slocum's advance with Hoke's division while Stewart's and Hardee's troops would launch a surprise attack from the north, hopefully crushing Slocum's left flank and driving the Federals back in confusion. Meanwhile, Hampton's cavalry would screen against Howard's more distant Right Wing. The morning of March 19 began with bright sunshine, creating a deceptively peaceful atmosphere. Sherman, believing Johnston remained far to the north near Raleigh, had already departed to join Howard's wing, leaving Slocum to advance with the Left Wing. When Slocum's lead elements encountered Confederate resistance, they initially believed they faced only cavalry and minor infantry detachments—a severe miscalculation. Around noon, Brigadier General William P. Carlin's division of the XIV Corps advanced to develop what they presumed to be a small enemy force. Instead, they marched directly into Johnston's trap. At approximately 2:45 p.m., Johnston unleashed his main assault. As recorded in the Official Records, the Confederate attack fell with tremendous force upon Carlin's unsuspecting division. The official report of Brigadier General James D. Morgan stated: "The enemy attacked in force at 2:30 p.m., but our troops rallied and held their ground." This understated assessment belied the severity of the situation. In reality, the Confederate assault overwhelmed Carlin's division, capturing two cannons and sending Union troops fleeing in disorder. The intensity of the Confederate attack is evident in the report of Colonel Harrison C. Hobart of the 21st Wisconsin: "The enemy appeared suddenly in our front in heavy force... Their line of battle extended beyond our left, and they advanced rapidly, with terrific yells. The regiments on my left gave way in confusion." The collapse of Carlin's division created a dangerous situation for Slocum's entire wing. However, the Union forces soon stabilized their position along a ridge near the farm of Reddick Morris, where Morgan's division held firm against repeated Confederate assaults. The arrival of the XX Corps under Brigadier General Alpheus S. Williams further reinforced the Union line. By late afternoon, Slocum had established a strong defensive position in the shape of an inverted "V," with both flanks refused and well-supported by artillery. Johnston continued to launch attacks throughout the remainder of the day, particularly against the Union left flank, but failed to achieve the decisive breakthrough he needed. Among these attacks was a notable charge by the remnants of the Army of Tennessee across an open cotton field—an action later memorialized as "The Last Grand Charge of the Army of Tennessee." This poignant episode, where diminished Confederate regiments advanced with parade-ground precision despite withering fire, is detailed separately (in a “sidebar” post) as it represents the final major offensive action by this storied Confederate army. As darkness fell, both armies entrenched their positions. The first day's fighting ended with mixed results. Johnston had achieved tactical surprise and inflicted approximately 1,200 casualties on Slocum's wing, but had failed to destroy the Union force before reinforcements could arrive. Union Brigadier General William Cogswell's brigade of the XX Corps had arrived at a critical moment, helping to secure the Federal line and preventing Johnston from exploiting his initial success. The Battle Continues: Day Two (March 20, 1865) The second day of battle saw a significant shift in the strategic situation. During the night, Sherman received urgent messages from Slocum reporting the encounter with Johnston's entire army. Surprised but adaptable, Sherman immediately ordered Howard's Right Wing to march toward Bentonville to reinforce Slocum. As Howard's leading elements approached the battlefield by midday on March 20, the balance of forces tipped decisively against Johnston. Johnston, recognizing the changing circumstances, altered his strategy from offense to defense. He withdrew Hoke's division from its advanced position and established a new defensive line in the shape of a "V" with the apex pointing toward the Union position. This configuration allowed Johnston to protect his only escape route—a bridge over Mill Creek—while maintaining the ability to resist Sherman's now-united army. The second day saw limited combat, primarily consisting of skirmishing and artillery exchanges as both sides adjusted their positions. Sherman, now present on the battlefield, chose not to launch a general assault against Johnston's entrenched position. As Sherman later wrote in his memoirs: "I had no wish to drive him [Johnston] from his position, for he would have been compelled to retire to Raleigh, and could there have been reinforced; so that I rather wanted him to remain at Bentonville until Schofield and Terry could reach Goldsboro." Johnston, for his part, maintained his defensive posture, hoping Sherman might attempt a frontal assault against his prepared positions. According to Johnston's post-war writings, he believed such an assault would result in heavy Union casualties and potentially restore Confederate morale. When no such assault materialized, Johnston began preparing for an eventual withdrawal. Day Three and Mower's Charge (March 21, 1865) The final day of battle produced the most dramatic moment of the engagement. While Sherman continued to avoid a general assault, Major General Joseph A. Mower, commanding a division of the XVII Corps on the Union right flank, received permission to conduct a "reconnaissance in force" against the Confederate left. What began as a reconnaissance quickly transformed into something far more significant. Around noon, Mower's division pushed through difficult swampy terrain and unexpectedly broke through the Confederate flank. Within moments, Mower's troops had advanced to within half a mile of Johnston's headquarters and the vital Mill Creek bridge—the Confederates' only escape route. This critical moment is vividly described in the Official Records. According to Confederate General Hardee's report: "The enemy advanced with vigor, but were met with a determined counterattack." The severity of the situation compelled Hardee to personally lead a counterattack, utilizing any available troops, including the 8th Texas Cavalry. In this desperate action, Hardee's 16-year-old son, Willie, was mortally wounded while charging with the Texas cavalry. After fierce fighting, the Confederates successfully repelled Mower's advance, preserving their escape route. Sherman, upon learning of Mower's unauthorized advance, ordered him to withdraw to his original position. This decision has been debated by historians ever since, as Mower's attack—had it been reinforced—might have trapped Johnston's entire army. Sherman later explained his reasoning: "I checked Mower's pursuit, as I did not want to drive Johnston's army into Raleigh... I thought he would retreat during the night." Sherman's prediction proved correct. Having narrowly escaped disaster, Johnston ordered a withdrawal during the night of March 21-22. By morning, the Confederate army had crossed Mill Creek and was retreating toward Smithfield. Graphics: 1) March 19th Overview Map of Major Confederate Attacks; 2) Day One Detailed Tactical Map – March 19; 3) Day Two Detailed Tactical Map – March 20; 4) Day Three Tactical Map – March 21

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