Jason Liebel

@buccocapital Hey but you can buy this endless stream of losses for only 11x sales now!

Snowflake net income chart cracks me up. Wrong way, gentlemen

@irbezek Ha, well put

If $FICO at 40x GAAP earnings and 30x EBITDA is apparently a consensus "value" stock, it's time to retire the idea of value investing. It had a good run. And now it's done.

I am incredibly disappointed the federal government announced plans to remove the extremely important and used protected bike lane on 15th Street along the National Mall. This is one of the most popular bike lanes in the District and it connects DC residents and visitors to Downtown to the Wharf and to Virginia. This is an important avenue to keep pedestrians and bicyclists safe, and to keep bikes and scooters off the sidewalks in these high traffic areas. I am working on alternatives to protect this bike lane. I will keep you posted.

@DrewCohenMoney Thanks! What was giving me pause is that the total impact of the debt discount is getting captured across time on all 3 financial statements, whereas the SBC impact on a shareholder is not. But if you’re creating a FCF multiple based on a single period, then this makes sense.

So the thing is when you issue a bond you can either “pay” cash interest expense or instead take less money upfront and pay the debt holder back in full later. So if you issue a bond for $100, you may sell it for only $90. The difference if $10 is real money the company will have to payout in the future. It doesn’t show up like cash interest expense though, instead it is amortized. Since this is a non cash adjustment, it is added back to operating cash flow. So doing this in theory a company could issue debt and never capture the interest paid on it (because it only flows through the financing cash flow). The idea of backing it out, is basically treating it as cash interesting because it eventually will be cash paid out

Most investors know to back out SBC from the cash flow statement... But a rarer adjustment is backing out the amortization of a debt discount. When a bond is issued below par, instead of paying interest in cash, a portion is "paid" by them collecting less money upfront.

@JoshYohe_PGH And he had 4 pts in his first game back!

Random Mario stat for fun: He took off the '94-95 season for health reasons. After not playing in almost two years (and during a time when scoring was way, way down) he went 28-42-70 in his first 25 games of the '95-96 season.

@Kross_Roads I am not sure this is a good comparison for a few reasons. “However, should the share price fall substantially, like it did with $FISV …” $CRM already took the fall and is down over 50%.

$CRM is taking a page out of the $FISV book by using a large amount of debt to finance buybacks. Let's look at $FI / $FISV and the impact of such a move. Fiserv is a serial acquirer, much like Salesforce. And like Salesforce, they generate plenty of cash. Yet this cash wasn't enough to meet the buyback demands of the company and shareholders. They took on debt, partly for acquisition reasons, and partly for buybacks back in 2029; debt that represents 6x their FCF. Share count has diminished substantially from the peak of 680m shares in 2029 to 534m shares today, good for a 21.5% reduction of the float. That's nice. However, the cost has been substantial. While Fiserv took on debt at exceptionally low rates for the most part, they are spending $1.5b to finance the debt. When compared to their $4.3b FCF in 2025, that looks sustainable, but it doesn't paint the whole picture, especially when some of this cheap debt matures. They've effectively retired 146m shares since 2019 and their direct share repurchases have totaled $24.4b at an average share price of $167 per share. $FISV now trades under $60 per share. My contention is that Fiserv would have been materially better off with moderate buybacks that stabilized the float, not dipping into the debt bucket to try to accelerate buybacks on top of maintaining their acquisition strategy. $CRM is a different company in a different situation, true. Their balance sheet looks fairly healthy (though note some smoke / mirrors via Goodwill, similar to most serial acquirers), and they generate an impressive amount of FCF. However, should the share price fall substantially, like it did with $FISV as growth fell, this effectively is leveraging their future. It's a risk they shouldn't be taking here, in my opinion.

@nikitabier Can you get rid of the bots that impersonate popular finance accounts and say, "My strategic plan!" below nearly every post? They are directing folks to scam services.

@paulcerro Absolutely. Definitely needs active risk management and a tolerance for pain

@JasonLiebel yea but it's been super hard over the last year or so given how stupid the market is at rewarding things that are obvious shorts

We shared our IPO notes on $OFRM last week (no position), but didn't see how the valuation warranted the growth it was having We don't like valuation shorts, but we also wanted to wait for clarity from their first earnings release Guide came in lackluster. Stock down 18% in AHs

@fundiescapital LOL

Put a fork in them, they are dead. $ADBE

@BlueDuckCap Same. I’m fascinated by $EVLV after earnings… today it’s down more than a lot of total garbage stocks.

Days like this we tend to add to our cheapest long ideas. And we keep hedges on in case the market gets worse, which certainly remains a possibility.

@stoic_point Good point. The price action since earnings is a bit of a head-scratcher.

How much could this expansion be worth? $EVLV disclosed in Q3 that original deal was $15mm for 24 HS and 29 MS. There are 81 elementary schools… *Also GA is advancing a bill to fund this for all districts

@stoic_point @paulcerro On top of all that management is handling themselves well.

$EVLV: none of this is investment advice. Big beat & raise w/ guidance well above Street (Revs +7% points from prior guide and ARR +5% points). 1. No one else comes close to $EVLV: standout growth + profit hard to find anywhere in publics. Exactly a year ago new mgmt guided ’25 at 23% growth & LSD-MSD EBITDA margins. Actual ’25 results: 40% rev growth & 8% EBITDA margins. Leading to point #2… 2. 2026 guidance is again conservative. How? Simple math: ’25 ending ARR $121mm + (at least) 2,000 net adds in ’26 @ $16k ARR/unit (at least) = ending ’26 ARR of $153mm, already well above guide of $145-150mm. What's more: ARR/unit will be higher this year and biz will “comfortably” end w/ over 10k units. 3. Valuation: one could say “5x sales is high…”etc. Ok what EBITDA multiple do you pay for 20-30%+ growth & high-teens to 20% EBITDA margins. Is 15x, 20x, 30x expensive? Expect in 12 months or less Street will be looking at EBITDA valuation and not a Sales multiple. Why? Operating leverage in this biz is massive…EBITDA margins went from -20% to 8% in a year. How? CAC, calculated as (Sales & Marketing $/ Unit Adds) dropped 27% YoY in 2025. Said another way it cost almost 1/3 less to each sell a unit. Thanks to: larger & multi-product deals, land & expand (50% of sales), and operational excellence by the former $MSI team (CEO, CFO and CRO). June 9th investor day should elucidate much of this. Again no price targets or recommendations, just thoughts on continued standout results. Disclaimer: note this post is not an offer or solicitation to buy/sell any security and is also not investment advice. Investors should conduct their own research or consult their financial advisor prior to making any investment decision.

@Uzocapital Well done!

$TALK is acquired for $5.25. Shouldnt complain as its +150% since my pitch/write up 18 months ago, but agreeing to a single digit takeout premium is extremely disappointing. Side note: this is my third de-spac holding to be taken out in 12 months!

@evantindell @MikeFritzell Well done, thanks for sharing your letter.

We sent out our Q4 2025 letter. Warning: it's long. biremecapital.com/blog/the-end-o… We were +33% for the year, after a rough 2024. Inside, we issue a broad criticism of the Trump administration's actions across various domains, from its weaponization of DoJ prosecutions, to the corruption of the Trump family's crypto businesses, to the "systematic attack on science and technocracy". We also go in on what we call "vibe investing", the fact-lite method of speculation that took the number of multi-billion market cap, pre-revenue companies to highs not seen since the 2021 SPAC bubble. $QBTS $JOBY $OKLO $ONDS etc. Amazingly, these stocks still have no material cost to borrow. In addition, we share our short thesis on $AAPL as well as give our views on how the "Alchemist fallacy" may pertain to AI-related businesses. Finally, we describe a few investments we made in 2025, from SoftwareOne $SWON.SW to $PINFRA to $3445.JP and give an update on the amazing run had by Airtel Africa $AAF.LN. As always, none of this is investment advice and past performance does not guarantee future results!

@RagingVentures Interesting, thanks!

@JasonLiebel $TOST at $26 is very different than at $40+. AI is an opportunity, not a threat, for them.

You may have to hold your nose, but my bet is that a basket of current perceived AI losers such as $WDAY / $TOST / $BL / $HUBS nicely outperforms perceived AI winners such as $MU / $SNDK / $BE / $GLW over the next 18 months. Valuation matters more than good looks. Godspeed!

@Fierce__beast SPOT got really expensive. Not sure you need to dig much further than that to explain the last 6 months. But the business has done well as you say.

short thesis for $SPOT or $NDAQ? sold off with saas but why? earnings/revenue trends are up, and they are both basically monopolies in their respective niches. also with NDAQ does a potential IPO of OpenAi/Anthropic or other AI stocks benefit them?

@Ross__Hendricks @WeCanShootToo Absolutely. The crazy dispersion creates great setups if you can short. Expected return on the US market overall looks unappealing.

@WeCanShootToo it's a market of stocks, not a stock market many businesses trading at decade-low valuations or lower

This "AI disruption" panic will turn out to be one of the silliest overreactions and greatest mispricing events in recent history Generational buying opportunities are being created from sheer ignorance